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Essays on Price and Welfare
Misaki Matsumura
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on price and welfare. The first chapter
investigates the optimal price index for central banks to stabilize in a model economy where
volatile prices are harmful to welfare through monetary friction. The second chapter esti-
mates the impact of recent technological innovation, namely the internet, on the dynamics
of prices and welfare through a variety of real mechanisms. The third chapter analyzes the
impact of financial regulation on the prices of financial assets and the welfare of the financial
market participants.
There is currently a debate about what price index central banks should target when
economies are open and exposed to international price shocks. Chapter 1 derives the opti-
mal price index by solving the Ramsey problem in a New Keynesian small open economy
model with an arbitrary number of sectors. This approach improves on existing theoretical
benchmarks because (1) it makes an explicit distinction between the consumer price index
(CPI) and the producer price index (PPI), and (2) it allows exogenous international price
shocks to play a role. Qualitatively, I use the analytical expression of the optimal price index
to discuss that popular indices, such as the PPI and the core/headline CPI, are suboptimal
because they ignore the heterogeneity in price stickiness and the effect of inflation on the
trade surplus. Quantitatively, I calibrate a 35-sector version of the model for 40 countries
and show that stabilizing the optimal price index yields significantly higher welfare than
alternative indices.
In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Yoon J. Jo and David Weinstein, we estimate the
impact of e-commerce on Japanese prices and welfare. First, we consider the possibility that
e-commerce may have lowered prices by driving down the average prices of goods available
online. Second, we compute the welfare gains due to the ability of e-commerce to enable
consumers to purchase goods from other regions. Third, we compute the gains that arise
through e-commerce’s ability to arbitrage intercity price differences. We find that all three
channels produced welfare gains in Japan, but our estimates suggest that the first and
second channels are by far the most important, with welfare gains through these channels
being eleven to sixteen times larger than through the price arbitrage channel. Overall, we
find that increased inter-city arbitrage raised Japanese welfare by 0.12 percent, the gains
due to new varieties available through online shopping raised welfare 0.7 percent, and the
gains due to overall price reductions for goods available online raised welfare by 1 percent.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Sakai Ando, we analyze the impact of dealer
regulation on price quality (informativeness and volatility) and its implications for the welfare
of market participants. We argue that although price informativeness, volatility, and the
dealer’s profitability all deteriorate, against conventional wisdom, other market participants
are better off due to the dealer’s risk-shifting motive. A static model is used to clarify
the main intuition, and the robustness of the welfare results, as well as the fragility of
the conventional wisdom about price quality, are discussed by incorporating dynamics and
endogenizing information acquisition.
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Chapter 1
What Price Index Should Central
Banks Target?




As many small open economies (SOEs) have shifted their monetary policy from exchange
rate pegs to inflation targeting policies, there has been growing interest in which price index
they should target. The theory of optimal monetary policy with a multi-sector economy can
be used to answer this question, as in Aoki (2001) and Woodford (2010), but such analyses so
far have been limited to closed economy setups, leaving open economy questions unanswered,
such as the effect of international commodity prices and the role of trade patterns. This lack
of the optimal price index theory in an open economy underlies the ongoing debate over the
choice between, for instance, the headline consumer price index (CPI) versus the core CPI
or the CPI versus the producer price index (PPI).
In this paper, I derive the optimal price index for open economies to stabilize by solving
the problem of a central bank attempting to maximize household welfare, i.e., a Ramsey
problem. I call the derived index the Ramsey price index (RPI) and present its analytical
formula. Due to the openness of my model, the index depends on the export share of output
in each sector in addition to the parameters studied in closed economy models such as the
consumption share, price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution. By calibrating the
model to 40 countries with 35 sectors, I find that (1) RPI stabilization performs better for
all countries in terms of welfare than headline CPI, core CPI, or PPI stabilization and (2)
the ranking of the indices other than the RPI differs across countries.
To derive the optimal price index, I begin with the multi-sector DSGE model with output
price stickiness analyzed in Woodford (2010). The use of a multi-sector model is necessary
to answer my research question since different price indices arise due to the difference in
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weights applied to the prices in different sectors. Output price stickiness is the key monetary
friction in my model and the workhorse model in the literature, in keeping with extensive
empirical evidence (see Nakamura and Steinsson 2008, for example). Under output price
stickiness, volatile inflation causes mispricing by firms, leading to welfare-damaging inefficient
production activities.
As the key departure from Woodford (2010), I allow each sector in the economy to
export a part of its output. This openness allows for a difference between CPI and PPI
because when the economy can trade, what is produced is not necessarily consumed. The
choice between the two indices is often the focus of monetary policy discussions especially
for commodity exporters and developing countries. For instance, Frankel (2010) numerically
analyzes Latin American commodity exporters and concludes that producer price based
indices better perform than consumer price based indices in terms of price stability. India
changed its target index from PPI to CPI in 2016; see Rajan (2016). The existing theoretical
framework is not suitable to answer this type of question since the consumption based weight
coincides with the production based weight1.
Another key feature of my model is the use of an SOE setup rather than a two-country
setup. This is to capture the notion of international price movement that is exogenous to the
economy. The Bank of Japan, for example, argued that the movement of the international
oil price was the most important reason that it failed to achieve its inflation target; see
Kawamoto and Nakahama (2017). The SOE framework allows me to answer the question of
whether the economy should bear such volatility in inflation that is caused by international
1The input-output structure is another reason that the PPI and CPI can differ. I focus on the difference
arising from the trade in this paper.
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price changes.
In this multi-sector New Keynesian (NK) SOE DSGE environment, I solve the Ramsey
problem and obtain the optimal price index that remains constant in the long-run expectation
under the Ramsey solution. This means that my proposed optimal price index is based on
welfare maximization rather than an arbitrary objective. The welfare maximization problem
is subject to optimizing behaviors of the representative household and firms under monetary
frictions. The use of the Ramsey framework also means that the monetary policy considered
in this paper is not limited to a particular class of monetary policy such as the Taylor rule.
Despite the generality of the choice of monetary policy, I show that, in the long-run, a
particular price index remains constant. I explore the property of this RPI qualitatively and
quantitatively.
The key trade-off between stabilizing one price index versus another can be understood
by considering the cost of volatile inflation rates in the sectors with lower weight in each
price index. Therefore, the resulting optimal price index takes the form of a weighted sum
of the prices in different sectors, where the weight assigned to each sector reflects the cost of
inflation in each sector. In other words, in a multi-sector environment, the inflation rates of
all the sectors cannot be stabilized simultaneously following a shock that leads to a relative
price change. For example, when a change in world demand lowers the efficient relative
price of oil, the central bank needs to essentially choose one of two options: (1) a stable oil
price and an increase in non-oil price and (2) a stable non-oil price and a decrease in the oil
price. Given this trade-off, we should stabilize the price of the sector with the higher cost of
inflation.
My first main result is the analytical formula for the RPI. In particular, I highlight three
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lessons from the formula. The first two lessons come from each of the two components of the
formula. The formula is a weighted sum of different log prices in different sectors, where the
weight represents the welfare cost of inflation in each sector. I show that the weight consists
of two parts, one representing the size of the sector and the other representing the sensitivity
of the production wedge to inflation in the sector. I also show that the RPI formula does
not directly depend on international prices. The third lesson comes from what is not in the
formula.
The first lesson from the first component of the RPI is that the size of the sector in the RPI
weight needs to be measured in terms of the production size rather than the consumption size.
This is because the cost of inflation in my model is the efficiency loss in production. If there
is inefficiency in production, it is welfare damaging either through reduced consumption,
more work or a negative effect on the trade balance, which affects the economy through
a tighter budget constraint. Therefore, regardless of whether its output is consumed or
exported, inefficiency in production is costly in a sector that is large in terms of production.
An implication of this is that the central banks should stabilize PPI rather than CPI if
everything else is constant. However, there is a caveat in this simple takeaway, as my
quantitative analysis shows that the stabilization of PPI does not necessarily perform better
than CPI stabilization due to the second component of the RPI weight.
The second component of the RPI weight is a combination of a well-known stickiness
parameter and less frequently highlighted but equally important parameter, representing the
elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods within a sector. These two parameters
govern the sensitivity of inefficiency to inflation in the sector in question. The mechanism
comprises two steps. First, volatile inflation causes mispricing by the firms in a sector.
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This step depends on the degree of price stickiness. Second, mispricing leads to deviations
of demand and production from the efficient level. This step depends on the elasticity of
substitution.
The addition of sectoral heterogeneity in the elasticity of substitution provides the second
lesson that is important when we discuss core inflation targeting versus headline inflation
targeting. Recall that the difference between the two measures is whether they include
commodity prices such as food and energy2. While the literature to date has focused on one
characteristic of commodities, namely price flexibility, the high elasticity of substitution is
also an important characteristic3. As is standard in the conventional argument, if we base
our decision only on the price flexibility of different sectors, we should assign a lower weight
to commodity sectors and thus favor the use of core inflation targeting. However, if we focus
on the latter characteristic, we should place greater weight on commodity sectors. Given my
analytical formula, whether we should place less weight on prices in commodity sectors or
not depends on the relative size of price flexibility and elasticity.
The third lesson from the analytical formula is that exogenous international prices do
not appear in it. This is despite the fact that I naturally model the effect of exogenous
international prices. In my model, the firms respond to the change in the cost of imported
material caused by the change in the international price of inputs. The firms also know that
a deviation of their export price from those of their international competitors results in a
change in export demand. I show that these international prices affect the optimal price
2Although the original definition of the core inflation rate involves econometric models that attempt to
identify the persistent component of the inflation rate (see, for example, Wynne 2008), the optimal monetary
policy literature has practically interpreted the core index as an index excluding food and energy.
3See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) on price flexibility and Broda and Weinstein (2006)on the elasticity
of substitution.
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index if and only if they affect the output prices of domestic sectors. This is because volatile
inflation causes efficiency loss in production regardless of the cause of the volatility, and
thus, we do not need to adjust the formula for the price index depending on whether such
volatility comes from international prices.
As an implication, although we may tend to think that central banks are not responsible
for inflation volatility caused by international price movements, a central bank should be
concerned about volatility as long as it affects the RPI. To understand this point, note that
although international prices are exogenous, domestic prices can be controlled via changes
in the exchange rate. Imagine an economy where all the domestic prices of different sectors
are proportional to the international prices in those sectors. The ratio between the vector
of international prices and the vector of domestic prices is the exchange rate. If the central
bank selects one domestic sector, it is possible to stabilize the domestic price of that sector
by adjusting the exchange rate to offset international price movements. Of course, this
operation affects all other sectors, so the central bank faces a trade-off between stabilizing
one sector and stabilizing another. The RPI indicates how to balance this trade-off.
My second main result is obtained from quantitative analysis, where I compare the welfare
under simple stabilization policies for the RPI and three conventional price indices. Here, a
simple stabilization policy means a policy in which the inflation rate in terms of the price
index in question is zero in both the short and long run. In reality, implementing these
policies via either Taylor rules or exchange rate interventions is simpler than implementing
the Ramsey solution itself. However, it is not obvious that the simple stabilization of the RPI
yields higher welfare than the stabilization of other price indices since the analytical result
only states the optimality of long-run stabilization of the RPI, and the Ramsey solution
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itself, in general, involves short-run deviations from complete stabilization.
Calibrating to 40 countries with 35 sectors, I show that, for all countries in my sample,
RPI stabilization performs the best among the stabilization schemes for the four indices
considered. The loss from a simple stabilization of the RPI compared with the Ramsey
solution turns out to be negligible and less than one-hundredth, on average, of the loss from
simple stabilization of the other indices in terms of steady-state consumption. This means
that the RPI is suitable not only for long-run stabilization targets but also for short-run
targets.
Another important point from the welfare calibration is that there is no simple takeaway
other than the RPI. This is because the ranking of other stabilization policies varies across
countries depending on the combination of trade patterns and price stickiness. That is, CPI
targeting performs better than PPI targeting for some countries while headline CPI performs
better than core CPI targeting for other countries, depending on the combination of price
stickiness, the elasticity of substitution, and trade patterns. The only result common to all
countries in my sample is that RPI stabilization performs better than the stabilization of
the other indices.
1.1.1 Related literature
This paper is an open economy extension of the method to derive the optimal price index
from the Ramsey problem developed in Woodford (2010). The price index in Woodford
(2010) can be obtained as a special case of the RPI proposed in this paper by letting the
exports in each sector be zero and requiring the elasticity of substitution to be homogeneous
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across sectors. However, the other direction, i.e., deriving the RPI from Woodford’s index,
is not straightforward. This is because the size of each sector in Woodford (2010) can
be interpreted either as the size of consumption or the size of production, and one might
suggest different open economy extensions of the index depending on the interpretation. My
analysis and the resulting formula for the RPI show that the correct interpretation is the
size of production.
This paper is the first to theoretically show that the size of sectors in the stabilization
objective should be measured by production size rather than consumption size in a multi-
sector SOE environment. A similar feature can be seen in the result of Gali and Monacelli
(2005), who demonstrate the optimality of output price stabilization in a model with only
one production sector. However, having multiple sectors is key to answering the question
of which price index to target since this creates the crucial trade-off between stabilizing one
sector versus another when the first-best allocation cannot be achieved. In particular, their
analysis cannot tell whether the result is coming from the assumption that there is only one
sector with sticky prices or the assumption that the economy produces in only one sector.
This makes it difficult to generalize their model to various trade patterns commonly observed
in the real world such as the commodity importing case. My general formula enables me to
separately discuss the effect of production and stickiness and can be applied not only to the
special case of Gali and Monacelli (2005) but also to the opposite polar case (commodity
exporter) and the intermediate cases.
There is a literature that analyzes the optimal monetary policy in two-country models
(see Corsetti et al. 2010 and Engel 2011, for examples) and the models of a monetary union
(see Gali and Monacelli (2008) and Kekre (2018), for examples). This paper differs from this
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literature in two senses. First, although, similarly to Woodford (2010) and this paper, these
papers often identify the central bank’s trade-off depending on price stickiness, they do not
derive the price index that balances the trade-off except for special cases that achieve the
first-best allocation. Second, the two-country setups of these papers are essentially closed
since the two countries (or the countries in the union) do not trade with the rest of the world.
Therefore, their framework cannot answer the question of how to deal with international price
movements.
In this paper, I use the term “optimal price index”, but the derived price index does not
necessarily coincide with the optimal indices in the literature on index theory: see Diewert
et al. (2009), for example. This is because the purposes of the index are different. In index
theory, Diewert et al. (2009) among others attempt to obtain an accurate measure of the
cost of living while my aim is to obtain the index for the central bank’s stabilization target.
By solving the household’s optimization condition in the partial equilibrium sense, we can
see that the CPI is the optimal price index in the sense of the cost of living in my model.
However, my analysis shows that the optimal price index for the central bank’s stabilization
target is different from the CPI. It is natural to obtain different optimal price indices for
different purposes.
From a technical point of view, the open economy extension in this paper involves two
innovations that are also applicable to other SOE problems. The first is the definition of the
Ramsey problem, which is consistent with the assumption of the timing of asset markets.
Specifically, the Ramsey planner needs to recognize that some of the effects of its policy
will be offset by the insurance effect of the asset market. In this way, I can compare the
central bank’s second-best problem with the planner’s first-best problem and offer intuitive
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discussions comparing the two. The definition of the Ramsey problem is in line with the
Ramsey taxation literature, but the previous NK SOE literature has defined the Ramsey
problem in a different way, and hence, the first-best allocation cannot serve as a benchmark
for the analysis. The definition of the Ramsey problem in this paper can simplify and clarify
the analysis by De Paoli (2009), for example, of the case of the inefficient steady state.
The second innovation of this paper is differential tax rates that depend on the place
of consumption, which allows me to simplify the analysis under terms of trade externalities
without relying on extreme assumptions on parameter values. This is another feature that
distinguishes my paper from Gali and Monacelli (2005), who impose a subsidy that partially
offsets steady-state inefficiency and eliminate the rest of inefficiency by setting a parameter
value such that the value of exports does not respond following any shock. I believe my novel
simplification is useful for monetary policy discussions under terms of trade externalities.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I first explain the SOE NK
DSGE model with which I define the Ramsey problem. In Section 3, I explain my analytical
results. I first state the key assumptions on tax rates that make the analysis simple before
approximating the Ramsey problem. The main theorem states that the RPI is stabilized
in the long run, which is the justification for my proposal of RPI stabilization. Section 4
discusses the quantitative welfare comparison. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1.2 Method
I derive the RPI by solving the Ramsey problem of a central bank attempting to maximize
the welfare of a representative household given market constraints in an SOE NK DSGE
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model. This section describes these market constraints and defines the Ramsey problem.
The economy features an arbitrary number of sectors with heterogeneous output price
stickiness a la Calvo (1983). There is no domestic input-output structure, but the produc-
tion requires labor and imported intermediate goods. The output can either be exported
or domestically consumed. When exported, the price is sticky in the producer currency.
Specifically, I denote the number of sectors by S ∈ N, within each of which, a continuum
of firms produce differentiated goods. The differentiated goods are aggregated within each
sector.
The economy is small and open in the sense that international conditions are exogenous.
The costs of imported materials are given by the exogenous international price times the
endogenous exchange rate. The price of exports is compared with the exogenous prevailing
price in the international market, to which the foreign demand for the country’s export
responds. The economy also takes the asset prices in complete international asset markets
as given.
The monetary authority attempts to maximize the welfare of the representative domestic
household, which consumes goods from all the sectors and provides labor. The monetary
authority takes the optimization behavior of the household and firms under staggered price
setting as given. It also takes exogenous international market conditions as given. I assume
the timeless perspective following Woodford (2003).
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1.2.1 Market conditions
Sectors are heterogeneous in price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution across differen-
tiated goods within a sector. The former is already identified as key to obtaining the optimal
price index in the closed economy literature. Although heterogeneity in the elasticity has
not been highlighted in the literature, it is quantitatively important and intuitive. That is,
a high elasticity of substitution implies that a small mispricing leads to a tremendous swing
in demand and is thus costly to welfare.
For the model to be applicable to different countries with different trade patterns, I use
a general production technology and a general trade pattern. By adjusting the parameter
of the production technology of my model, one can consider a country such as Japan im-
porting commodities, i.e., goods with flexible prices and high elasticities of substitution, and
exporting differentiated goods or a country such as Russia doing the opposite.
Compared to the common SOE framework featuring tradable goods and non-tradable
goods or that with home goods and foreign goods, the description of the production sector
is enriched such that any imported good goes through the domestic sector before being
consumed by the household. This allows me to treat different sectors uniformly despite the
generality. My model encompasses the common frameworks in the literature as special cases.
1.2.1.1 The representative household
In any period of time t ∈ [0,∞], the representative household consumes goods from each of
the S sectors denoted by Cst for s ∈ S and supplies labor, denoted by Lst, to each of the S
sectors. I assume that the amounts of consumption from different sectors are aggregated in
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a Cobb-Douglas function with the exponential factor ψs for sector s ∈ S summing up to one
∑





This implies that elasticity of substitution across sectors is one. This is the standard as-
sumption used in multi-sector NK models; see, for example, Aoki (2001) and Eusepi et al.
(2011).4For the labor supply, I simply assume homogeneous labor that can be summed. This
means that the disutility from labor depends only on the aggregate amount of work, not in





An alternative would be to assume increasing disutility from labor supplied to each firm in
each sector. This would increase the efficiency cost of price dispersion relative to my case.
Given prices {Pst}s∈S ,Wt, profits {Est}s∈S, a lump sum transfer Tt, all denominated in
the local currency, the pricing kernel in the international asset market M∗t , the exchange
rate Et, and the price Λ of initial debt D0, where the unit is in the utility in the pre-specified














4This does not mean that the assumption is without loss of generality. Benigno and Benigno (2003),
for example, demonstrate that relaxing the assumption of a unitary elasticity between a home good and a





































/ (1− σ) in the objective function represents the instan-
taneous utility from consumption from each sector {Cst}s∈S aggregated according to Ct =∏
s∈S C
ψs
st . The second term in the objective function represents the disutility from labor sup-
ply to each sector {Lst}s∈S. From the expenditure minimization problem, the CPI consistent




















I assume that the household trades in the international asset market before the mone-
15
tary authority chooses its policy. With this timing convention, the marginal utility for the
household of having less debt D0 is fixed at the exogenous level Λ across different possible
monetary policies. The constant Λ represents the shadow price of the initial debt in the
asset markets. This allows me to subsequently derive an international risk sharing condition
that is invariant across policies. The policy-invariant risk sharing condition is standard in
the literature, but how to consistently derive the condition in a DSGE setup has not been
fully explored. For further discussion, see Senay and Sutherland (2007).
The level of consumption is determined by the tightness of the lifetime budget constraint.
Denoting the aggregate consumption of a foreign country and its price by C∗t and P ∗t , we can
consider the stochastic discount factor to be equated to the ratio of marginal utilities of the
consumer in that foreign country between any two states of the world. In particular, if we
letM∗0,t =
∏t
τ=1M∗τ be the discount factor from period 0, or the planning period, to period
t in the future, then, assuming the same utility function for the foreign consumer consuming







under the assumption that the foreign consumer also has access to the same complete asset
markets. Gali and Monacelli (2005) also interpret the stochastic discount factor in this way.






Λ = βtC−σt EtP−1t .
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where Qt = EtP ∗t /Pt is the real exchange rate and ξ = (ΛP ∗0 )−
1
σ /C∗0 is a constant. For this
SOE, foreign consumption C∗t and the foreign consumption price level P ∗t are exogenous,
so is the stochastic discount factor M∗t . Note that if we do not assume the asset markets
that insure across different policies, we need to allow Λ to vary across policies and hence the
coefficient of the risk sharing condition also varies across policies.
1.2.1.2 The individual firm’s technology and aggregation
The production technology for firm i in sector s ∈ S is given by
Ysit + Y Xsit = Zs,tMαsmsit L
αsl
sit .
Ysit and Y Xsit are the output of firm i in sector s at time t shipped for domestic use and
exported to foreign, respectively, Zs,t is the stochastic sector-specific productivity, Msit is
the imported good, and Lsit is labor. Note that the Cobb-Douglas parameters αsm and αsl
are allowed to vary across sectors.
I assume that the technology is linear, that is, αsm+αsl = 1 for all s ∈ S. When αm = 0,
this reduces to the production technology assumed in Gali and Monacelli (2005). The linear
technology assumption makes the following calculation simpler by making the marginal cost
independent of the amount produced. If one instead assumes decreasing returns to scale,
17
the efficiency cost of price dispersion will be larger. For simplicity, I also assume αsl > 0 for
all s ∈ S. This means that all sectors use at least some amount of labor. This is empirically
true. Some countries, on the other hand, may import nothing in some sectors. Therefore, I
do not impose αsm > 0.
By setting αsm ≈ 1 and αsl ≈ 0, I can consider a country importing in sector s. Alterna-
tively, by setting αsm ≈ 0 and αsl ≈ 1, I can consider a country being skilled at producing
goods in sector s, and depending on the demand from foreign, it is likely that the country
exports in sector s in equilibrium.

















that operates competitively. The elasticity of substitution parameter θs can be heterogeneous











Y Xst , (1.10)













Note that the output for domestic use and foreign export are the same goods but labeled
and priced differently.
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1.2.1.3 The individual firm’s pricing decision
Assume that in each sector s ∈ S, a randomly selected fraction 1− λs of the firms can reset
the price. The price stickiness parameter λs can also vary across sectors. An individual
firm in sector s takes wage Wt, import price EtQ∗st, the demand function in equations (1.10),
production function and tax τs as given. The unit cost of imported good EtQ∗st is given by
the product of the endogenous exchange rate Et and exogenous and stochastic international
price Q∗st. The prices of its output are set by the individual firm to maximize its expected
profit.
(












































The realized profit Esit is aggregated within and across sectors Est =
∫
Esitdi and immedi-
ately paid out to the household. Note that the firms are taxed differently across sectors and
between destinations. The rate for profits earned domestically is τs and the rate for profits
from foreign is τXs .









































Ys,t + λsβEt (Πs,t+1)θs−1 F˜s,t+1 (1.15)















































Note that the nominal exchange rate is substituted out using the definition of the real
exchange rate Qt = EtP ∗t /Pt ⇔ Et = QtPt/P ∗t , and I defined CPI inflation rate as Πt =
Pt/Pt−1 and sectoral inflation rates as Πs,t = Pst/Pst−1,ΠXs,t = PXst /PXst−1. For the derivation,
see Appendix A.1.1.
Equations (1.13) and (1.14) govern the dynamics of sectoral inflation. Note that the
sectoral inflation rate Πs,t and the inflation in terms of the CPI Πt are related through
the change in the relative price Pst/Pt. Thus, the equations state that sectoral inflation is
a function of expected future sectoral inflation F˜s,t and the expected future marginal cost
K˜s,t. The sectoral inflation rate is the weighted sum of one and the ratio F˜s,t/K˜s,t, where
the weight on one becomes larger as the price becomes stickier λs → 1. When the price is
completely sticky λs = 1, then sectoral inflation becomes one, meaning that the nominal
sectoral price is fixed at the previous level, and only the relative price may move if the CPI
Pt moves. At the other extreme, when the price is fully flexible λs → 0, these equations
hold by having F˜st = K˜st. In this case, the expectation terms in F˜st and K˜st also disappear,
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restoring the flexible price equilibrium pricing rule
Ps,t
Pt


















Msitdi = Mst, Cst = Yst, Xst = Y Xst .
Using the factor demand from individual firms, these reduce to market clearing conditions
in aggregate variables
Cst = Yst and Xst = Y Xst (1.19)































































where the function fs is defined as











For the derivation, see Appendix A.1.2.
Equation (1.20) combined with the dynamics (1.21) and (1.22) are the key equations
capturing the cost of inflation in sector s.
First, as we can see from the dynamics, sectoral inflation or deflation Πst = Pst/Pst−1
causes larger wedges ∆st,∆Xst . When sectoral inflation is zero, i.e., Πst = 1, the wedge decays
at the rate λs to the steady state of ∆st = 1. When the inflation rate deviates from one, it
enlarges the deviation of the wedge from one.5 The effect of inflation on the wedge is larger
when the price is sticky, represented by a larger λs, and when the differentiated goods are
more substitutable, represented by a larger θs. Price stickiness limits the ability of firms to
set a uniform price across differentiated goods. A higher elasticity induces a larger response
of demand and thus production to the price differential among similar goods within the
sector.
Second, the aggregate resource constraint (1.20) states that the wedges ∆st,∆Xst create a
gap between the input Lst and the outputs Cst, Xst in effective units, which is the ultimate
source of welfare loss in my model. Even if the production function in each firm is not
affected by the inflation rate, the distribution of production within the sector is affected
by inflation, as explained in the previous paragraph. Since uneven outputs are translated
5This happens regardless of inflation or deflation. The first term is increasing in Πst = Pst/Pst−1, but
the second term is decreasing in Πst = (Ps,t/Pt) Πt/ (Ps,t−1/Pt−1). The overall term behaves like the first
term when Πst  1 and like the second term when Πst  1.
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into a lower effective output under the love of variety assumption represented by the CES
aggregator (1.9), sectoral inflation causes the production wedges.
1.2.1.5 Small open economy assumptions







where X∗st is the exogenous total international demand for sector s and P ∗st is its aggregate
price index that is also exogenously given. This assumption can be derived from the cost
minimization condition of a foreign buyer who aggregates the composite goods of sector s
from different countries with a constant elasticity of substitution θ∗s aggregator.
1.2.2 The Ramsey problem
The monetary authority’s problem is defined as follows.
Definition 1.1. The optimal monetary policy is the solution to the following problem.
Given random shocks
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s∈S the central bank chooses a contingent plan of
all the endogenous variables Ct, Lt,
(
Cst, Lst, Pst/Pt, P
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The last condition is equivalent to the household’s lifetime budget constraint (1.3) under
the assumption that all the profit goes to the household as Et and the balanced government
budget. This condition is important for binding the planner with the same trade-off between
consumption and labor as that faced by the decentralized economy.
Although the initial level of debt D0 is mathematically expressed as a choice variable,
this does not mean that the central bank can freely choose it. Recall that I assumed in the
previous sub-section that the asset markets operate before the monetary authority chooses
its policy. Thus, the monetary authority takes into account the change or lack thereof in
the initial level of debt D0 when it chooses its policy. In this sense, the monetary authority
indirectly chooses the initial level of debt.
1.3 Analytical Results
In this section, I derive the formula for the RPI and discuss the intuition behind the index.
The justification of the index is given in a theorem that states that RPI needs to remain
constant in long-run expectation for the economy to achieve the Ramsey optimal allocation.
I start by showing two lemmas that help us understand the trade-off faced by the central
bank.
The first lemma concerns the steady-state property that makes the analysis tractable.
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The second lemma shows how the Ramsey problem can be approximated around the steady
state. As studied in Benigno andWoodford (2012), the solution to the approximated problem
approximates the solution to the original Ramsey problem under regularity conditions.
Then, I state the theorem on the optimality of stabilizing the RPI. The formula for RPI
can be interpreted as a weighted sum of prices in different sectors, where the weight depends
on output share of the sector, price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution within the
sector. I discuss two points on the formula. First, compared with the CPI, the RPI is closer
to PPI since PPI includes prices of exports. However, the PPI is not always better than
CPI due to the other two factors: price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution. Second,
international prices do not directly appear in the formula. This means that the central bank
should be concerned about international prices if and only if they affect output prices that
appear in the RPI formula.
1.3.1 Terms of trade externality and the efficiency of the steady
state
To focus on the monetary friction in the analysis, it is convenient to assume that the tax
rates are set to offset any real distortions that arise under the flexible price equilibrium.
There are two types of real distortions in this economy: monopolistic distortions and terms
of trade externality. It is widely known what tax rate offsets the former since it also arises
in the closed economy setup. Regarding the latter, however, no paper has explicitly defined
the distortion and offset it using a tax.
In this subsection, I show that these distortions can be offset by taxes if we assume
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different tax rates between domestic consumption and exports, as I do in my model. The
distortions are defined as wedges between the social planner’s allocation and the flexible price
equilibrium. The planner’s problem is defined as the maximization of the household’s welfare
subject only to the resource and technology constraint and the conditions in international
markets. The flexible price equilibrium is defined as usual. Monopolistic competition leads
to monopolistic markups in the price that appear as distortions in the allocation. The terms
of trade externality, on the other hand, comes from the inability of the individual firms to
exploit monopolistic competition in the international market.



































st = Cst +Xst ∀s ∈ S










































The objective function is the same as the welfare of the household in the Ramsey problem
in Definition 1.1. The first-best planner is constrained only by the aggregate production
technology in each sector and the inter-temporal trade balance condition. In building the
aggregate production function, I already imposed uniform production within a sector Ysit =
Yst and so forth, as the optimality condition. The inter-temporal trade balance condition
does not necessarily require balanced trade in each period, but any trade deficit is financed
in the international asset market, and any trade surplus is invested in the international asset
market such that the discounted sum of the trade surplus equals the initial level of the
external debt D0.













































































To compare this with the flexible price allocation, I define the flexible price allocation
as the solution to equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.4)-(1.6), (1.8), (1.13), (1.14), (1.15)-(1.18) under
λs = 0 for all s ∈ S, and (1.19)-(1.23), and the household’s budget constraint. Appendix










































































where the real wedges χs, νs are defined as











We can see that the characterizations of allocations are equivalent except for the wedges
χs and νs. The wedge χs for all s represents distortions coming from domestic monopolistic
competition. The wedge νs for all s represents distortions coming from the inability of the
domestic firms to exert their monopolistic power in the international market, which I call
the terms of trade externality.
Thus, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1.1. The flexible price allocation is efficient if and only if χs = νs = 1 for all s ∈ S.
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That is,
1− τs = θs
θs − 1 , 1− τ
X












There are two types of inefficiency that the tax needs to address. To see this, note that
even if the tax in each sector offsets the monopolistic markup in each sector by setting







between θs and θ∗s . To achieve the efficient allocation, the tax needs to offset both internal
distortion due to domestic monopolistic competition and external distortion due to (not
utilizing) international monopolistic competition.
The external distortion arises when the elasticity of foreign demand is finite and hence
θ∗s/ (θ∗s − 1) > 1. In this case, the equilibrium consumption of export sector good is too
low. The planner can improve welfare by exporting less while simultaneously improving the
terms of trade. The market equilibrium cannot achieve this since each export sector takes the
total demand for the exports as given, but the planner can strategically increase the sectoral
price of exports as a whole to affect the terms of trade and foreign demand. To achieve this
allocation in a decentralized manner, the fiscal authority needs to impose different tax rates
depending on the destinations of goods.
In the following analysis, I assume such efficient tax rates to focus my analysis on mon-
etary frictions. If I do not assume this efficient level of taxation, the monetary authority
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will have an incentive to use differential inflation rates across sectors to correct the distorted
real allocation. If this force is added to the monetary trade-off that I analyze below, the
analysis becomes too complicated. As the first step, I believe this simplification is beneficial
in understanding the optimal price index.
1.3.2 Approximation of the Ramsey problem
This subsection derives the approximation to the Ramsey problem around the optimal steady
state defined in Appendix A.2.3. I denote the log deviation from the steady state by the
lower-case letter of the corresponding symbol of the variable. All domestic nominal variables
are expressed relative to domestic CPI Pt. All international nominal variables are expressed
in relative terms to foreign CPI P ∗t .
I show that when the steady state is efficient in the sense defined in the previous section,
the second-order approximation of the welfare function, i.e., the objective function of the
Ramsey problem, becomes purely quadratic without utilizing the second-order approxima-
tions of the pricing equations. Therefore, under regularity conditions, we can obtain an
accurate first-order approximation to the solution of the non-linear Ramsey problem defined
in Definition 1.1 by solving the approximated Ramsey problem that maximizes quadratically
approximated welfare subject to linearly approximated constraints.
Note the difference between the optimal steady state and the efficient allocation. As
mathematically defined in Appendix A.2.3, the optimal steady state is optimal in the second-
best sense, where the monetary authority’s problem takes sticky pricing mechanisms and
market conditions as given. Therefore, the optimal steady state need not be an efficient
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allocation in the first-best sense. The appendix also shows that the optimal steady state
can be characterized by the equations for flexible price allocation under constant exogenous
variables and thus is efficient when the assumption of Lemma 1.1 is satisfied.
Denote the household’s welfare by W and its steady state level by W¯ . Define the vector




ct = [c1t, ..., cSt]′ and xt = [x1t, ..., xSt]′
are the vectors of consumption and exports of all the sectors. Furthermore, define the vector
of exogenous variables as




x∗t = [x∗1t, ..., x∗St]
′ , p∗t = [p∗1t, ..., p∗St]
′ , q∗t = [q∗1t, ..., q∗St]
′ , and zt = [z1t, ..., zSt]′
are the vectors of foreign demand for exports, international prices of exports, international
prices of imports, and productivity shocks.
Before assuming the efficient tax rate, by using the market conditions except for the
















































where L is the steady-state level of aggregate labor supply, φsc = Cs/ (Cs +Xs) is the steady-
state consumption share of output in sector s, φls = Ls/L is the steady-state labor usage
share of sector s, φsx = 1 − φsc is the steady-state export share of output and d (•) is the
diagonal matrix of the vector inside the parentheses. The 2S by 4S + 1 matrix N defines
the natural levels Nξt of the endogenous variables defined in the appendix.
The first two lines are linear in the endogenous variables, but when the steady state is
efficient χs = νs = 1 for all s ∈ S, all of the linear terms disappear. Therefore, under
the efficient steady state, we can obtain a purely quadratic second-order approximation of
welfare.
Appendix A.2.6 shows that under the efficient steady state, the natural levels of the
endogenous variables coincide with the flexible price equilibrium denoted by Fξt with a 2S
by 4S + 1 matrix F . In the following, I denote the log deviation from the flexible price















































Therefore, I obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1.2. If the steady state is efficient, approximated optimal monetary policy can
be obtained by solving the linear-quadratic problem. Given initial conditions v−1 and pre-

























subject to (1) the Phillips curves







where κs = (1− λs) (1− βλs) /λs, and (2) the identities linking inflation rates and relative
prices
pit = 1S×1pit + γIv (v˜t − v˜t−1) + It − It−1 and piXt = 1S×1pit + γIvX (v˜t − v˜t−1) + IXt − IXt−1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.7.
The coefficient matrices Γv2, γPv , γPvX , γIv and γIvX , the scalar Γpi and the residuals It and
IXt are given in Appendix A.2.7. The choice variables are the vector of consumption of each
sector ct and the vector of exports from each sector xt contained in the vector of endogenous
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variables vt, the vector of inflation rates
pit = [pi1t, ..., piSt]′ , piXt =
[




and CPI inflation pit. The reason for having CPI inflation here is that nominal variables
are normalized by CPI inflation. One can alternatively write the equations with different
normalization and still obtain the same result for the optimal price index.
As is usual in closed economy analysis, we have two parts in the objective function. The
first part is the quadratic terms in the gaps in real variables from their respective natural
levels. The second part is the nominal part representing the cost of volatile inflation.
The nominal friction is larger when the sector uses more labor, the price is sticky, or
the elasticity of substitution is high. This is intuitive because if the inflation rate is volatile
in a sector, the price dispersion of the sector increases. This means that to produce a
certain effective output in the sector, the sector requires more labor input and imported
materials, causing disutility for the household through more labor or a tighter international
budget. The overall effect will be larger if the sector uses more labor at the steady state.
Inflation volatility leads to higher price dispersion when the price is stickier. Given the same
distribution of individual prices within a sector, the degrees of price dispersion ∆st,∆Xst
become higher if the elasticity of substitution θs is higher.
In the constraints, there are in total 2S Phillips curves for domestic prices and export
prices in each sector. The last two equations in the constraints are identities linking sectoral
inflation rates pit,piXt and CPI inflation pit. This means that there is only one degree of
freedom left in this problem. Although there are different inflation rates for different sectors,
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they cannot be freely chosen since relative inflation rate between two sectors determines the
evolution of the relative price of the two sectors.
1.3.3 Ramsey price index
This subsection states the main result of this paper. If we define a price index using the
coefficients on the inflation rates in the loss function derived in the previous subsection, the
price index stays constant in the long-run expectation under the optimal monetary policy.
This implies that if the central bank does not stabilize this price index in the long-run, its
policy is necessarily sub-optimal. Specifically, Appendix A.2.8 shows the following.

























Then, under the solution to the Ramsey problem,
lim
T→∞
Et logPT = Φ−1logP.
I call this price index Pt the RPI since its stabilization is desirable as the solution to the
Ramsey problem. The scalar Φ is used to normalize the coefficients to sum to one. This
theorem states that the long-run stabilization of the RPI can be obtained as a necessary
condition of the solution of the Ramsey problem. The theorem motivates the central bank’s
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policy that stabilizes the inflation rate measured in this index since if this price index is not
stabilized in the long run under some policy, the policy must be sub-optimal.
The converse is not necessarily true. That is, complete stabilization of this price index
does not necessarily guarantee that the economy follows the optimal path consistent with the
first-order conditions. Although it is generally possible to derive the if-and-only-if condition
using the method of Giannoni and Woodford (2010), the condition is generally complicated.
To keep my discussion simple and intuitive, I propose the use of a simple policy rule that
always stabilizes the RPI. The welfare analysis in Section 1.4 shows that the welfare loss
from simple RPI stabilization policy is negligible compared to the optimal monetary policy
and that it performs better than the stabilization of headline CPI, core CPI, and PPI.
The RPI is a weighted sum of prices in different sectors, where the weights depend on
consumption share ψs, the elasticity of substitution θs, the Phillips curve slope κs that
contains the information of the price stickiness λs and the trade pattern φsx/φsc.
The weight reflects the trade-off that the monetary authority faces. As the derivation
indicates, the weight takes the form of the coefficients on inflation rates in the loss function
of the Ramsey problem representing the cost of inflation in different sectors. If the volatility
of the inflation rate in a sector is relatively more costly to welfare than that in other sectors,
the RPI assigns higher weight to the former sector.
Note that this price index will remain constant even if there is a unit-root process in the
exogenous variables that may result in a permanent change in the natural levels of endogenous
variables. This fact should be noted since if all exogenous variables are stationary, price levels
under any price index will eventually coincide after all transitory shocks die out.
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1.3.3.1 Comparison with CPI and PPI
To understand the relationship between the RPI and the conventional price indices, let us
consider the weight on sector s under logPs = logPXs . Recalling that φsc + φsx = 1, the
















From this expression, we can see that weighting under the RPI can be seen as that
under PPI multiplied by the sensitivity of the wedge to inflation θs/κs. The PPI weight is
relevant because the cost of inflation appears as the wedge in production; see equation (1.20).
Therefore, the relevant size of the sector is the production size rather than consumption size.
However, the quantitative result in the next section shows that the sensitivity of the
wedge to inflation θs/κs is important in the sense that PPI targeting sometimes performs
worse than CPI targeting. The reason for the inclusion of this additional factor is that a given
inflation volatility causes different wedge sizes depending on price stickiness, summarized by
κs, and the elasticity of substitution, captured by θs.
Compared to the CPI weight, ψs, the PPI weight is higher for exporting sectors. This
is because when some of the output is exported, the consumption weight on the sector is
smaller than the optimal weight. In such a case, we can obtain the correct size of the sector
by inflating the consumption weight ψs by the output-to-consumption ratio 1/φsc.
We can also obtain the price index derived in Woodford (2010) as a special case by
assuming no trade φsc = 1 and a homogeneous elasticity of substitution θs = θ. In this
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special case, the weight assigned to sector s is6ψs/κs.
The previous literature has argued for core inflation stabilization based on the observation
that the non-core sectors have higher degrees of flexibility or higher values of κs, resulting
in disproportionately smaller weights on those sectors. The RPI adjusts for the elasticity
of substitution θs and trade 1/φsc. The former has the effect of placing a higher weight on
sectors with higher substitutability within the sector. This is important since some non-core
sectors do have higher values of the elasticity of substitution. The latter has the effect of
placing a higher weight on export sectors. This may shift the optimal weight away from the
core weight and closer to the headline weight for commodity exporting countries.
1.3.3.2 Role of international commodity prices
Another lesson that we can learn from the formula for RPI is that international commodity
prices P ∗st, Q∗st do not appear directly in the index. That is, the formula for RPI in Theorem
1.1 is a weighted sum of prices set by domestic firms Pst and PXst . Even if those prices are
influenced by international prices, the formula does not adjust for or offset the influence of
external factors.
Note that this is despite the fact that I naturally model the effect of exogenous interna-
tional prices. As in the pricing equations (1.13)-(1.18), the international price of inputs Q∗st
affect the firms’ pricing behavior through their marginal costs. As in the export demand
equation (1.23), prices of international competitors P ∗st affect export demand. The former
has a first-order impact on sectoral prices, and the latter has a first-order impact on the
6This is not exactly the same as the expression in Woodford (2010) since I am simplifying the analysis in
one dimension, namely, heterogeneity in the labor. This will affect the expression for the κs reflecting the
increasing disutility from uneven labor supply.
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trade balance and a second-order impact on sectoral prices.
We can observe from the formula in Theorem 1.1 that these international prices affect
the optimal price index if and only if they affect the output prices of domestic sectors. This
is because volatile inflation causes efficiency loss in production regardless of the cause of the
volatility, and thus, we do not need to adjust the formula for the price index depending on
whether such volatility comes from international prices. In other words, output prices in the
formula are sufficient statistics in the measure of the most welfare-relevant inflation rate.
As an implication, although we may tend to think that central banks are not responsible
for inflation volatility caused by international price movements, a central bank should be
concerned about volatility as long as it affects the RPI. To understand this point, note that
although international prices are exogenous, domestic prices can be controlled via changes
in the exchange rate. Imagine an economy where all the domestic prices of different sectors
are proportional to the international prices in those sectors. The ratio between the vector
of international prices and that of domestic prices is the exchange rate. If the central bank
selects one domestic sector, it is possible to stabilize the domestic price of that sector by
adjusting the exchange rate to offset international price movements. Of course, this operation
affects all other sectors, so the central bank faces a trade-off between stabilizing one sector
and stabilizing another. The RPI indicates how to balance this trade-off.
1.4 Quantitative Results
This section calibrates the model to data on 40 countries with 35 sectors. The purpose
of the calibration is twofold: first, to understand the quantitative difference between the
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optimal price index and conventional price indices and, second, to obtain some insights into
the implementation of the optimal monetary policy. That is, as noted above, the long-run
stabilization of the optimal price index is insufficient to guarantee that the economy follows
the optimal path. Therefore, the performance of the simple policy rule that completely
stabilizes the optimal price index would be of interest. I calculate the welfare loss from
stabilizing the optimal price index and sub-optimal price indices.
1.4.1 Welfare evaluation
I compare the welfare under the solution to the Ramsey problem, i.e., the optimal policy
with those under four simple stabilization policies for the RPI, headline CPI, core CPI, and
PPI. The equilibrium dynamics can be obtained by solving for the bounded solution of the
set of constraints combined with one of the following monetary policy alternatives.
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under each of the solutions and report the welfare loss compared to the optimal monetary
policy.
1.4.2 Data
To evaluate the welfare loss described in the previous subsection, I need to obtain parameter
values, some steady-state variables a description of the exogenous processes. I consider one
period to be one month in this section. Parameters common across all countries and sectors,
summarized in Table 1.1, are the discount factor β = 0.97 112 , to match the 3% annual discount
rate, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ = 2, which is the standard
value in the literature, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply φ = 0.47,
following De Paoli (2009)De Paoli (2009).
I allow for sectoral heterogeneity in the elasticity of substitution θs and price stickiness
λs . For the stickiness parameters, I use the estimates of Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
For the elasticity of substitution, I use the estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006). I follow
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Table 1.1: Parameters common across countries and sectors
Parameter Value Note
β Discount rate 0.97 112 3% annual rate
σ Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution 2 e.g. Arellano (2008)
φ Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.47 e.g. De Paoli (2009)
the categorization of 35 industrial sectors in the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)8.
Appendix A.3.2 shows the concordance of the categories across these data sources. The
parameter values are summarized in Table 1.2. In the analysis below, these stickiness pa-
rameters and elasticity parameters are assumed to be common across countries.
Since the definition of the “core” index varies across countries, I define the set of core
sectors Core ⊂ S as non-commodity sectors for the purposes of cross-country comparison.
Table 1.2 also reports whether a sector is the core sector.
I use country-specific values for ψ,αm,αl,φc,φx and φl. These are constructed for 40
countries in the 2013 release of World Input-Output Database as follows9. I use the year 2000
to align with the periods covered in other estimates (Nakamura and Steinsson: 1998-2005,
Broda and Weinstein 1990-2001) and the 2013 release for the sake of matching with Rauch’s
classification.
For a given country, the domestic part of its input-output table is taken from the WIOD
and the imports and exports are calculated by summing all the foreign entries for the country.
As consumption {PsCs}s∈S, I use the sum of gross fixed capital formation (WIOD column
c41) and final consumption by households (c37), non-profit organizations serving households
(c38), and government for each sector (c39). The consumption expenditure share ψ is
8See Timmer et al. (2015).
9The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, In-
dia, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Mexico, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Taiwan, and the U.S.A.
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Table 1.2: Sector-specific parameters common across all countries
Sector WIOD θs λs θsκs Core
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 9.83 .125 2 1
2 Mining and Quarrying 5.53 .961 3289 1
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 6.35 .737 67 0
4 Textiles and Textile Products 3.91 .977 6519 1
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 3.69 .962 2310 1
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 4.01 .987 19639 1
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 5.05 .956 2364 1
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 5.75 .513 12 0
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 5.25 .939 1275 1
10 Rubber and Plastics 4.8 .968 4214 1
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 3.04 .959 1637 1
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 7.43 .962 4651 1
13 Machinery, Nec 8.99 .963 5932 1
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 4.79 .963 3161 1
15 Transport Equipment 13.41 .727 130 1
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 2.75 .835 83 1
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 2.59 .513 6 0
18 Construction 2.59 .939 629 1
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 2.59 .531 6 0
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 2.59 .939 629 1
21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 2.59 .939 629 1
22 Hotels and Restaurants 2.59 .939 629 1
23 Inland Transport 2.59 .583 9 1
24 Water Transport 2.59 .583 9 1
25 Air Transport 2.59 .583 9 1
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 2.59 .583 9 1
27 Post and Telecommunications 2.59 .939 629 1
28 Financial Intermediation 2.59 .939 629 1
29 Real Estate Activities 2.59 .939 629 1
30 Renting of MandEq and Other Business Activities 2.33 .939 566 1
31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 2.59 .939 629 1
32 Education 2.59 .939 629 1
33 Health and Social Work 2.59 .939 629 1
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 2.85 .939 692 1
35 Private Households with Employed Persons 2.59 .939 629 1
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calculated as the share of each sector over aggregate domestic consumption.
As the payment to labor {WLs}s∈S, I use value added (WIOD row r64). The labor usage
share φl is calculated as the share of each sector over the aggregate value added of all the
sectors in the country.
Since I abstract from the input-output linkages in my theoretical analysis, I need to
obtain the values of αm,αl,φc,φx that correspond to the economy without input-output
linkages. To do so, I adjust the raw input shares and usage shares using the input-output
matrix. The adjustment described in Appendix A.3.3 counts all indirect usages of labor and
imported goods in calculating αm,αl. In calculating φc,φx, all indirect consumption and
exports are counted. In this way, I can obtain the property αm +αl = 1S×1 assumed in the
analysis and the property φc + φx = 1 that needs to hold by definition.
Finally, the dynamics of the exogenous variables are assumed to be described as a vector
auto-regressive process with one lag (VAR(1)). I obtain the coefficients and the variance-
covariance matrix of the error terms by fitting the following monthly processes to the VAR(1)
model. The sample period is from June 2009 to August 2017.
I use the logarithm of US consumption as world consumption c∗t , US imports as an
approximation of world demand x∗t , and US export price indices as an approximation of the
prices of international competitors p∗t . The monthly series are accessed through CEIC10, and
the data sources are summarized in Table 1.3 for export demand x∗t and in Table 1.4 for
export prices p∗t . For c∗t , I use seasonally adjusted series of personal consumption expenditure
(PCE) in 2012 prices from Bureau of Economic Analysis. The standard deviation in the
sample is 0.94%.
10CEIC is a proprietary database, which can be accessed here: https://insights.ceicdata.com.
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Table 1.3: Data source
x* WIOD Std (%) Series Name Source
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 12.7 Imports: 1-Digit: Food and Live US Census Bureau
Animals
2 Mining and Quarrying 9.5 Import Value: SITC: Customs, Aggregate US Census Bureau
under Metal and Mining Sector
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 10.2 Imports: 1-Digit: Beverages and Tobacco US Census Bureau
4 Textiles and Textile Products 10.6 Imports: CIF: 2-Digit: Textile Fibers US Census Bureau
and Their Wastes
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 7 Imports: 1-Digit: Manufactured Goods Classified US Census Bureau
Chiefly by Material
6 Wood and Products of Wood and 9.9 Imports: 2-Digit: Cork and Wood US Census Bureau
Cork
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and 6.5 Imports: 2-Digit: Paper, Paperboard and US Census Bureau
Publishing Pulp
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 9.9 Imports: 2-Digit: Petroleum, Petroleum Products US Census Bureau
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 6.8 Imports: 1-Digit: Chemicals and Related US Census Bureau
Products, nes
10 Rubber and Plastics 11.2 Imports: 2-Digit: Rubber Manufactures US Census Bureau
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 8.4 Imports: NAICS: Mfg: Non Metallic US Census Bureau
Mineral
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 13.2 Imports: 2-Digit: US Census Bureau
Metalliferous Ores and Metal Scrap
13 Machinery, Nec 8.1 Imports: 1-Digit: Machinery and Transport US Census Bureau
Equipment
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 8.5 Imports: 2-Digit: Electrical Machinery, Apparatus US Census Bureau
and Appliances, nes
15 Transport Equipment 10.3 Imports: 2-Digit: Road Vehicles US Census Bureau
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 9 Imports: 1-Digit: Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles US Census Bureau
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 22.4 Imports: 2-Digit: Electric Current US Census Bureau
18 Construction 1.7 Imports: sa: Service US Census Bureau
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor 10.5 Imports: 2-Digit: Road Vehicles US Census Bureau
Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except 7.8 Merchant Wholesalers Sales: Total US Census Bureau
of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles 6.8 Retail Sales and Food Services: US Census Bureau
and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods ex Motor Vehicle and Parts
22 Hotels and Restaurants 5.4 Retail Sales: FS: ow: Full US Census Bureau
Service Restaurants
23 Inland Transport 5.8 PCE: saar: SE: HCE: TR: Bureau of Economic Analysis
PT: Ground Transportation (GT)
24 Water Transport 2.8 Imports: sa: Service US Census Bureau
25 Air Transport 12.1 PCE: saar: SE: HCE: TR: Bureau of Economic Analysis
PT: Air Transportation
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport 5.4 Avg Weekly Earnings: PB: Travel Bureau of Labor Statistics
Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies Agency
27 Post and Telecommunications 4.6 PCE: saar: SE: HCE: Other: Bureau of Economic Analysis
CO: Postal and Delivery Services (PDS)
28 Financial Intermediation 2.7 Avg Weekly Earnings: FA: Credit Bureau of Labor Statistics
Intermediation and Rel Activities
29 Real Estate Activities 2.6 Avg Weekly Earnings: FA: Real Bureau of Labor Statistics
Estate
30 Renting of MandEq and Other Business 6 Avg Weekly Earnings: FA: Machinery Bureau of Labor Statistics
Activities and Equip Rental and Leasing
31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social 2.2 Imports: sa: Service US Census Bureau
Security
32 Education 1.7 Imports: sa: Service US Census Bureau
33 Health and Social Work 1.4 Imports: sa: Service US Census Bureau
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 2.4 Avg Weekly Earnings: OS: Personal Bureau of Labor Statistics
Care Services
35 Private Households with Employed Persons 1.5 Imports: sa: Service US Census Bureau
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Table 1.4: Data source
p* WIOD Std (%) Series Name Source
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 15.2 Export Price Index: Agriculture and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Livestock Products (ALP)
2 Mining and Quarrying 14.2 Export Price Index: Oil, Gas, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Meneral and Ores: Mineral and Ores
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 6.3 Export Price Index: Beverages and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Tobacco Products
4 Textiles and Textile Products 7.8 Export Price Index: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Textile and Textile Articles (TA)
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 9 PPI: Hides, Skins, Leather and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Products
6 Wood and Products of Wood and 3.1 (DC)Export Price Index: Wood Products Bureau of Labor Statistics
Cork
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and 3.2 Export Price Index: Paper Bureau of Labor Statistics
Publishing
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 26.1 Export Price Index: Petroleum and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Coal Products
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 5.7 Export Price Index: Chemicals Bureau of Labor Statistics
10 Rubber and Plastics 3.4 Export Price Index: Plastics and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Rubber Products (PRP)
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral .8 Export Price Index: Nonmatalic Mineral Bureau of Labor Statistics
Products
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 9.8 Export Price Index: Primary Metals Bureau of Labor Statistics
(PM)
13 Machinery, Nec 1.1 Export Price Index: Machinery (MA) Bureau of Labor Statistics
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment .6 Export Price Index: Computer and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Electronics Products (CEP)
15 Transport Equipment .6 Export Price Index: Transportation Equipment Bureau of Labor Statistics
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling .5 Export Price Index: Miscellaneous Manufactured Bureau of Labor Statistics
Articles (MM)
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 1.3 CPI U: Services: Utilities and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Public Transportation
18 Construction 1.3 PPI: ME: Construction Bureau of Labor Statistics
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor .2 CPI U: Transport: Private: MV Bureau of Labor Statistics
Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel Maintenance and Repair (MR)
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except 1 PPI: Wholesale Trade Services (WTS) Bureau of Labor Statistics
of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles 1 CPI U: Housing: HFO: HO: Bureau of Labor Statistics
and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods Repair of Household Items
22 Hotels and Restaurants 3.6 PPI: Accommodation Services: Travel Accommodation Bureau of Labor Statistics
23 Inland Transport 3.6 PPI: Travel Arrangement Services: Vehicle Bureau of Labor Statistics
Rentals and Lodging
24 Water Transport 2.7 PPI: Travel Arrangement Services: Cruises Bureau of Labor Statistics
and Tours
25 Air Transport 11.1 Export Price Index: Air Passenger Bureau of Labor Statistics
Fares
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport 2.1 PPI: Travel Arrangement Services: Others Bureau of Labor Statistics
Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
27 Post and Telecommunications 1.4 PPI: ME: General: Scales and Bureau of Labor Statistics
Balances: Retail,Commercial,Hseholdand Mail
28 Financial Intermediation 2.1 PPI: Credit Intermediation Services (CIS) Bureau of Labor Statistics
29 Real Estate Activities 2 PPI: Real Estate Services Bureau of Labor Statistics
30 Renting of MandEq and Other Business 3.6 PPI: Rental and Leasing of Bureau of Labor Statistics
Activities Goods
31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social 1.1 PPI: Selected Security Services Bureau of Labor Statistics
Security
32 Education 1 PPI: Educational Services Bureau of Labor Statistics
33 Health and Social Work .6 CPI U: Medical Care: Services Bureau of Labor Statistics
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services .7 CPI U: GS: PC: Personal Bureau of Labor Statistics
Care Services
35 Private Households with Employed Persons .2 PCE: PI: sa: Services (SE) Bureau of Economic Analysis
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For import prices q∗t , I combine export price indices using country-specific compositions
of imports to sectors. That is, I use the World Input-Output table to calculate how much
sector s of a given country imports goods and services from sector s′ of all other countries.
I denote the share of imports from sector s′ over total imports to sector s by α˜ss′ . I then
use the weighted sum of the log prices of all source sectors s′ as the import price index
q∗st =
∑
s′∈S α˜s′sp∗s′t. I assume that productivity zt is constant to focus on observable shocks.
1.4.3 Welfare results
Table 1.5 shows the welfare loss from simple monetary policy rules (i.e., monetary policies
2-5 in Subsection 1.4.1) compared with the optimal monetary policy. The units for these
values is 0.01% of steady-state consumption.
As a benchmark, notice that the welfare loss from the stabilization of conventional price
indices reported in Table 1.5 is on the order of 0.01% of the steady-state consumption. This
is small as a percentage of consumption, but it is typical to obtain such numbers in the
standard NK environment. For example, Gali and Monacelli (2005) report 0.0166% for their
benchmark case.
The first finding from the welfare calibration is that most of the welfare loss can be
eliminated by switching from stabilizing conventional price indices to the RPI. Comparing
the second column, labeled Ramsey, with any of the third to the fourth columns in Table
1.5, the welfare loss in terms of consumption decreases to less than one-hundredth of the
loss from targeting conventional indices, on average across countries. In other words, mere
stabilization of RPI performs as well as the solution to the Ramsey problem.
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The second finding shown in Table 1.5 is that, while RPI is always the best, the ranking
of the stabilization of other indices varies across countries. This implies that we should not
conclude that PPI is superior to CPI just because the analytical expression for the RPI can
be interpreted as PPI plus an adjustment. For example, the worst index to target for the
U.S., China, and Japan is PPI, core CPI, and headline CPI, respectively. In other words, the
adjustment is large enough to make PPI stabilization less desirable than CPI stabilization
for some countries, depending on the trade pattern.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I solve a central bank’s Ramsey problem and derive the Ramsey price index
for small open economies to stabilize. Due to the openness of my model, the index depends
on the export share of output in each sector in addition to those parameters that have been
studied in closed economy models such as the consumption share, price stickiness and the
elasticity of substitution.
By calibrating the formula to 40 countries, I find that RPI stabilization eliminates almost
all of the welfare loss obtained under stabilization policies for headline CPI, core CPI, or
PPI. In other words, the loss coming from a simple stabilization of RPI compared with the
Ramsey optimal solution is negligible.
Regarding the ranking of stabilization policies for other indices, there is no common
tendency applicable to all countries. Therefore, one should not ignore the price stickiness
and elasticity components of RPI and prefer CPI or PPI.
Steady-state efficiency represents the key assumption that substantially simplifies the
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Table 1.5: Welfare loss from simple policy rules
Welfare Loss (0.01%) Ranking
Country Ramsey Headline Core CPI PPI Best 2nd 3rd Worst
AUS .001 .007 .016 .004 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
AUT .002 .099 .099 .074 Ramsey PPI Core CPI Headline
BEL .009 .177 .261 .51 Ramsey Headline Core CPI PPI
BGR .016 .073 .168 .134 Ramsey Headline PPI Core CPI
BRA 0 .005 .004 .005 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
CAN .002 .044 .06 .025 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
CHN 0 .006 .006 .004 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
CYP .008 .052 .047 .104 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
CZE .005 .215 .253 .147 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
DEU .001 .043 .038 .033 Ramsey PPI Core CPI Headline
DNK .002 .095 .046 .083 Ramsey Core CPI PPI Headline
ESP .002 .073 .03 .086 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
EST .006 .363 .507 .324 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
FIN .002 .064 .103 .091 Ramsey Headline PPI Core CPI
FRA .001 .056 .022 .058 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
GBR 0 .012 .01 .012 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
GRC .002 .029 .015 .035 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
HUN .003 .255 .167 .159 Ramsey PPI Core CPI Headline
IDN .001 .033 .032 .036 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
IND .001 .012 .007 .016 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
IRL .005 .332 .323 .241 Ramsey PPI Core CPI Headline
ITA .001 .071 .031 .075 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
JPN 0 .008 .003 .007 Ramsey Core CPI PPI Headline
KOR .002 .18 .086 .358 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
LTU .011 .053 .099 .177 Ramsey Headline Core CPI PPI
LUX .03 1.343 1.466 .932 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
LVA .007 .102 .128 .101 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
MEX .001 .011 .015 .008 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
MLT .008 1.669 .769 1.379 Ramsey Core CPI PPI Headline
NLD .007 .215 .085 .451 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
POL .001 .023 .027 .022 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
PRT .001 .122 .034 .148 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
ROU .003 .018 .058 .015 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
RUS 0 .011 .013 .007 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
SVK .01 .193 .266 .27 Ramsey Headline Core CPI PPI
SVN .008 .216 .279 .15 Ramsey PPI Headline Core CPI
SWE .001 .078 .089 .159 Ramsey Headline Core CPI PPI
TUR .001 .036 .01 .035 Ramsey Core CPI PPI Headline
TWN .003 .198 .121 .164 Ramsey Core CPI PPI Headline
USA 0 .015 .003 .015 Ramsey Core CPI Headline PPI
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analysis. Relaxing this assumption would give the central bank an additional incentive to
stabilize one sector rather than another to influence their equilibrium relative price. Extend-
ing the analysis in this direction represents a fruitful area of future research.
I abstract from input-output networks across different sectors in the economy. Adding
this feature would result in a different formula for the RPI.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of E-Commerce on Urban
Prices and Welfare
Yoon J. Jo, Misaki Matsumura, and David E. Weinstein
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2.1 Introduction
How has e-commerce affected prices and welfare? Economists have suggested a number of
approaches to answering this question. In early work, Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) suggested
that the internet raises welfare by giving consumers better access to new varieties. More
recent work, has considered impacts through impacts on average prices (Goolsbee and Klenow
(2018)) or through the ability of information technology to generate price convergence (c.f.
Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Jensen (2007), and Steinwender (2018)).One of the limitations
of prior work has been that it has focused on small samples of goods (e.g., books), had no
data on price trends prior to the creation of the internet (which makes assigning the impact
of e-commerce difficult to measure), or focused on different information technologies (cell
phones or telegraphs).
This paper makes use of a unique Japanese data set covering hundreds of products over
close to three decades to examine the impact of the internet on Japanese prices and welfare
using a number of popular modeling techniques. First, we consider the possibility that e-
commerce may have lowered prices by driving down the average prices of goods available
online. Second, following Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) and Arkolakis et al. (2012), we compute
the welfare gains due to the ability of e-commerce to enable consumers to purchase goods
from other regions. Third, following Jensen (2007), we compute the gains that arise through
e-commerce’s ability to arbitrage intercity price differences. We find that all three channels
produced welfare gains in Japan, but our estimates suggest that the first and second channels
are by far the most important, with welfare gains through these channels being eleven to
sixteen times larger than through the price arbitrage channel. Overall, we find that increased
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inter-city arbitrage raised Japanese welfare by 0.06 percent, the gains due to new varieties
available through online shopping raised welfare 0.12 percent, and the gains due to overall
price reductions for goods available online raised welfare by 1 percent.
We make use of two unique datasets. The first, a quinquennial government survey of
households that reports the purchase locations of Japanese consumers, and the second cov-
ering all sales transacted by Japan’s largest e-retailer, Rakuten. We merge these data with
the price data underlying the Japanese consumer price index (CPI), covering 30,000 price
quotes per year in physical stores across Japan over the period 1991 to 2016. We also use
these estimates to compute the welfare gains arising from the ability of e-retail to arbitrage
away regional price differences.
In order to identify the impact of e-commerce, we exploit the fact that the growth of
e-retail happened rapidly in Japan, so it is relatively easy to divide recent history into
clear pre and post e-retail periods. Rakuten was one of the earliest entrants to the e-
retail business, starting in February of 1997. Unlike Amazon, Rakuten’s business model was
not to sell goods directly to consumers, but rather to serve as a platform through which
consumers could easily find stores willing to sell products online. This difference enabled
them to expand without developing warehouses and extensive logistics networks. Thus,
while only 40 percent of Amazon’s transaction value comes from third-party sellers, virtually
all of Rakuten’s transactions come from this source. Since its entry into Japan, Rakuten
experienced explosive growth. By April of 2000, when it announced its initial public offering
and a year before the entry of Amazon into Japan, Rakuten had grown to be a platform in
which consumers had access to goods available from 2,300 merchants.1 Already at this point,
1Phred Dvorak, "Japan’s Highly Popular Rakuten Plans IPO Despite Shaky Market,"Wall Street Journal,
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the Rakuten website was getting 95 million hits per month—almost one hit for every man,
woman, and child in Japan. Thus, within five years, Japanese consumers in any city went
from only being able to buy locally or from catalogs to being able to purchase goods from
thousands of merchants located across Japan. By 2010, Rakuten had a 30 percent market
share in the Japanese e-commerce market, eclipsing global giants like Amazon and Yahoo.2
Rakuten transaction values continued to skyrocket reaching 12.7 trillion yen by 2017: equal
to about 2.3 percent of Japanese GDP.3
Since we can observe both which goods tend to be sold intensively online and can observe
how pricing behavior for goods changed before and after the entry of Rakuten, we can
adopt differences-in-differences strategy to identify how pricing behavior changed for goods
suitable for e-retail relative to goods not suitable for e-retail. We first characterize the set
of goods suitable for e-retail by calculating the difference between the share of consumer
expenditure for a good purchased through the internet with that in the Japanese Family
Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), which is used to compute the expenditure weights
for the Japanese consumer price index. While we find that virtually all goods are sold online,
there is enormous variation in e-retail intensity. Not surprisingly, highly perishable, non-
standardized goods are not sold intensively online. Neither are highly time-sensitive goods
and goods requiring consumer identification (e.g., medicines) or goods with high weight-to-
value ratios. To a first approximation, goods sold online closely resemble the set of goods that
historically dominated the catalog business: books, clothing, footwear, hardware, gardening
supplies, and (later) electronics. 4 Moreover, we find that regional variation in e-commerce
April 18, 2000.
2Rakuten Annual Report (2010).
3Rakuten Annual Report (2017).
4see https://dingley.com/five-pivotal-moments-in-catalog-history/
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sales intensity is entirely driven by the share of college-educated people, with no role for
urban-rural or young-old divides once one controls for education.
We use this feature of the data to first document evidence that the emergence of e-
commerce is associated with price drops in physical retailers selling goods that are available
online. This result is complementary to that of Goolsbee and Klenow (2018) who found that
goods available online in the U.S. have a lower rate of inflation than goods not available
online. Our result differs in two important dimensions. First, we show that this price impact
is apparent in the pricing decisions of physical retailers. Second, we show that the association
between goods that can be sold online and their relative rates of price changes did not exist
prior to the entry of large e-commerce firms. Thus, we provide evidence that advent of e-
commerce changed relative pricing behavior by lowering the relative prices of goods suitable
for e-retail by reducing relative retail markups, improving logistics, or generating some other
efficiency gain. If we assume that the monetary policy is such that e-commerce did not affect
prices in sectors untouched by e-retail, this appears to have lowered the Japanese price level
by about one percentage point between 1997 and 2016.
We next consider the impact of e-commerce on welfare through enhancing consumer ac-
cess to new varieties. Computing these gains for the class of models introduced by Krugman
(1980), Melitz (2003), and Eaton and Kortum (2002) can be done quite easily with our data
by simply computing the share of online purchases. This share rose rapidly to levels quite
similar to those observed in the U.S. Based on these sales shares, we obtain an estimate of
the welfare gain from e-commerce of 0.7 percent in 2016.
Finally, we examine how the difference in convergence rates across cities between goods
available online and those not available online changed after the entry of Rakuten into the
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market. We estimate that intercity convergence rates for Japan pre-Rakuten are higher than
those obtained in Parsley and Wei (1996) and Cecchetti et al. (2002). These studies found
no convergence or half-lives of price differentials of nine years. In contrast, we find that
half-lives for price differentials across Japanese cities are only 4.8 years for both goods that
are suitable and unsuitable for online sales prior to Rakuten’s entrance into the market. The
difference probably arises from the fact that Japanese CPI data is based on the sampling
of identical or extremely similar goods across cities, which makes it superior for this type
of analysis. Rakuten’s entry is associated with a 25 percent drop in this half-life for goods
traded intensively online, which we assume is due to the difficulty of maintaining intercity
price differences in a world with e-retail.
With these estimates in hand, we next compute the impact of e-retail on Japanese welfare
through improved price arbitrage using the model developed in Jensen (2007). An interesting
feature of this model is that not only is it the case that consumers in low-priced cities lose
while consumers in high-priced cities gain, the price movements imply that on net consumers
lose. This result doesn’t mean that arbitrage isn’t beneficial. The net welfare gain occurs
because producers in the low-priced cities can now sell in the high-priced cities. While this
does entail a loss for producers in the high-priced cities, the increase in surplus for producers
in the low-priced cities exceeds the losses for producers in the high-priced cities and the net
loss of consumer surplus, resulting in higher real income in the economy. Thus, the internet
acts very much like a reduction in trade costs in that there are lots of winners and losers.
Relative producer surplus falls and consumer surplus rises in the sectors with comparative
disadvantage (locations with relatively high-priced goods), but relative producer surplus
rises and consumer surplus falls in the sectors with comparative advantage (locations with
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relatively low-priced goods). However, just like a reduction in trade costs, the net gains are
positive.
In order to estimate these effects, we compute counterfactual price paths for the Japanese
economy. The first is based on our estimates of how intercity price differentials should
dissipate in the presence of e-retail, and the second is based on how intercity price differences
would dissipate in the absence of e-retail.The faster rate of price convergence in the presence
of e-retail implies that welfare gains will be higher after Rakuten entered the market. When
we quantify this for Japan, we estimate that the entry of Rakuten raised the welfare of
Japanese consumers by about 0.06 percent per year.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our results are related to a number of papers related to how information technology has
affected pricing and welfare. A large number of papers have demonstrated that information
technology serves to reduce price dispersion and promote trade. Freund and Weinhold (2004)
show that countries with more web hosts export more to each other. Jensen (2007), Aker
(2010), and Allen (2014) examined the impact of the introduction of mobile phones on fish or
agricultural markets in India, Niger, and the Philippines, and Steinwender (2018) examined
the impact of the transatlantic telegraph cables on 19th century textile prices and exports.
Our work is complementary to these papers in that we also show that e-retail serves to reduce
price dispersion. However, our work differs in focus and scope—our study examines the role
played by e-commerce in an advanced, modern economy on the prices of hundreds of goods
in physical retailers.
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Our paper is also related to studies of the impact of e-commerce on welfare. Many of
these studies have focused on the gains from variety that arise as consumers can purchase
products that are not available in local stores. For example, Brynjolfsson et al. (2003)
compute the variety gains from internet book sales; Fan et al. (2018) examine the relative
variety gains in large and small Chinese cities associated with internet usage; and Einav
et al. (2017) estimate the gains from e-retail due to shopping convenience and and new
varieties. An important difference between these studies and ours is that we make use of
government surveys of e-commerce sales to compute e-commerce sales shares (an impor-
tant input into welfare calculations) rather than using private Alibaba or credit-card data
to assess e-commerce expenditure shares. These private measures of e-commerce intensity
deviate substantially from official measures. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau reports
that in 2014, e-commerce firms accounted for about 6 percent of total retail sales, and the
Japanese Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry reports that in the same year, Japanese
e-commerce firms had a 4.4 percent market share.5 By contrast, the e-commerce sales inten-
sity in credit card or Ali Research data is around 20 percent for the U.S. and 10.6 percent
for China. Part of the discrepancy comes from the fact that credit cards are more likely to
be used for e-commerce transactions and balance-sheet sales numbers for e-commerce firms
often include revenues from other sources—finance, telecommunications, etc.—that do not
necessarily involve e-commerce. For example, of Rakuten’s net sales, 42 percent comes from
e-commerce, 7 percent from travel, and of the remainder most comes from credit cards,
banking, securities, and telecommunications.
Our paper also relates to studies of how the internet affects local markets. Goldmanis
5https://census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf
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et al. (2010) examine regional patterns in online purchase behavior change the market struc-
ture in bookstores, travel agencies and car dealers. Goyal (2010) finds that the introduction
of internet kiosks raised soy prices in rural India. Couture et al. (2018) conduct a random-
ized control trial in eight rural Chinese counties and find little effect of the introduction of
e-commerce on the local economy. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) show that the creation of
online insurance sales systems reduced the variance of insurance pricing. Our work differs
from these studies in terms of scope (the large number of different sectors considered), the
link to physical retail prices across an entire economy, and identification strategy (the ability
to examine differential rates of price convergence before and after the advent of e-commerce).
The paper also relates to the literature on internet pricing. In particular, Cavallo (2017)
shows that online prices and prices in physical stores are quite similar. This fact helps
motivate our assumption that local retailers with high prices should face stiff competition
from online retailers. Goolsbee and Klenow (2018) show that price trends of goods sold
online exhibited lower inflation rates in the US between 2014 and 2017 than in the CPI.
While we also show that goods available online exhibit lower inflation rates than goods not
available online, there are two important differences between our study and theirs. First, we
can show that this pattern was not present prior to the introduction of e-commerce. This
fact makes it clear that the differential patterns in inflation rates is not a characteristic of
the goods themselves but rather it was an effect that appeared for goods sold online only
after the introduction of the internet. Second, we show that goods sold intensively online
exhibit lower rates of price increase in physical stores. This is consistent with the idea that
online price trends are mirrored in the prices of physical retailers.
Finally, our paper is also related to the large literature on PPP convergence regressions.
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Parsley and Wei (1996) were the first to document that differences in convergence coefficients
across cities was linked to trade costs, an insight that we build upon in this paper. Bergin
et al. (2017) employ a similar triple difference strategy to show that rates of price convergence
across European countries increased after joining the euro area. Our contribution lies in
adapting some of the techniques developed in these earlier papers for understanding how
e-commerce affects regional price convergence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the the es-
timation strategy and provides the theory for the welfare calculation. Section 2.3 presents
the data and provides some stylized facts about e-retail suitability. We present our main
estimates for the impact of Rakuten on price convergence and welfare in Section 2.4, and
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theory
Estimating the impact of e-commerce on average prices and in New Trade Theory is very
straightforward following Arkolakis et al. (2012), so we will skip the theoretical discussion of
how to do this and just deal with the estimation issues in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. In Section
2.2.1, we model the impact that e-commerce has had on interregional price differential, and
we show how the decline in these differentials raises welfare in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Estimating the Impact of the E-Retail on Price Arbitrage
We begin by defining some notation. Let pict ≡ lnPict be the log price of item i in city c in
time t. Define the ∆k operator as ∆kpict ≡ pict−pic,t−k; thus, if we set k = 1, we can examine
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annual changes, but we can also examine longer differences by setting k equal to a whole
number larger than one. Let xi ∈ [0, 1] be the “e-commerce suitability” of the good, where
zero indicates it is not suitable for e-commerce and one indicates that it is the most suitable
good for e-retail. Let Dt be an indicator variable that is one if e-commerce are positive in
period t and zero otherwise. We assume that the change in the price of any item in a city c
can be written as a standard purchasing price parity specification in which we introduce a
modification that allows the rate of price converge for goods available online to change, i.e.,
∆kpict = αit + βct + (γ + δ1xi + δ2Dtxi) pic,t−k + ict, (2.1)
where αit is a item-time fixed effect; βct is a city-time fixed effect; γ is a parameter that cap-
tures the rate of intercity price convergence for goods not available online; δ1 is a parameter
that captures the rate of price convergence for goods available online prior to the entry of
e-commerce firms; δ2 captures the increase in rate of price convergence for online goods after
the entry of e-commerce firms; and ict is an iid error term. We think of this error as price
shocks arising from period t local supply-and-demand conditions for an item in a city that
are not shared by all items in the city and are uncorrelated with past prices.
In this specification, a critical parameter is the rate of convergence given by (γ + δ1xi + δ2Dtxi),
which we expect to be between −1 and 0. A value of -1 means that equation (2.1) collapses
to pict = αit + βct + ict, and therefore the price of any item can be decomposed into its
national price (αit), a common local market premium (βct), and an iid error term that is
not persistent. In this case, any idiosyncratic price shock to a good in a city (ict) has no
impact on prices in the next period. Hence, price convergence occurs in one period, and
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prices always equal their conditional mean of (αit + βct) plus a random iid shock. At the
other extreme, we have the case of where (γ + δ1xi + δ2Dtxi) = 0, which implies that the
price of that good i in city c follows a random walk with a drift term given by (αit + βct).
In intermediate cases where (γ + δ1xi + δ2Dtxi) ∈ (−1, 0) , price differences across cities can
persist for more than k years.
In our setup, we can write the approximate half-life6 of any price deviation from the
steady-state price (measured in intervals of length k) as7
Ht ≡ ln (0.5)
ln
(
1 + γˆ + δˆ1xi + δˆ2Dtxi
) . (2.2)
As one can see from this formula, the change in the rate of convergence depends on all of the
estimated convergence parameters, therefore there is not a simple mapping from changes in
δt into rates of convergence. Thus, the impact of e-retail on the rate of convergence for any
good i can be written as:
∆Ht ≡ ln (0.5)
ln
(
1 + γˆ + δˆ1xi + δˆ2xi
) − ln (0.5)
ln
(
1 + γˆ + δˆ1xi
) . (2.3)
2.2.2 Welfare
We can use these estimates to inform us about the welfare gains from e-commerce by us-
ing the framework developed in Jensen (2007). Jensen considered a technological change
that enabled arbitrage between a high-priced region (H) and a low-priced region (L). This
6As Goldberg and Verboven (2005) note, this formula is only correct for AR1 processes.
7The steady state price is given by the price at which setting ∆pict = 0. This price equals pic =
− (αit + βct) / (γ + δ1xi + δ2Dtxi).
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framework can easily be applied to the e-commerce context since e-commerce firms provide
a platform that enables consumers in any city to purchase goods from a large number of
retailers spread across Japan. If e-commerce enables local retailers in the low-priced region
to make ∆Q units of sales to the high-priced region, we should expect the price in region
H to fall and the price in L to rise as shown in Figure 2.1. Consumers in H will gain
(A+B), and sellers will gain (C − A), yielding a net gain of (B + C). Similarly, in region
L, consumers will lose (D + E) and sellers will gain (D − F ), yielding a net loss of (E + F ).
Overall, the welfare gain is (B + C)− (E + F ), which will necessarily be positive in the case
of linear demands with equal slopes as long as the price in H is at least as large as the price
in the region L after arbitrage (i.e., P (QH + ∆Q) ≥ P (QL −∆Q)). One can also see this
condition holds in the figure because both trapezoids (B + C) and (E + F ) have identical
bases and differ only in the heights of their parallel sides.
Jensen (2007) considered a case in which the marginal cost of supplying a market is zero,
which enabled him to compute the lengths of the parallel sides of the quasi-trapezoids by
just using the prices. When thinking about production more generally, however, marginal
costs are likely to be positive, so technically we should subtract marginal costs from prices
when computing the lengths of the parallel sides of the quasi-trapezoids. However, as one
can see from Figure2.1, if we assume constant and equal marginal costs of production, then
G = G′ , and we can still compute the welfare gain as (B + C +G) −
(
E + F +G′
)
=
(B + C)− (E + F ).8
In order to compute the welfare gain, we need to compute the price change associated
8The assumption of equal marginal costs is probably not extreme for Japan given the small physical size
of the country (most major cities are within a few hours drive of Tokyo), which means that transport costs
are unlikely to produce large price differences across cities.
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Figure 2.1: Welfare Gains from Arbitrage in the Jensen Model
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with the arbitrage opportunity associated with e-commerce. We begin by writing the change
in welfare due to the price change of good i in city c over k periods as
∆Wict =
1
2 (2Pic,t−1 + ∆P ict) ∆Qic,t −m∆Qic,t, (2.4)
where m is the marginal cost of producing the good. Without loss of generality we can
decompose prices and quantities into two components: a national component that captures
national movements in the price of good i (∆Pit), a city-specific component that captures
relative movements in prices in that city (∆PRict):
∆Pict = ∆Pit + ∆PRict. (2.5)
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Let the total quantity demanded be denoted by Qit ≡ ∑cQict. We can now decompose
quantity movements (∆Qict) into a national component (∆QNict ≡ (Qic,t/Qi,t) ∆Qit), which
tells us how consumption in the city would have moved if it followed the national trend, and



















































In other words, the change in welfare in a city can be decomposed into a term that depends on
how the national change in prices and quantities affected welfare, a second term that depends
on how price movements in that city relative to the national average affected welfare, and two
second-order terms that capture the fact that a relative price decline matters more for welfare
if it occurs for a good that is on average growing in consumption and one that captures the
fact that a national drop in prices raises welfare more if local demand is also rising. Our
focus will be on the aggregate gains arising from the second term (∑c ∆WRict=∑c ∆WRict −
m
∑
c ∆QRict), which captures the first-order impact of relative price movements on welfare.
Defining the terms this way lets us write ∆QRict/Qict = ∆Qict/Qict −∆Qit/Qit, which is
more convenient to write as a log approximation given by ∆qRict ≡ ∆qict−∆qit. If we assume
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that there is no regional variation in demand elasticities (ηc = η ∀c), we then have
∆qRict ≡ ∆qict −∆qit = −η (∆pict −∆pit) . (2.8)
If we multiply this expression by Qic,t−5 and sum across all cities we obtain an expression















where the last equality follows from our assumption (which is the same as that of Jensen
(2007)) that relative price changes arising from new arbitrage opportunities do not affect







In other words, the log-change in national price index is just a quantity-weighted average of
the log price change in each city. We now can conduct our counterfactual welfare analysis.
Based on equation (2.1), we can write the best estimate of price change:
∆̂pict = αˆit + βˆct +
(
γˆ + δˆ1xi + δˆ2Dtxi
)
pic,t−1. (2.11)
Therefore, the aggregate price change for any good is
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The evolution of prices in each city relative to the national price increase can be expressed






























∆̂WRict (Dt) . (2.15)
The real gain due to enhanced arbitrage from e-retail can then be written as:
∆̂WEt ≡
[
∆̂WRt (Dt = 1)− ∆̂W
R
t (Dt = 0)
]
/Pt, (2.16)
where Pt is the price level in year t. Note that this gain only applies to any particular period.
If we want to compute the aggregate gain over more than one period, we can calculate the







A major challenge in prior research is the lack of a product-wise measure of e-retail sales.
Thus, prior work has not been able to observe the value of e-retail sales and instead uses
online expenditure share of each city’s total retail sale or . Fortunately, we make use of two
datasets providing a product-wise measure of e-retail sales in Japan: the National Survey of
Family Income and Expenditures (NSFIE) and Rakuten sales data.
The NSFIE is a representative survey of households that report the purchase channels by
product of Japanese households:small retail store, supermarket, convenience store, depart-
ment store, co-op purchasing, discount store, catalog, Internet, and others. Starting in 2004,
the NSFIE also began a quinquennial recording the expenditure share of each product from
online merchants.
Rakuten, the largest e-retail company in Japan, provided us with 2010 internet sales data
(aggregated across buyers and merchants) for each of their narrowest product categories
covering the universe of transactions on their platform. In that year, Rakuten had a 30
percent market share of all Japanese e-commerce, so we believe that its transactions are
likely to be representative of the overall internet sales intensity of goods.9 When uploading
the product information on to the Rakuten platform, sellers designate whether their product
falls into one of approximately 40,000 product categories or “genres”. We then matched these
9Rakuten, Inc. (2010) Annual Report.
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genres to the expenditure categories in the 2010 Japanese Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES) and the categories that appear in the Japanese consumer price index. This
generated a matched sample in which we have 312 tradable goods in a typical year, which
we use in our main specifications, and of 364 expenditure items that we use to characterize
all Japanese expenditures.
We construct e-commerce intensity of an expenditure category by comparing average
household’s total expenditure on that category with average household’s online expenditure
on it. We measure total expenditure ei on category i by using national average expenditures
per household in 2009 taken from FIES. We denote online expenditure in category i from
NSFIE by si.10 We then define e-commerce intensity xi of category i by taking the ratio of











In order to see how e-commerce intensity varies across products, we aggregated the FIES
codes into some broader categories in Table 2.1 so that we could display the data in a com-
pact form. As most of services are not available online, we will focus on e-commerce’s
impact on goods prices for all of our main results. The rows are ordered by a cate-
gory’s share of Japanese expenditures on goods. The first column of Table 2.1 reports
the percentage of expenditures in category ` among goods in 2009 as reported in the FIES
(E` ≡ ∑i∈Ω` ei/∑j ej × 100), where Ω` is the set of items in some more aggregated category
`. In the second column, we report the percentage of online expenditure in 2009 that corre-
10We compute si from Rakuten by summing gross merchant sales across all genres contained in the set of




sponds to that category ((S` ≡ ∑i∈Ω` si/∑j sj × 100), where si is online expenditure from
NSFIE). The fourth column reports the “e-commerce intensity” in 2009, which we define to
be the ratio of the two previous columns divided it by the maximum value of S`/E` (i.e.,
xi ≡ Si/Ei/ [maxj {Sj/Ej}]). Thus, our measure of e-commerce intensity takes on a value
of zero if there are no transactions involving an expenditure category and a value of 1 if
the online expenditure relative to those in the economy is the highest among all categories
of goods. Expressing e-commerce intensity this way makes our e-commerce intensity (xi)
invariant to the size of sector i.
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Table 2.1: Internet intensity of consumer expenditure on goods
Category Share of Total Share of Internet E-commerce Intensity E-commerce Intensity E-commerce Intensity E-commerce Intensity
Expenditure 2009 Expenditure 2009 2004 2009 2014 Rakuten 2010
Fruits and vegetables 10.24 1.76 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03
Household consumables 10.19 18.00 0.36 0.15 0.28 0.58
Clothing 9.61 13.45 0.28 0.11 0.22 0.42
Store-bought cooked food 7.62 1.10 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Cereal 6.21 1.54 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.07
Fish and shellfish 6.13 1.40 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04
Cakes and candies 5.72 1.62 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.08
Meat 5.55 0.73 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03
Recreational goods 4.65 12.71 0.55 0.30 0.47 0.93
Household applicances 4.05 6.32 0.31 0.21 0.36 0.35
Electronics 3.88 19.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.53
Alcoholic beverages 3.36 1.32 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.26
Medicine and nutritional supplements 3.35 4.85 0.29 0.23 0.31 0.23
Non-alcoholic beverages 3.17 2.20 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.16
Oils, fats and seasonings 3.11 0.73 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05
Newspapers and magazines 2.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dairy products and eggs 2.81 0.29 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01
Transportation equiment 2.14 3.01 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.58
Domestic utensils 2.06 4.04 0.39 0.14 0.49 0.53
Furniture and furnishings 1.78 3.45 0.39 0.33 0.51 1.00
Footwear 1.40 2.13 0.30 0.14 0.28 0.92
Total/Mean 100.00 100.00 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.32
Notes: Shares are expressed as percentages. Internet intensity is calculated as Data s ource: FIES, NSFIE, Rakuten, and authors’ calculation. The
first column is from FIES. Column 2- 5 are from NSFIE and the last column is from Rakuten.
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Table 2.1 makes clear some basic stylized facts of our data. First, within goods categories
we see that there are no zeros in the table indicating that at this level of aggregation all
categories of goods were available online in in 2009. Second, there is enormous variation in
the e-retail intensity. Some of this reflects the fact that highly perishable, non-standardized
items (e.g. fresh foods), restricted/time-sensitive items (e.g., medicine and physical newspa-
pers ), and high weight-to-value items (non-perishable groceries) are not sold much online.
At the other end of the spectrum, we see that more standardized goods—e.g., electronics,
books, clothing, footwear, and furniture and furnishings—are sold very intensively online.
Interestingly, we see that domestic utensils, household consumables (which includes non-
durable household supplies like paper products and cleaning agents), and recreational goods
(which includes items like sports equipment and gardening supplies) are sold very intensively
online as well. In other words, goods sold intensively online tend have characteristics that are
similar to those goods historically available in catalogs—i.e., goods that are non-perishable,
low weight-to-value, standardized, and storable.Third, e-commerce intensity from NSFIE in
2009 is highly correlated with that from Rakuten in 2010.
There is an important difference between aggregate e-commerce sales shares point-of-
sale data reported by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the
numbers reported in the NSFIE. The difference is likely to due to the way in which the data
are collected. METI bases its e-commerce sales shares by conducting a survey of the major e-
commerce firms and dividing e-commerce sales by the sales of of all Japanese manufacturers.
The NSFIE, however, is based on household surveys and suffers from the problem that a
growing share of households have been not answering questions related to where they made
their purchases. In particular, in 1999 only 7 percent of expenditures were from undisclosed
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locations, but by 2014, this number had risen to 13 percent. By contrast, the share of
e-commerce sales in the NSFIE is rising over time, but the the level in 2014 was only 2.4
percent of aggregate expenditures, which is about half the METI number and implausibly
small given the magnitude of Rakuten sales. After discussing the discrepancies with people
knowledgeable about Japanese statistics, we came to the conclusion that an important part
of the discrepancy is due to households that buy goods online not reporting the sales channel
and the purchase channel being left blank.11 We therefore use the METI data to identify
aggregate internet sales shares and the NSFIE and Rakuten data for understanding the
distribution of internet sales shares.
The NSFIE data also enables us to examine e-commerce intensity by location for the 47
prefectures of Japan. As one can see from Figure 2.2, there is a very strong association be-
tween the share of prefectures online expenditures and the share of a prefecture’s population
over the age of 15 that went to college. This variable alone explains 60 percent of the variance
across prefectures. Interestingly, when we tried to control for other prefectural covariates
that we thought might be associated with e-commerce expenditure shares—per capita in-
come, population (urbanization), average age, or other education levels—none of these were
even close to statistically or economically significant in any specification in which we also
included the share of the population with a college degree. This suggests that e-commerce is
largely a technology that serves highly educated people and urban-rural or old-young digital
divides are secondary.12
11We thank Takashi Unayama of Hitotsubashi University for insights into this issue.
12Interestingly, Fan et al. (2018) find no link between education and internet sales intensity. One possibility
for the difference in the results is that Chinese education levels in their data set are much lower than in our
data. The average number of years of education in Fan et al. (2018) is only 8.8 years whereas the average in
our sample of Japanese cities is 11.9 years .
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Internet Sales Share vs Share of College Education
We also make use of the fact that the Japan Statistical Bureau (JSB), which produces
the Japanese CPI provides detailed information on representative prices of the products in
the FIES categories. These prices are sampled in all cities that are either a prefectural
government or have population of 150,000 or more with an aim of not only tracking product
prices across time but also across space. This information typically identifies the brand of
an item or a detailed description (e.g., “Big-eyed tuna, sliced (for sashimi), lean, 100g”).
While the data is not sufficiently detailed to always pin down the exact barcode, the data
leaves limited scope for unobserved quality differences to affect intercity price differentials.
For example, Imai et al. (2012) find that it is sufficiently detailed to rule out approximately
85 percent of all bar codes in a CPI product category. Moreover, since the objective of
the JSB sampling is to make meaningful intercity price comparisons, there is a tendency to
select the same products by, for example always picking the largest selling item within a
sampling frame if available. Thus, while US CPI data typically is based on different baskets
of goods in different cities, the JSB’s “purposive” sampling generate samples in which the
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same good or very similar goods are sampled in different cities. Therefore, it is reasonable
to believe that intercity prices are informative about true price differences across locations.13
One problem in the data is that we have periodic product substitutions that arise as goods
are added to or dropped from the CPI sample. Fortunately, we have official quality-adjusted
price quotes for Tokyo computed by the JSB14, which we use to adjust the prices in other
cities. This procedure is equivalent to assuming that the quality change associated with a
product substitution in the CPI is identical across cities.
13In order to further clean the data, we drop all observations in which the item only appears in one city.
We also trimmed 3 smallest and 3 largest price quotes within an item-year observation. Finally, we dropped
the bottom and top 1% of log price changes.
14http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?bid=000001033703&cycode=0, accessed on April 5th, 2017.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for the Sample of Goods
Mean Standard Min p10 p50 p90 Max
Deviation
Period: 1992 to 1996
∆1pict -0.004 0.099 -0.858 -0.102 0.000 0.089 0.953
xi(t=2009) 0.057 0.073 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.157 0.456
xi(t=2009) × pic(t−1) 0.455 0.679 0.000 0.018 0.136 1.337 4.107
Observations 74,992
Period: 1997 to 2001
∆1pict -0.008 0.106 -1.124 -0.117 -0.001 0.084 1.165
xi(t=2009) 0.053 0.070 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.151 0.456
xi(t=2009) × pic(t−1) 0.415 0.645 0.000 0.018 0.123 1.212 4.075
Observations 109,853
Period: 2002 to 2006
∆1pict -0.010 0.115 -1.798 -0.129 -0.003 0.104 1.679
xi(t=2009) 0.052 0.074 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.146 1.000
xi(t=2009) × pic(t−1) 0.399 0.689 0.000 0.020 0.113 1.165 11.690
Observations 164,011
Period: 2007 to 2011
∆1pict -0.001 0.125 -1.695 -0.129 0.000 0.126 1.556
xi(t=2009) 0.053 0.081 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.146 1.000
xi(t=2009) × pic(t−1) 0.410 0.750 0.000 0.019 0.112 1.195 10.684
Observations 164,531
Period: 2012 to 2016
∆1pict 0.014 0.100 -1.276 -0.085 0.010 0.121 1.092
xi(t=2009) 0.052 0.080 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.141 1.000
xi(t=2009) × pic(t−1) 0.398 0.724 0.000 0.019 0.109 1.173 10.300
Observations 168,592
Notes: Prices are in natural log. ∆pict is the one-year log difference in prices;
xi = si/eimaxj(sj/ej) .
Table 2.2 reports the sample statistics for our data. As one can see from the table, we
have more than 100,000 price quotes in any of our five-year periods since e-retail has become
available in Japan in 1997. The first line of the table shows the average annual rate of
inflation across the sample period. As one can see, on average goods prices fell before 2011,
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which reflects the deflation that can be observed in Japan over this time period. The second
line reports information on the e-commerce intensity of the goods in our sample (xi). The
values of xi across goods tell us about the relative importance of online sales. Here we see
that goods in the the upper 90th percentile of the distribution have an e-retail intensity of
0.146 over the full sample period, which is more than seven times higher than a good with
the median intensity. Moreover, at the upper tail of the distribution, we observe goods with
an e-commerce intensity that is more than 50 times higher than that of the median good.
These summary statistics reflect the skewness in the distribution of e-retail sales intensity
that we saw in Table 2.1. Some goods are sold very intensively online, but most goods are
purchased predominantly in physical stores.
One concern about our data is that it is not at the barcode level. This might create
problems if the JSB is sampling goods of very different quality across cities. Hottman et al.
(2016) show that the correlation between price and quality in bar-code data is 0.9, so we
should expect sampling problems to produce high levels of price dispersion in our sample.
We can check whether we have excessive price dispersion (caused by including goods of very
different quality within categories) by computing the the price of each good in each city
less the average price of that good across all cities and then taking the standard deviation
of this difference. When we do this in the third row of each panel, we find that intercity
price differences for the same good in Japan is about 15 percent. By contrast, Broda and
Weinstein (2008) find the standard deviation in intercity prices of bar-coded goods is 22
percent in the US and 19 percent for Canadian provinces. The fact that intercity price
dispersion of goods in the Japanese CPI is lower than that for bar-coded goods in the US
and Canada suggests that the JSB is probably not including goods that differ substantially
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in quality when sampling goods in different cities and therefore that quality variation across
cities for the same product is unlikely to be a major problem in our data.
2.4 Estimation
In Section 2.4.3, we first do some data exploration to first show that price convergence is a
central tendency in the data and that there is visual evidence that the internet changed the
rate of convergence. We also show that there was no important change in the overall rates
of price change for goods available online. This provides some prima facie evidence that
our focus on relative intercity price movements of goods sold by e-retailers as opposed to
absolute price declines of online goods is in line with the data. We next estimate the impact
of e-retail on the rate of price convergence in Section 2.4.3.1. Finally, in Section 2.4.3.2, we
present our estimates of the welfare gain from e-retail.
2.4.1 E-commerce and National Prices
Goolsbee and Klenow (2018) have explored whether we see any differences in rates of inflation
for goods available online. Here, we build on this work to show that these differential rates
of inflation only appeared after the entry of e-commerce firms. In order to examine this in
the data, we regress annual log price changes of goods (∆pict) on good (i) and city (c) fixed
effects along with an indicator variable, Dt, that is one starting in 1997 (the year Rakuten
opened) and zero before as well as the internet sales intensity of the good interacted with
this dummy (xiDt):
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∆pict = αi + βc + φDt + θxiDt + ict, (2.18)
The coefficient on Dt (φ) tells us whether there was any differential trend in price inflation
for goods available online after the entrance of e-commerce firms and θ, the coefficient on
the e-commerce intensity interaction term (xiDt) tells us about the differential rate of price
change for goods traded online after the entry of e-commerce firms. We do this for two time
periods (1992-2001) and (1992-2016) to see if there is any difference in the results we obtain
by looking at the period immediately after the entry of e-commerce firms versus the full time
period.
Table 2.3: Relative Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆1pict ∆1pict ∆1pict ∆1pict ∆1pict ∆1pict ∆1pict
Dt -0.0024*** -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0069*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0093***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
E-commerce Intensity 0.0229*** -0.0060 -0.0058 -0.0583*** -0.0860*** -0.0859*** -0.0882***
×Dt (0.0048) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0026) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Constant -0.0040*** -0.0119*** -0.0094** -0.0041*** -0.0175*** -0.0172*** -0.0175***
(0.0004) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0004) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Sample Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods and Service
Fixed Effects Product Product and City Product Product and City Product and City
t 1992-2001 1992-2001 1992-2001 1992-2016 1992-2016 1992-2016 1992-2016
Observations 152,958 152,958 152,958 394,663 394,663 394,663 397,670
R2 0.000 0.040 0.040 0.001 0.038 0.039 0.038
E-commerce intensity year 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: RPS, NSFIE, and authors’ calculation. First three columns use periods from 1992 - 20001 immediately after the entry of
e-commerce firms and column (4) - (7) use the full-time period.
We present these results in Table 2.3. Overall, the constant term is negative, which
reflects the fact that Japan experienced deflation over much of this time period. In all
the regressions with full time period, we see a significant negative coefficient on the post-e-
commerce e-commerce intensity interaction (xiDt). Even more interesting is the fact that this
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effect becomes statistically significant and larger once we extend the sample to 2016. In terms
of economic magnitudes, the results in column 6 imply that a good at the 90th percentile
of internet sales intensity had an inflation rates that fell by 1 percentage points per year
faster after the entry of e-commerce firms. This is consistent with results in Goolsbee and
Klenow (2018) who found that goods traded online have lower inflation rates than goods not
available online. However, our results differ in that we show that this difference is observable
in the prices in physical stores and that these differential price trends did not exist prior to
the entry of e-commerce firms. These results suggest that while there may be some evidence
that better logistics, reduced markups, and other factors associated with e-retail might have
affected price increases of goods available online.
We can also use these estimates to compute the implied gain from the differential impact
on prices estimated in Table 2.3. If we assume that the entry of e-commerce did not affect
the price level in sectors with no e-commerce sales, i.e., we ignore general equilibrium effects,








where θˆ is the estimated coefficient on the internet intensity interaction term in equation
(2.18). Based on the specification in column 7, we estimate that e-commerce lowered the
Japanese price level by 0.05 percent per year or about 1 percentage point between 1997
and 2016 due to reductions in markups and efficiency gains. Converting this number to
welfare depends on whether one thinks the drop in the Japanese price level was just due to
a reduction in retail markups (in which case most of the gain was a transfer from producers
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to consumers) or a rise in efficiency in which case it was a pure welfare gain.
2.4.2 Gains in “New Trade Models”
Although Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) computed the variety gains from internet book sales, we
know of no study that has done this generally. Fortunately, this is trivial to do with our
data. Arkolakis et al. (2012) show that in the Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003), and Eaton
and Kortum (2002) models, the log change in welfare following a trade liberalization equals
1

ln λ, where λ ∈ [0, 1) is the share of consumer of expenditures on sales from retailers other
than e-commerce firms, and  equals the “trade elasticity.” The trade elasticity has a different
interpretation in different models. For example, in the Krugman (1980) model it equals one
minus the elasticity of demand whereas in the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, it equals
the negative of the Fréchet shape parameter. However, in order to make progress, we will
use a standard estimate for the trade elasticity of -5.
The computation of the share of household purchases that was made from sources other
than e-retailers and be computed straightforwardly. Based on the NSFIE data, we know that
the share of household expenditures purchased from all retailers (χ) was 0.62 in 2014, with
the remaining expenditures covering utilities, education, and other expenditure items that
we will assume do not represent e-commerce. If we couple this with the share of expenditures
in 2014 from all e-retailers, s = 0.0437, we we have λ = (1− s)χ+ 1− χ = 0.97. This gives
us an estimate of the welfare gain from e-commerce in Japan in 2014 of 0.6 percent. We can
also easily do some robustness checks for different values of the trade elasticity. Allowing the
trade elasticity to range -3 to -7 results in welfare gains that range from 0.4 percent to 0.9
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percent. Similarly, if we had computed the Japanese gains achieved in 2017, we would obtain
a number of 0.7 percent. Thus, our point estimate for the welfare gains these e-commerce
gains is 0.6, with reasonable estimates ranging from 0.4 percent to 0.9 percent.
2.4.3 Gains Due to Price Arbitrage
In order to visualize what is going to drive our results, we first consider two five-year periods.
The first five-year period (1991-1996), pre-dates the formation of e-commerce by at least a
year, so we can call this period the “pre-e-commerce period.” We start the second period
in 1996 because we assume that in 1996, the distribution of prices was reflective of a world
without e-commerce but by 2001, Rakuten was already a prominent, listed company, with
tens of millions of hits and thousands of stores selling on its platform.
It is difficult to compare price changes across goods and cities in their raw form because
different goods exhibit different average price changes in different years. We therefore nor-
malized the data by regressing ∆pict and pict on product and city fixed effects and construct
normalized price changes (∆5pict− αˆit− βˆct) and normalized price levels (pic,t−5− αˆ′it− βˆ′ct),
where αˆit (αˆ′it) and βˆct (βˆ′ct) are the estimated fixed effects from the regression of ∆pict (pict)
on product and city fixed effects. Thus, these normalized prices remove the effect of any
common price movements at the product or city level. Figure 2.3 presents plots of normal-
ized five-year change in prices (∆5pict − αˆit − βˆct) against the normalized five-year lag of
prices in each city (pic,t−5 − αˆ′it − βˆ′ct).
The first panel shows how normalized price changes vary with normalized prices before
and after the entry of e-commerce. There is a clear negative relationship between initial
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Data source: RPS, NSFIE, and authors’ calculation. Notes: This graph plots normalized price changes
against normalized price levels. The left panel shows normalized price changes before the entry of e-commerce
and the right panel shows them after the entry of e-commerce. The first panel plots for all goods, the second
panel plots for goods with e-commerce intensity lower than the bottom quartlie, and the third panel shows
for gods with e-commerce intensity higher than the top quartile.
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price deviations and future price growth, which indicates that goods that had high prices in
cities tended to have lower rates of inflation than goods with low prices. This mean reversion
in the data is the convergence that is likely to be product of price arbitrage. As one can see
from these two plots, there is the average rate of price unconditional rate price convergence
is about 30 percent and rose to 39 percent in the four-years after the entry of e-commerce.
These plots also speak to the relatively high quality of the Japanese data. For example,
studies using U.S. data (c.f., Parsley and Wei (1996)) find no evidence of price convergence
once one controlled for city fixed effects. One plausible reason for the weaker evidence of
price convergence in the U.S. is that that the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers
Association data used in this study is not based on purposive sampling, so price changes in
cities are based on a changing mix goods of different qualities across locations (as shown in
Handbury and Weinstein (2015)).
The next two pictures show what was driving this increase in the intercity rate of price
convergence. Here, we divide the sample into the set of goods with an internet sales intensity
in the lowest first quartile of the distribution in 2009 (xi < 0.076) and the set of goods in the
highest quartile of the distribution (xi > 0.013). As one can see from the second panel in
Figure 2.3, there was almost no change in the rate of convergence for goods not sold on the
e-commerce. The slope of the line for goods not available online in the early period is -0.29,
which is almost identical to the slope in the pre-e-commerce period (-0.30) and the slope in
the post-e-commerce period for goods not traded much online (-0.29). In other words, the
entry of e-commerce firms did not seem to have had much of an effect on goods not traded on
e-commerce. However, we see a very different pattern for goods with an internet intensity in
the upper quartile of the distribution. The slope steepens by 66 percent, rising in magnitude
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from -0.29 to -0.48. In other words, Figure 2.3 provides the visual version of the result we
will explore econometrically in Section 2.2.1—following the entry of e-commerce firms, the
rate of price convergence for goods traded intensively rose substantially.
2.4.3.1 Estimating Convergence Rates
We now turn to obtaining estimates of the impact of Rakuten on the rate of intercity price
convergence. Table 2.4 presents the results of estimating equation (2.1) for five- and one-year
intervals. In the first column, we present separate regressions for a specification analogous
to what we showed in the plots. In the first two columns, we present separate regressions
for 1996 and 2001 where we let the convergence rates vary across the two time periods.
Comparing the first rows of columns 1 and 2 reveals the convergence rates for goods not
suitable for e-commerce (i.e., those where xi = 0) were almost identical before and after
the entry of e-commerce. The coefficient on e-commerce intensity interacted with lagged
prices (xipic,t−5) in column 1 indicates that the rate of convergence for goods suitable for
e-commerce sales was not significantly different than the convergence rate of other goods
prior to to the entry of e-commerce. However, the negative and significant coefficient on the
interaction term (Dtxipic,t−5) in the post-e-commerce sample (where we dropped the xipic,t−5
term from the specification because we do not have any pre-e-commerce observations) indi-
cates a significantly faster rate for goods available online after the entry of e-commerce firms.
This specification confirms the basic insight about the increase in the rates of convergence
of goods sold intensively online after the entry of e-commerce that we saw in Figure 2.3.
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Table 2.4: Estimates Over Period 1991-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ∆5pict ∆5pict ∆5pict ∆1pict
Lagged price -0.291*** -0.326*** -0.312*** -0.137***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002)
E-commerce intensity -0.181** -0.028 0.050**
(t=2009) × Lagged price (0.091) (0.084) (0.025)
E-commerce intensity -1.115*** -1.222*** -0.753***
× Lagged price × Post e-commerce (0.084) (0.097) (0.048)
t {1996} {2001} {1996,2001} Annual
1992-2001
Observations 25,923 27,509 51,185 152,958
R2 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.51
E-commerce intensity Year 2009 2009 2009 2009
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: RPS, NSFIE, and authors’ calculation.
In column 3, we estimate our baseline differences-in-differences specification of equation
(2.1) using a five-year difference by letting t take on two values: 1996 and 2001. The
most important result for our purposes is the estimate of the coefficient on the interaction
term on the internet intensity coefficient. As one can see from the table, the coefficient is
negative and precisely measured. Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient on pic,t−k, γˆ,
doesn’t change much, and we continue to get a negative and significant coefficient on the
e-commerce intensity interaction term (δˆ2 = −1.222). Interestingly, the estimate of δ1, the
differential rate of price convergence for e-commerce intensive goods flips sign and becomes
small and positive, which implies that if we pool the data over the two time periods, goods
suitable for e-commerce had, if anything, a slightly slower rate of price convergence than
goods not available online.
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One way to assess the economic significance our results is in terms of price-convergence
half-lives: i.e., the amount of time it takes for half of any price differential to disappear. Al-
though five-year differences lend themselves easily to the standard differences-in-differences
specification, it is not standard to discuss half-lives in terms of five-year periods. The con-
ventional way to estimate half-lives is to use higher frequency data. In column 4 of Table 2.4,
we redo our estimation at an annual frequency. The coefficients fall in magnitude because a
given percentage movement in prices over a five-year period implies a smaller movement over
any single year. However, we observe the same pattern in the data. The entry of e-commerce
is associated with a significant increase in inter-regional rates of price convergence.
We next compute the half-lives for three variants of our specification: one for goods not
traded online (xi = 0); one for goods in the 90th percentile of e-commerce intensity in the
pre-e-commerce period (xi = p90, Dt = 0); and finally one for one for goods in the 90th
percentile of e-commerce intensity in the post-e-commerce period (xi = p90, Dt = 1). For
goods not sold online (xi = 0), the coefficient of -0.137 on lagged prices corresponds to a
half-life for price differences of 4.7 years. Similarly, we also see that prior to the entry of
e-commerce firms (i.e., goods for which xi = p90, Dt = 0) had a similar half-life of 5 years.
Thus, prior to the entry to e-commerce firms, we see only a marginal difference in convergence
rates for goods available online and off. By contrast, when Cecchetti et al. (2002) estimated
this half-life using U.S. data, they found it to be nine years: almost twice as long. Similarly,
Parsley and Wei (1996) found a unit root, i.e., an infinite half-life, when running a similar
regression with city fixed effects. The differences in these results probably highlights the
intercity comparability of the price data in Japan. However, there is a much larger impact
of e-commerce on the convergence rate for Japanese goods sold online (xi = p90, Dt = 1).
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For these goods, the half-life fell from 5 years to 2.5 years after Rakuten’s entry: a 50percent
increase in the convergence rate.
Table 2.5: Estimates Over Alternative Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable ∆5pict ∆5pict ∆5pict ∆5pict ∆1pict
Lagged price -0.391*** -0.460*** -0.389*** -0.391*** -0.161***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
E-commerce intensity 0.638*** 1.077*** 0.477*** 0.488*** 0.017
(t=2009) × Lagged Price (0.089) (0.094) (0.088) (0.086) (0.017)
E-commerce intensity -1.319*** -2.459*** -1.380*** -1.297*** -0.345***
× Lagged price × Post e-commerce (0.102) (0.105) (0.097) (0.089) (0.015)
t {1996,2006} {1996,2011} {1996,2016} {1996,2001, Annual
2006,2016} 1992-2016
Observations 52,017 43,388 42,683 87,818 394,663
R2 0.55 0.60 0.64 0.61 0.46
E-commerce intensity year 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: RPS, NSFIE, and authors’ calculation.
There are a number of potential problems with the evidence that we have just presented.
The first is that we have mismeasurement in e-retail suitability (xi). If this is correct, one
should expect that measurement error in e-commerce suitability would cause us to underesti-
mate the effects of this variable on price convergence. A second concern is that perhaps there
is something special about the first five years after e-commerce entered the Japanese market.
In Table 2.5, we also examine alternative time periods following the entry of e-commerce
firms. In the first three columns, we do a differences in differences based comparing the
five years prior to the entry of e-commerce firms (1991-1996) with three alternative non-
overlapping periods: 2001-2006, 2006-2011, and 2011-2016. These results confirm that the
choice of end period does not matter qualitatively for our basic finding that the rate of price
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convergence for goods available online rose after the entry of e-commerce firms. Finally, in
the last column of Table 2.5 we repeat the estimation over the full period (1992-2016) at
the annual frequency. The results are similar to the estimates over the shorter time period
(1992-2001) reported in Table 2.4.
The results we have presented so far have only included a sample of goods because prices
are easier to measure for goods than services and many services are hard to provide at a
distance. However, e-commerce also conducts online sales activities in the services sector,
so a reasonable question might be whether the results change significantly if we include all
goods and services in the analysis. In Table 2.6, we repeat our analysis using the universe of
all goods and services in the Japanese consumer expenditure survey. The results are quite
similar to the set of results we obtained only looking at a sample of goods. The coefficient
on the post-e-commerce, e-commerceintensity interaction term does not move significantly,
indicating that our results are robust to the choice of sample.
Table 2.6: Robustness Check Using All Goods and Services
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ∆5pict ∆5pict ∆1pict
Lagged price -0.312*** -0.390*** -0.161***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
E-commerce intensity -0.028 0.500*** 0.017
(t=2009) × Lagged price (0.083) (0.085) (0.017)
E-commerce intensity -1.220*** -1.305*** -0.345***
× Lagged price × Post e-commerce (0.096) (0.088) (0.015)
t {1996,2001} {1996,2001 Annual
,2006,2016} 1992-2016
Observations 51,685 88,930 397,670
R2 0.52 0.62 0.46
E-commerce intensity year 2009 2009 2009
89
2.4.3.2 Welfare Gain
Aggregate consumer gains due to faster price convergence can be calculated from the equation
(2.16) and (2.17). One of the interesting features of these equations is that the welfare gain
is proportional to the choice of demand elasticity. Since this elasticity has been estimated
in other papers, we calibrate the welfare gain using an elasticity of six, which corresponds
to a trade elasticity of −5. Note that halving this elasticity would halve the welfare gain
and doubling it would double the gain. In all cases, we base our estimates of the impact of
e-retail on the rate of convergence on Table 2.5 column 5. All of the data has been converted
into 2016 yen. The first columns shows the estimated welfare gains due to price convergence
in that year and the second column gives the counterfactual welfare gain that would have
occurred if price convergence for goods available online had remained at the pre-e-commerce
rate (i.e., (Dt = 0)) as given by equation (2.15). We see that price convergence across regions
during this time period led to an average welfare gain of 227.8 billion yen per year (about
2 billion dollars) for residents of our sampled cities. In the second column, we compute the
counterfactual gain that would have occurred if the speed of convergence had remained at the
pre-e-commerce rate. This gain is somewhat lower: only 180.2 billion yen per year. Thus,
the difference between these two columns—47.7 billion yen— (approximately 433 million
dollars) constitutes the average annual welfare gain for consumers in our sample of cities.
This number is difficult to interpret because it is only computed for residents in our
sampled cities. To obtain a sense of how much this matters for welfare, we should deflate the
number by the total amount of expenditures of our sampled households, which is reported
in the fifth column of Table 2.7. We obtain an estimate of the welfare gain which equals 0.12
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Table 2.7: Counterfactual Welfare Gain
Year ∆WˆRt (Dt = 1) ∆WˆRt (Dt = 0) ∆WˆEt Total Expenditure Expenditure on Goods
1997 198.7 156.3 42.4 32,287 20,690
1998 190.4 149.8 40.6 32,076 20,557
1999 205.0 162.1 42.8 35,561 22,231
2000 240.5 191.0 49.4 39,809 24,781
2001 247.8 200.3 47.6 38,222 23,716
2002 216.3 172.1 44.2 38,635 23,928
2003 224.9 176.3 48.6 38,564 24,365
2004 236.4 187.4 49.1 37,897 23,995
2005 227.5 178.8 48.6 42,102 25,538
2006 240.0 189.8 50.3 41,178 25,114
2007 274.3 219.0 55.3 41,483 25,137
2008 257.7 203.4 54.2 40,850 25,073
2009 253.8 199.5 54.3 40,982 25,410
2010 251.6 197.6 54.0 43,400 27,975
2011 242.8 190.5 52.2 42,339 27,429
2012 234.0 185.5 48.5 42,849 27,548
2013 216.6 171.6 45.0 43,501 27,505
2014 203.5 160.4 43.2 42,550 27,174
2015 203.5 160.7 42.8 40,698 26,964
2016 191.6 151.6 40.0 40,210 26,809
Average 227.8 180.2 47.7 39,760 25,097
Note: Unit is in billions of yen.
percent of consumer expenditures. 15
A concern that one might have about this counterfactual is that the level of price dis-
persion itself might be a function of the existence of e-retail. One simple way of seeing how
important shifts in the distribution of prices are for understanding the welfare gains is to
conduct the counterfactual using the pre-e-commerce period (1991-1996). The shocks to
prices during this period were independent of e-retail and hence the counterfactual answers
the question, “what would the gain to consumers have been given the pre-e-commerce dis-
15To get some sense of how large this is, we can compare the gain to Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) estimate of
the gains due to Amazon’s entry into U.S. book market. That paper estimated a gain of less than 1 billion
dollars in 2000—only 0.015 percent of U.S. personal consumption expenditures in that year. In other words,
our estimate is about eight times as large.
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Table 2.8: Counterfactual Welfare Gain pre-Rakuten Period
Year ∆WˆRt (Dt = 1) ∆WˆRt (Dt = 0) ∆WˆEt Total Expenditure Expenditure on Goods
1992 176.4 137.2 39.2 33,020 21,001
1993 180.6 143.7 36.9 32,613 20,745
1994 166.0 131.6 34.4 32,368 20,582
1995 170.0 133.9 36.1 32,844 21,049
1996 196.3 156.6 39.7 32,848 21,055
Average 177.8 140.6 37.2 32,738 20,886
Note: Unit is in billions of yen.
tribution of prices if e-commerce had entered in those years.” We report the results from
this exercise in Table 2.8. Our estimates imply that had e-commerce entered the Japanese
market five years earlier, the welfare gain would have been about 37.2 billion yen per year for
consumers in our sample of cities. This estimated gain is comparable to what we observed
in the post-e-commerce period (47.7 billion), indicating that it doesn’t make a substantial
difference whether one computes the welfare gain based on price differential that existed
before or after e-commerce entered the market.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper makes use of a unique Japanese data set covering hundreds of products over
close to three decades to examine the impact of the internet on Japanese prices and welfare
using a number of popular modeling techniques. First, we consider the possibility that e-
commerce may have lowered prices by driving down the average prices of goods available
online. Second, following Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) and Arkolakis et al. (2012) we compute
the welfare gains due to the ability of e-commerce to enable consumers to purchase goods
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from other regions. Third, following Jensen (2007), we compute the gains that arise through
e-commerce’s ability to arbitrage intercity price differences. We find that all three channels
produced welfare gains in Japan, but our estimates suggest that the first and second channels
are by far the most important, with welfare gains through these channels being eleven to
sixteen times larger than through the price arbitrage channel. Overall, we find that increased
inter-city arbitrage raised Japanese welfare by 0.12 percent, the gains due to new varieties
available through online shopping raised welfare 0.7 percent, and the gains due to overall
price reductions for goods available online raised welfare by at most 1 percent.
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Chapter 3
Intensive Margin of the Volcker Rule:
Price Quality and Welfare
Sakai Ando and Misaki Matsumura
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3.1 Introduction
The Volcker rule, named after Paul Volcker (Volcker (2010)), is one of the most important
regulations after the Great Recession designed to prevent future financial crises. It limits
the ability of banking entities as dealers to take risks on their own books by banning pro-
prietary tradings and other activities described in the Final Rule.1 Although the necessity
of restricting the excessive risk taking by banking entities is widely agreed, as discussed in
Duffie (2012) and summarized in the Final Rule, the specific regulation targeted at the risk
taking of dealers has invoked various concerns about its economic implications. Despite the
importance of the policy and active public debates, there has been no theoretical analysis
on the validity of these concerns. In particular, one of the immediate concerns is about the
intensive margin (short-term impacts);2 the dealer regulation that ties the hands of price
making institutions deteriorates the quality of price (informativeness and volatility) and
therefore has a negative welfare impact. (Duffie (2012) Section 1, the Final Rule Section
3.b.2.b.)
This paper studies the robustness of this conventional wisdom about the intensive margin.
Our main result is that the dealer regulation may lower price quality and dealer’s profitability
as in the conventional wisdom, but at the same time, if we take into account the fact that
somebody has to hold the traded financial assets eventually, the dealer regulation may raise
the welfare of other market participants against the conventional wisdom. In two extensions
1Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with,
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, Office of the Federal Register, Vol.79, No. 21, National Archives
and Records Administration.
2The extensive margin, on the other hand, is mainly about the unknown consequences of the migration of
dealers to unregulated areas. Given that the extensive margin has not materialized as Kelleher et al. (2016)
argues, this paper focuses on the intensive margin.
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of the baseline model, we also argue that this novel insight on the welfare is robust, while
the conventional wisdom about the deteriorating price quality is fragile to the introduction
of dynamics and endogenous information acquisition.
Our welfare analysis deepens the debate on the dealer regulation by identifying the dis-
tribution of cost bearing. The typical discussion of dealer regulation focuses on the trade-off
between the benefit from lower systemic risk and the cost due to efficiency loss caused by
constraints imposed on dealers. This paper elaborates on the discussion of the cost by iden-
tifying dealers as the only group of market participants who bear the cost even though all
the market participants face a less informative and more volatile price.
To demonstrate the seemingly counter-intuitive results rigorously, the baseline model
formally describes the force that improves the welfare of non-dealers despite the price quality
deterioration. The price quality deterioration that the baseline model captures is based on
the same mechanism as the one widely discussed in public comments summarized in the
Final Rule; if the dealer is not allowed to buffer temporary supply and demand imbalances,
the price she quotes has to reflect those imbalances rather than economic fundamentals, and
therefore becomes less informative and more volatile. Accordingly, one can show her expected
profit decreases. The intuition behind the seemingly counter-intuitive welfare results is that,
if the total asset is fixed, somebody has to hold risky assets. If a dealer regulation restricts the
dealer’s risk-taking ability, the risky assets held previously by the dealer have to be held by
other market participants. The only way for a dealer to induce other market participants to
hold risky assets is to quote an attractive price for them, resulting in a welfare redistribution
from the dealer to other market participants. At the same time, for other market participants
to accept more risks, this welfare redistribution has to be large enough to make them better
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off.
To critically evaluate the robustness of our mechanism, we relax the two simplifying as-
sumptions in the baseline model in the two extensions. These exercises not only validate
the robustness of our welfare results but also point out the fragility of the conventional
wisdom about price quality. In the first extension, we extend the assumption of exogenous
initial endowments in the baseline model by constructing a dynamic model and obtaining
the endogenous steady state inventories of risky assets. The analysis suggests that the wel-
fare implications in the baseline model survive in the steady state, but the price volatility
decreases against the conventional wisdom. In the second extension, we endogenize the in-
formation acquisition activities. The analysis suggests that the welfare results of the baseline
model are again robust, but the price informativeness might remain the same after regulation
against conventional wisdom.
The Volcker rule and how we map it to a stylized model. In analyzing the effect
of the Volcker rule, the obvious challenge is how to map the complicated actual regulation
into an economic model. In particular, a large portion of the debates on the Volcker rule
focuses on the difficulty of telling the proprietary trading from pure dealing. We argue that
even if the regulators cannot cleanly detect proprietary tradings, the Volcker rule works as a
deterrence device so that the impact of the Volcker rule, at least qualitatively, can be analyzed
by considering the “effective” risk aversion of the dealer. In the following, we illustrate the
institutional details of the Volcker rule and the justification for using the “effective” risk
aversion of the dealer as the modeling device. For the complete description, see the Final
Rule.
The Volcker rule is a section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
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Protection Act. It bars banks from engaging in proprietary trading and having relationships
with covered funds, with several exemptions including market making. To achieve this
goal, the rule mandates that each bank under regulation runs a compliance program and
requires big banks to report to regulators seven quantitative measures of trading activities,
which are calculated every day for each individual trading desk.3 Enforcement tools include
criminal and civil penalties,4 which are presumably used as a threat to incentivize banks to
police themselves as part of their compliance program. Although the Volcker rule has not
been applied against any cases yet, some argue that a good predictor of actual punishment
procedure is the so-called London Whale trading mess, which eventually cost J.P. Morgan
Chase $920 million in fines (Henning (2013)).
We map the implementation of the Volcker rule to the increase in the dealer’s effective
risk aversion parameter. In section 3.2.3, we micro-found our comparative statics by showing
how a severer threat of possible regulatory intervention can be mapped to a higher effective
risk aversion parameter of the dealer.
One can also simply interpret that our choice of modeling describes an idealistic regu-
lation; since the absolute goal of the Volcker rule is to reduce dealers’ excessive risk taking
activities, the comparative statics in the dealer’s effective risk aversion is a direct thought
experiment on its effect. Therefore, our analysis is robust to possible future changes in
the actual implementation of the Volcker rule, and is applicable to potential similar dealer
regulations outside of the U.S. that share the same goal.
In reality, however, due to the difficulty of detecting proprietary trading, the Volcker
3See the Final Rule, III.D and III.E for overviews of metrics reporting and compliance program require-
ment.
4See the Final Rule, IV.C.4. for other possible enforcement tools.
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rule might not be able to perfectly achieve what it intends. In this case, one may be more
interested in the effect of the Volcker rule when it can only achieve its goal to some extent,
i.e., when the Volcker rule can eliminate some but not all risk takings on dealers’ own books.
Our comparative statics in a continuum of the effective risk aversion levels can provide
insights on all such intermediate cases. We provide further discussions in section 3.2.3.
Literature. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to formally analyze
the Volcker rule based on an internally consistent equilibrium model, although the economic
implications of the dealer regulation themselves have attracted interest after the financial
crisis of 2007. The Final Rule summarizes public comments that reflect a wide range of
opinions from both academia and industries. Duffie (2012) is one of the critical assessments
of the Volcker rule based on various empirical and theoretical research. Trebbi and Xiao
(2015) report that the Volcker rule has not produced structural deterioration in market
liquidity. Kelleher et al. (2016) argues that the incumbent big dealers are still in their
positions since they find legal loopholes and discourage new entrants. We complement these
contributions by (1) formalizing the mechanisms behind some of the concerns about the
intensive margin and (2) pointing out a novel insight on welfare implications of the dealer
regulation.
From the modeling point of view, our baseline model is an extension of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) with a monopolistic and risk averse dealer who quotes the price, and our
infinite horizon model is a descendant of Wang (1994). Another paper that also extends
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) with a risk averse dealer is Liu and Wang (2016), which
studies the bid-ask spreads under information asymmetry in a static model. As a modeling
contribution, we show that a price making dealer can be cleanly embedded in both the static
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and dynamic frameworks, enabling us to isolate the effect of the dealer regulation from
initial inventories of risky assets. See Vives (2010) for a coherent summary of the extensive
literature on the dealership in general.
The negative correlation between informativeness and welfare of market participants in
our model may remind some readers of the Hirshleifer effect, which describes that better
information can make market participants worse off by destroying insurance opportunity.
(Hirshleifer (1971)) However, as opposed to Hirshleifer effect, a change in informativeness is
not the cause of a change in welfare in our model. Both price quality and welfare redistri-
bution are the consequences of the dealer’s risk shifting. In this sense, our model points out
a mechanism that is different from that of the Hirshleifer effect.
In this paper, we focus on the intensive margin, although the extensive margin is also a
big portion of debates on the Volcker rule. For instance, Duffie (2012) discusses unpredictable
consequences of dealer’s migration to unregulated sectors. A direct analysis of entry and exit
in OTC markets can be found in Atkeson et al. (2015). An interesting result of the three-
type entry model of Atkeson et al. (2015) is that regulating dealer banks improves welfare
because in their model there is an excessive intermediation relative to a socially optimal
level. Although our analysis demonstrates that all other market participants than the dealer
are better off, our mechanism is different from Atkeson et al. (2015); we focus on welfare
redistribution through price level, while this channel is muted in Atkeson et al. (2015), in
which price is determined by Nash bargaining.
100
3.2 Baseline model
In this section, we describe the main intuition in a static model. We show as a result of
dealer regulation, price quality deteriorates and dealer’s expected profit declines, but the
welfare of other market participants improves.
3.2.1 Environment and definition
The baseline model contains two ingredients necessary to analyze the effects of dealer regu-
lation on price quality and welfare: a price quoting dealer and a signal extraction problem.
First, to formally think about the dealer’s pricing channel, it is necessary to introduce a
dealer who quotes price optimally. As a consequence of introducing optimal pricing, the
standard pricing mechanism based on the market clearing of demand and supply is extended
to an optimal inventory management problem, in which the dealer’s optimal price pins down
the trade-off between higher expected profit and riskier inventory, instead of clearing the
excess demand.5 Second, to discuss price informativeness, we introduce a signal extraction
problem so that agents endogenously learn valuable information from equilibrium objects.
In particular, we introduce heterogeneous traders such that some agents have private infor-
mation about fundamentals. The dealer learns such private information through order flows
and quotes price optimally based on it. Since the price quoted is based on the extracted
private information, the price itself is also informative about the fundamentals. Thus, the
5This connection between a dealer’s inventory and her pricing has been emphasized in the literature
(Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1983), Treynor (1987), Grossman and Miller (1988), Hansch
et al. (1998), and Liu and Wang (2016)). The connection became salient in the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009
where “the reduced dealer capacity resulted in dramatic downward distortions in corporate bond prices.”
(Duffie (2012))
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informativeness of equilibrium objects is determined endogenously.6
Formally, there is one asset in the economy traded by three types of agents, the informed
agents I with mass λ ∈ (0, 1), the uninformed agents U with mass 1 − λ, and a dealer D.
We call the informed and uninformed agents, combined, traders. The dealer is monopolistic
for the purpose of parsimonious modeling, but as will be clear, a more sophisticated setup
such as monopolistic competition among dealers do not alter the insights as long as dealer’s
pricing decision takes into account average payoff and inventory risks.
Each player has a constant absolute risk aversion utility function (CARA), with param-
eters θ > 0 for the traders and θD > 0 for the dealer. The economy has three independent






















d denotes the return of the risky asset in the economy, which nobody can observe. z := d+ 
is the signal on d that only the informed agents can observe. s is the dealer’s inventory of
the asset, which only the dealer can observe. Risky inventory s can be positive or negative,
reflecting that the dealer can take either a long or short position. In the baseline model,
we do not model the traders’ inventory risks to illustrate the intuition parsimoniously. We
relax this assumption in section 3.3. The CARA normality assumption is for tractability. It
is known that the equity returns are not normal, and the approximation is worse for bonds
6The asymmetric information is not only a modeling device but also has empirical relevance. For instance,
Lu et al. (2010) and Han and Zhou (2013) study asymmetric information in the corporate bond market.
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than it is for equities. Although we conjecture that the intuition applies to a broader class of
fundamentals, the extension is beyond the scope of this paper. For an analysis of non-normal
noisy rational expectations models, see Breon-Drish (2015).
We work on the following equilibrium. Fix exogenous parameters
{
θ, θD, d¯, s¯, κd, κs, κ, λ
}
.
Let Ei be the conditional expectation operator conditional on the σ-algebra generated by
the information set Fi of agent i = I, U,D.
Definition 3.1. A set of price and demand functions
{
p (z, s) , xBI (z, p) , xBU (p) , xB (z, p)
}
constitutes an equilibrium if
1. (Traders) Demand functions xBI (z, p) and xBU (p) are best responses to the price quoted
by the dealer p (z, s).




, FI = {p (z, s) , z} , (3.2)




, FU = {p (z, s)} . (3.3)
Aggregate demand satisfies xB (z, p) = λxBI (z, p) + (1− λ)xBU (p).
2. (Dealer) Price quoted by the dealer p (z, s) is a best response to the aggregate demand
xB (z, p).








s, xB (z, p)
}
. (3.4)
Note that it is straightforward to introduce a risk-free interest rate 1 + r and the initial
wealth of the traders w0. Without loss of generality due to CARA normal framework, r and
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w0 can be set to be 0.
The interpretation of each agent’s problem is as follows. The traders are price takers
and extract information about the return d from the price p (z, s). Given the information,
the traders optimally choose the demand schedule p 7→ xBi , which sums up to the aggregate
demand xB (z, p). The superscript B represents best response. The dealer is a demand taker
and extracts information about the return d from xB (z, p). Based on the information, she
quotes the price optimally by controlling the sum of the risk-less cash flow pxB (z, p) and
the risky inventory
{
s− xB (z, p)
}
d. The equilibrium requires the quoted price to coincide
with the price p (z, s) taken as given by the traders. Thus, the pair of price and demand{
p (z, s) , xB (z, p)
}
that closes this loop constitutes a fixed point. In equilibrium, the dealer
can infer the signal z from the demand schedule due to the affine structure stated in theorem
3.1, so that the the uninformed agents are the only group of agents who do not observe the
signal z.
The equilibrium objects can be used to define equilibrium trading volumes and welfare.
The trading volumes of individual agents and the total trading volume in equilibrium can be
obtained by substituting p in demand functions with p (z, s), i.e., xI (z, s) := xBI (z, p (z, s)),
xU (z, s) := xBU (p (z, s)), and x (z, s) := xB (z, p (z, s)). With these equilibrium objects, we






, i = I, U. (3.5)
For the dealer, since we conduct a comparative statics with respect to θD as explained in
section 3.2.3, we adopt the expected cash flow as her welfare criterion to avoid mechanical
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welfare changes.
uD := Epi (d, z, s) = E [sd+ {p (z, s)− d}x (z, s)] . (3.6)
The expected cash flow can be considered a form of profit, which is in itself interesting
since some of the public comments in the Final Rule show the concern that U.S. banks lose
international competitiveness due to decreasing profitability.
3.2.2 Characterization of equilibrium
This section characterizes the affine structure of the equilibrium and defines the price infor-
mativeness.
The next theorem states that the equilibrium price and quantities are affine.
Theorem 3.1. There is a unique equilibrium such that the price function p (z, s) is affine.
In this equilibrium, the demand and the trading volume functions are also affine. The unique
set of coefficients {αI , βI , γI , αU , βU , α, β, γ, A,B,C} of the equilibrium
p (z, s) = A+B (z + Cs) , xB (z, p) = α + βp+ γz, (3.7)
xBI (z, p) = αI + βIp+ γIz, xBU (p) = αU + βUp (3.8)
satisfies BCβIγIβUβγ 6= 0, C < 0 < B, and
− κd + κ
θ
= βI < β = λβI + (1− λ) βU < βU < 0 < γ = λγI < γI . (3.9)
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Proof. See Appendix C.1.7
The signs of (βI , βU , β) and (γI , γ) reflect respectively the law of demand and the fact
that a higher signal z on the return d pushes up demand of the asset. The difference in
the price elasticity |βU | < |βI | can be understood by noting that for the uninformed agents,
two forces are at work in the opposite directions; an increase in price not only reduces their
demand by lowering the total return d− p, but also increases their demand by signaling the
dealer’s information about the higher return d. Since the informed agents observe z, they are
only subject to the former force. As a result, the aggregate demand function xB (z, p), which
is a convex combination of the traders’ demand functions, is more responsive to price than
the uninformed agents xBU (p) but less than the informed agents xBI (z, p). The positive sign
of B reflects the incentive for the dealer to raise her price when she faces a higher demand
as a result of a better signal z. The sign of C is negative since with a higher volume of
inventory the risk averse dealer wants to cut the price to dispose of her inventory.
Eq. (3.7) in theorem 3.1 suggests a natural way to define price informativeness. For the
uninformed agents, the term Cs is a noise that prevents them from inferring the signal z out
of price p (z, s). When the variance of the noise term V (Cs) is large relative to that of the
signal V (z), the variation of price function is dominated mainly by noise Cs, so that the
price is not informative about the valuable signal z. In contrast, if C = 0, the price fully
reveals z. Since the sign of C does not matter, we define the price informativeness as follows.
Definition 3.2. Consider the equilibrium characterized in theorem 3.1. The price informa-
7Whether the affine price function p (z, s) is unique in a larger set of functions, say, C1 or continuous
functions, remains to be open. Papers about the uniqueness in models of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and
Kyle (1985) include Boulatov et al. (2012), Palvolgyi and Venter (2015), and Breon-Drish (2015).
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tiveness Q is defined by
Q := 1|C| . (3.10)
Now that we have equilibrium objects, we are ready to discuss the dealer regulation.
3.2.3 Mapping the dealer regulation to the model
This section explains how we map the Volcker rule into the stylized model and provides a
formal micro-foundation as well as a verbal justification.
The way we map dealer regulation into the baseline model is to raise the dealer’s risk
aversion parameter θD ∈ (0,∞). Such modeling choice reflects the interpretation that θD
represents the effective risk aversion rather than the deep preference parameter; due to
the dealer regulation that bans the dealer from taking risks, the dealer behaves as if she
becomes more risk averse. In particular, we analyze the comparative statics of (1) price
informativeness Q, (2) price volatility V (p (z, s)), and (3) welfare of agents ui for i = I, U,D,
with respect to the dealer’s effective risk aversion θD ∈ (0,∞).
As a micro-foundation, we justify our modeling choice by showing that controlling the risk
aversion of the dealer is observationally equivalent to the dealer regulation with imperfect
monitoring and pecuniary punishment. Suppose the dealer’s true risk aversion is θ > 0 and
when she makes her pricing decision she knows that she has to submit a report about her
inventory to regulators, such as quantitative measures and annual certification by CEOs as
specified in the Volcker rule. We assume that regulators can only get noisy information m
about the risky inventory
m (p) = s− xB (z, p) + ξ (3.11)
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is independent of the uncertainty X ′ = [d s ] and its accuracy
σ2ξ > 0 can be chosen by regulators for some costs. Based onm, regulators impose a pecuniary
punishment F (m). Suppose regulators are reluctant to impose one when |m| is close to 0
out of concern about false accusation, but are willing to impose a larger one when |m| → ∞.
A simple parametrization of such punishment is F (m) = α2m
2 where α > 0 represents how


















The following proposition states that the two problems are equivalent, and therefore justifies
our parsimonious policy variable θD.




∈ R2++, there is an effective risk aversion
θD ∈ (θ,∞) such that the prices quoted in problem (3.12) and (3.13) are identical. The
converse is also true. For each effective risk aversion θD ∈ (θ,∞), there is a regulation(
σ2ξ , α
)
∈ R2++ such that the prices quoted in the two problems are identical.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
An implication of proposition 3.1 is that we can always order the severity of regulations
linearly. Such simplification not only makes the interpretations of the policy analyses simpler
but also makes the results robust to the details of the implementation in the stylized model.
108
A verbal justification is to interpret that our analysis describes the ideal scenario of
the Volcker rule, i.e., a scenario in which it can directly control the dealer’s risk-taking on
her own books. In other words, we investigate the dealer regulation’s mechanics which are
invariant to all possible implementations as long as they make the dealer effectively more
risk averse. Thus, our analysis provides a benchmark result that is robust to possible future
changes in the exact implementation of the Volcker rule, and is applicable to potential dealer
regulations outside of the U.S. that share the same goal.
For such justification to be valid, it is desirable to show that the policy variable θD can
fully span the situations of interest. Indeed, as the following proposition shows, by controlling
θD, we can capture both pure market making and pure proprietary trading.
Proposition 3.2. θD is a parameter that connects pure market making and pure proprietary
trading. That is, for any (z, s), x (z, s)→ s as θD →∞, and x (z, s)→ 0 as θD → 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
When the dealer becomes extremely risk averse θD → ∞, all assets are held by the
traders and therefore the dealer just makes the market. This equilibrium is exactly the same
as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). When θD → 0, the risk neutral dealer takes all the risks
on her own book. The intermediate cases 0 < θD < ∞ correspond to the realistic situation
where the Volcker rule deters proprietary trading only to some extent. Thus, by observing
the entire range of θD, we can obtain policy-relevant insights even if the regulation is not as
effective as is intended to be.
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3.2.4 Results
The following theorem presents the analytical results.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose the dealer becomes more risk averse. Price informativeness de-
creases. Price volatility eventually increases with sufficiently large inventory shocks. The
welfare of the traders improves. The welfare of the dealer deteriorates. Formally,
1. The price informativeness Q is decreasing in θD with limθD→∞Q = λκθ and limθD→0Q =
∞.
2. Price volatility eventually increases, limθD→0 V (p (z, s)) < limθD→∞ V (p (z, s)), if κs
is sufficiently small.
3. The welfare of the traders {uI , uU} defined in (3.5) is higher when θD > 0 than when
θD → 0.
4. The welfare of the dealer uD defined in (3.6) is higher when θD → 0 than when θD →∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
We also provide numerical results in Fig.3.1 to help illustrate the global behaviors of
equilibrium objects of interest and their intuitions. The parameter values are chosen so that
excess return of the asset is 10% with standard deviation 30% and the dealer’s inventory is
positive for 95% of the time so the dealer is almost always in the sell-side and the traders
are in the buy-side. The choice is for a descriptive purpose and the qualitative behaviors
remain the same for other parameter values.
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Figure 3.1: The four figures describe the impact of the increase in θD on equilibrium objects of
interest. All the x axes are θD. Parameter values are set to be θ = 1, d¯ = 1.1, s¯ = 10, κd = 1/.09,
κs = 1/25, κ = 1/.01 and λ = 0.1. Panel a shows that price informativeness deteriorates. Panel
b shows that the price volatility eventually increases. Panel c shows that the welfare of traders
improves, and the welfare difference widens. Panel d shows that the welfare of the dealer declines.
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The driving force behind theorem 3.2 and Fig. 3.1 is the risk-shifting motive of the dealer.
Note that the dealer’s objective function is equivalent to
(
s− xB (z, p)
)
E [d|z] + pxB (z, p)− θD2
(
s− xB (z, p)
)2
V [d|z] . (3.14)
The first two terms are the expected return of the inventory and the income from selling
xB (z, p) units of the asset for the price p, and the third term governs the dis-utility from
holding risky assets. As she becomes more risk averse θD → ∞, the third term dominates
the dealer’s incentive so that she puts more weight on disposing her risky inventory, trying
to shift risky assets to other market participants.
With this in mind, the effect of the dealer regulation on price quality can be understood
in the same way as the conventional wisdom. When the dealer becomes more risk averse,
she is more interested in clearing her inventory, so that the information of z, which is useful
in raising expected profit but not in reducing the risk of her inventory, is reflected less in her
pricing decision. Therefore, the price she quotes becomes less informative about the return
d, and more about the inventory risk s, leading to lower price informativeness. Accordingly,
since the price has to move together with the inventory shock s to reduce the inventory risks,
if the volatility of inventory V s = κ−1s is high enough, price volatility eventually increases.
One force that could confound this intuition is the rise in the traders’ price sensitivity |β|,
which contributes to the non-monotonicity of panel b. of Fig 3.1. Recall |βU | < |βI | since
the uninformed agents infer higher signal z from higher price p. As the dealer’s risk aversion
θD increases, price informativeness decreases so that the uninformed agents no longer infer
signal z from the price function p (z, s). As a result, the uninformed agents’ price sensitivity
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|βU | =
∣∣∣∂xBU (z, p) /∂p∣∣∣ increases, which then raises the price sensitivity of aggregate demand
|β| =
∣∣∣∂xB (z, p) /∂p∣∣∣. This higher responsiveness |β| = ∣∣∣∂ (s− xB (z, p)) /∂p∣∣∣ makes it easier
for the dealer to adjust her inventory, so that the dealer may not have to change price as
much to control inventory. Although this force creates the non-monotonicity, as the figure
suggests, it is of second-order importance in the limit.8
What is new relative to the conventional wisdom is the result on the traders’ welfare.
This welfare result can also be explained by the shift of the dealer’s incentive. Since the
dealer cannot absorb shocks using her own inventory due to additional risk aversion, some
of the risks have to be shifted to the traders. The only instrument the dealer has is the
price. Therefore, in order for her to shift risks to the traders, she has to compensate them
for their riskier positions by quoting a more attractive price than ever before. For the traders
to accept riskier positions, this benefit has to be large enough to make them better off. As a
result, welfare is redistributed from the dealer to the traders to the extent that the traders
are better off. Accordingly, the dealer’s profitability deteriorates in exchange for less risky
inventory.
One can also see in Fig.3.1.c that the traders’ utility difference uI − uU increases. This
is a corollary of the deteriorating price informativeness. Since price is less informative as
θD → ∞, the informational advantage of the informed agents over the uninformed agents
increases, which is then reflected in the welfare difference. In other words, uI −uU measures
8Another way to understand the result is to note the volatility identity
V d = E [V (d|p (z, s))] + V (E [d|p (z, s)]) .
When price informativeness declines, V (d|p (z, s)) increases, so V (E [d|p (z, s)]) decreases. Since
E [d|p (z, s)] = c0 + c1p (z, s) with a positive slope c1 > 0, V p (z, s) should decrease if c1 is a constant
over θD. This argument is intuitive but is not complete since c1 is also a function of θD.
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the value of information, and it increases as the dealer becomes more risk averse.
3.2.5 Discussion
We discuss two potential concerns about the assumptions embedded in the baseline model:
(1) the exogenous initial endowments and (2) the exogenous information acquisition. These
assumptions are relaxed in the following extensions so that the robustness or the fragility of
the results in the baseline model are examined.
First, in the baseline model, the traders are not endowed with any risky asset for parsi-
mony. However, such simplification implies that the immediacy of trading comes from the
dealer. If the traders are endowed with a large number of risky assets, the immediacy of
trading comes from the traders, in which case the dealer regulation might make tradings
harder and deteriorate the welfare of the traders. To address such concern, in section 3.3,
we endogenize the risky asset holdings before transactions by deriving the steady state in
a dynamic model. In particular, we extend Wang (1994) to build a dynamic model with
steady state risky asset holdings on both the dealer’s and the traders’ sides, and conduct an
analogous policy analysis of the dealer regulation.
Second, we like to address the exogenous information acquisition by the informed agents.
In the baseline model, the number of the informed agents λ is exogenous. However, when
the risk attitude of the dealer changes, the change in price informativeness might affect
the resulting welfare difference between the informed and uninformed agents, and therefore,
might incentivize more traders to invest in information acquisition activities. To see if the
results in the baseline model are robust to the introduction of the endogenous information
114
acquisition, in section 3.4, we allow λ to depend on θD, and conduct the same policy analysis
as in the baseline model.
3.3 Dynamic inventory management
This section argues that the welfare results of the baseline model survive even when the
exogenous initial endowments are endogenized as the steady state of a dynamic model. We
also show that the increase in price volatility, which is a part of the conventional wisdom
derived in the baseline model, does not survive.
As discussed in section 3.2.5, the exogenous endowments in the baseline model have to be
endogenized to deal with the concerns about the immediacy of tradings. For this purpose,
we extend the baseline model along Wang (1994) by adding a price-making dealer.
3.3.1 Environment and definition
There are one price-making dealer D and a continuum of identical price-taking informed
traders I = [0, 1].9 Their preference parameters are the rate of absolute risk aversion θi, i =
D, I and the common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). They trade a single risky asset xt with risky
dividend dt+1 and a risk-free bond yt with gross interest rate R. The total supply of the risky
asset is x¯, and the supply of the risk-free asset is infinitely elastic so that R is exogenously
given. Each agent i = D, I has a private investment opportunity sit, generating a risky
dividend dit+1. At each period t, each agent divides revenue ptxit−1 + dtxit−1 +Ryit−1 + sit−1dit
into consumption piit, investment in the risk-free bond yt and investment in the risky asset
9Since both the dealer and the traders have private shocks, we do not need to introduce uninformed




t. Hence, the flow budget for each agent i = D, I can be written as
piit + yit + ptxit = ptxit−1 +mit, mit := dtxit−1 +Ryit−1 + sit−1dit (3.15)
where mit is the amount of money at the beginning of period t that is independent of the
period t price.
To define the equilibrium, we need to specify the information set of each agent. As in the
baseline model, the informed traders receive a noisy signal about the dividend zt = dt+1+t+1.
The information set for the informed traders F It =
{







all the past prices, asset holdings, dividends, private investment opportunities and signals.
Given the prices (pt, R) and the information F It , the informed traders submit the demand






where the notation emphasizes that the demand schedule is a
noisy signal about zt. The information set for the dealer FDt =
{



















so that the dealer extracts information about
the signal zt. The dealer quotes price optimally knowing that her inventory is determined































Σ3×3 0 0 0
0 σ2sI 0 0
0 0 σ2sD 0












, denoted by the 3× 3 matrix Σ3×3, generates reasons to
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trade, and the i.i.d. assumption suffices to yield AR(1) equilibrium asset holdings as stated
in proposition 3.3.
The equilibrium is defined as follows. Let Eit be the expectation operator conditional on
the σ-algebra generated by F it , i = D, I .





is an equilibrium if the
following conditions are satisfied.















mIt = dtxIt−1 +Ryt−1 + sIt−1dIt
pit + yt + ptxt = ptxIt−1 +mIt
. (3.17)
2. At each t, given the information FDt and the price R, the dealer’s price pt solves







mDt = dtxDt−1 +Ryt−1 + sDt−1dDt
pit + yt + pxDt = pxDt−1 +mDt







Note that this equilibrium shares the same spirit as the baseline model; the dealer is a
demand taker and the traders are price takers. In this sense, the price and the demand are
best responses to each other.
The main difference is that since the problem is dynamic, the risky asset purchase of the
last period is directly tied to the current period risky inventory. Therefore, both agents can
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control their inventory shocks as opposed to the baseline model.
3.3.2 Characterization of equilibrium
This section characterizes the affine equilibrium and shows that the dynamic model has a
well-defined steady state distribution of the risky asset holdings.
Fix the following sixteen exogenous parameters
{
β,R, θI , θD, x¯, d¯, d¯
I , d¯D, σ2d, σ
2












































, i.e., for some constants of price
A0, Ax, B, C = [CI , CD]′ and constants of risky asset holdings (ρ0, ρ1), the equilibrium has
the form of












where Dt is a function of current shocks (zt, st).
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
This proposition satisfies our motivation to introduce dynamics; if |ρ1| < 1, we can obtain






since it does not affect individual optimization, and
therefore equilibrium objects.
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the average asset holding
ExD := ρ01− ρ1 . (3.22)
Another observation is that the equilibrium has the state-space representation where Eq.(3.21)
is the state equation and Eq.(3.20) is the observation. The reason for which the equilibrium
objects are persistent despite the i.i.d. shock assumption is the inventory management. The
transaction of the last period on the risky asset affects the amount of risks to begin with in
the current period, which then affects the transaction in the current period.
With the affine equilibrium structure, we can conduct an analogous policy analysis as
the baseline model.
3.3.3 Policy analysis
As in the baseline model, we focus on the comparative statics of equilibrium objects with
respect to the effective risk aversion θD ∈ (0,∞). The interpretation of the thought ex-
periment is as follows. Suppose the economy is in the steady state. If suddenly the dealer
regulation is introduced, what will happen to the price quality and welfare? In particular,
we note that our welfare analysis takes into account the transitional dynamics, not just the
comparison of the steady states before and after the policy intervention.
Let us formalize the equilibrium objects of interest. The price informativeness is de-
fined as |CD|−1 which reflects how much the information that the dealer extracts from the










where the asset holding is the steady state value derived in Eq. (3.22) when
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θD = θI , denoted by xD−1 = ExD (θI = θD), and the initial money is set to be mI0 = 0 without





, again with xD−1 = ExD (θI = θD) and mD0 = 0. Fig. 3.2 shows a
numerical example where the parameter values are specified in the caption.



































































Figure 3.2: The parameters are β = R−1 = .9, θI = 1, x¯ = 200, d¯ = 1.3, d¯I = d¯D = 1, σ2d = .09,
σ2 = .01, σddI = σddD = .5, σ2dI = σ2dD = σ2sI = σ2sD = .1. All the x axes except for panel d are
θD. The x axis for panel d is time t. Panel a shows that the price informativeness deteriorates as a
result of dealer regulation from the steady state. Panel b and c show that price volatility decreases
as opposed to Fig. 3.1. Panel c shows that the traders’ welfare improves. Panel d shows that the
expected consumption of the dealer declines at each time horizon. Panel f shows that as the dealer
becomes more risk averse, the steady state asset holding for the dealer decreases.
What is different from the baseline model is the declining price volatility, which increases
according to the conventional wisdom. The logic of decreasing price volatility can be under-
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stood from observing panel f. As the dealer becomes more risk averse, the dealer reduces
the risky asset holding. Since the absolute amount of risk in her inventory decreases, she
does not have to fluctuate price as much as in the baseline model where the inventory risks
from the endowments are exogenously fixed. In other words, since in the dynamic model the
inventory risks can be endogenously chosen to be small by reducing the risky asset holding,
there is less need to make price fluctuate.
All other results in the baseline model including the welfare implications survive in this
dynamic setting. Price informativeness deteriorates, the welfare of the traders improve and
the welfare of the dealer decreases. In particular, the expected consumption for the dealer
decreases not just in the sense of the discounted sum, but also at each future period.
In summary, we observe that the welfare results in the baseline model are robust, but
the increase in price volatility is flipped by introducing dynamics, suggesting the fragility of
the conventional wisdom.
3.4 Endogenous information acquisition
The section extends the baseline model by endogenizing information acquisition. We show
that the welfare results of the baseline model survive, but the decreasing price informa-
tiveness, derived in the baseline model as a description of the conventional wisdom, does
not.
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3.4.1 Definition of equilibrium
To endogenize the information acquisition, we follow Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and con-
struct a simple two-period model, in which the traders decide whether to invest in information
acquisition in the first period, and all players play the baseline model in the second period.
Accordingly, we use the same notation as the baseline model and modify the definition by
incorporating the free entry condition.
Let c > 0 denote the cost that traders have to pay when they decide to invest in infor-
mation acquisition.
Definition 3.4. Fix exogenous parameters
{
θ, θD, d¯, s¯, κd, κs, c
}
. A set of the number of
the informed agents, price and demand functions
{




1. Given λ, price and demand functions
{
p (z, s) , xBI (z, p) , xBU (p) , xB (z, p)
}
constitute
an equilibrium in the baseline model with the informed agents problem (3.2) replaced
by




, FI = {p (z, s) , z} , (3.23)
2. Free entry condition is satisfied, i.e., one of the three cases holds
(a) uI = uU , 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
(b) uI > uU , λ = 1,
(c) uI < uU , λ = 0,
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, xU (z, s) := xBU (p (z, s)) . (3.25)
Compared to the baseline model, there is one more endogenous variable λ, which is pinned
down by the free entry condition, and one more exogenous parameter c. The cost to invest
in information acquisition c shows up only in the calculation of the free entry and does not
alter the equilibrium conditions in Appendix C.1. In terms of the free entry condition, we
choose c such that the first case holds to make the analysis interesting.
3.4.2 Results and discussion
The same four equilibrium objects as the baseline model are of interest, i.e., price informa-
tiveness Q, price volatility V (p (z, s)), the welfare of the traders {uI , uU}, and the welfare
of the dealer uD. In addition, we are also interested in the behavior of the number of the
informed agents λ, which is a new endogenous variable in the extension.
Thanks to the CARA normal framework, we can analytically derive the comparative
statics in terms of the price informativeness Q and λ.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose the cost of information acquisition c is such that the number of the
informed agents is in the interior point 0 < λ < 1.
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The constant price informativeness is a knife-edge result specific to CARA normal frame-
work, but it cleanly delivers an insight on the endogenous information acquisition. As can
be seen from Fig.3.1, if the number of the informed agents λ is exogenously fixed, a stricter
regulation enlarges the welfare difference between the informed and uninformed agents as a
result of decreasing price informativeness. Therefore, as in the second claim, traders have
incentive to pay the cost c to acquire information until the welfare levels equalize. As more
traders become informed, the price informativeness increases, acting as the opposing force
to the original downward pressure due to the dealer’s risk aversion. In CARA normal frame-
work, these two forces exactly cancel out, so the price informativeness Q remains constant
over regulation θD as in the first claim.
The result for all the objects are summarized in Fig.3.3. The parameter values are
identical to the baseline model for those that overlap.
The most salient difference from the baseline model is the constant price informativeness.
It implies that the conventional wisdom about the decreasing price informativeness is not
robust once we take into account endogenous information acquisition.
124















































Figure 3.3: Endogenous information acquisition. All the x axes are θD. Parameter values are set
to be θ = 1, d¯ = 1.1, s¯ = 10, κd = 1/.09, κs = 1/25, κ = 1/.01, and c is chosen so that the
equilibrium λ = .1 when θD = θ. For the purpose of comparison, we plot the same objects in the
baseline model when κ = 1. All but the price informativeness show the same comparative statics
results as the baseline model.
Other panels follow the same patterns as in the baseline model except for the last panel
highlighting that the welfare ratio between the informed and uninformed agents is constant
due to the free entry condition. In terms of the level, one can see the same welfare redistri-
bution from the dealer to the traders as the baseline model. This observation confirms the
robustness of the welfare results in the baseline model.
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3.5 Final Remarks
We have analyzed the effects of dealer regulation on the properties of price and the resulting
welfare consequences. The baseline model shows that the price quality deterioration can
coexist with the welfare improvement of other market participants than the dealer. The
two extensions then demonstrate the robustness of the novel welfare implications as well as
the fragility of the conventional wisdom on the price quality deterioration. We are going
to conclude the paper by describing other important aspects of dealer regulation that this
paper does not address.
In this paper, we have limited our scope to the intensive margin of dealer regulation.
However, considering the extensive margin is also imperative for a comprehensive assessment
of the Volcker rule. Although Kelleher et al. (2016) reports that the migration has not
happened due to the efforts by the incumbent dealers to discourage entrance, as emphasized
in Duffie (2012), “a potential migration of market making to the outside of the regulated
bank sector might have unpredictable and potentially important adverse consequences for
financial stability.” See Whitehead (2011) for more discussion.
Another interesting topic that our paper does not address is the impact of the Volcker
rule on the real economy. For instance, a stricter regulation in financial markets might
increase capital cost and dampen real investment. Although the Volcker rule tries to mitigate
such impact by, for example, not restricting underwriting, the actual impact needs to be
investigated empirically.
These are the points worth more investigation as well as the important caveats in under-
standing the results of this paper.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs and Derivations for Section 1.2
A.1.1 Derivation of equations (1.13) and (1.14)




























from the following conditions.
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1. Optimal pricing problem of individual firms in equation (1.12) replicated here
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derived from the definition of C∗t and P ∗t given in equation (1.7) and the risk sharing
condition (1.8)
3. Aggregate price dynamics connecting the sectoral price to the price in the previous
period and the newly set price Psit (0) , PXsit (0)
Ps,t =
(








)1−θs + (1− λs)PXs,t (0)1−θs) 11−θs ,
which follows from the aggregation (1.11) and the i.i.d. likelihood of resetting prices.
The derivation closely follows that in Benigno and Woodford (2005).






































































































































































































































































































By rearranging this, we can obtain equation (1.13) and (1.14).






can equivalently be written as





= Fs,t,t + λsβ (Πs,t+1)θs−1EtF˜s,t+1.
Similarly, for K˜s,t, F˜Xs,t, K˜Xs,t. Thus we obtain the equivalent definitions given in equation
(1.15)-(1.18).
A.1.2 Derivation of equation (1.20)





















together with the evolution of the price dispersion (1.21) and (1.22) from the following
conditions.




























































The derivation here closely follows that in Benigno and Woodford (2005).



































Note that the second condition also uses the definition of the real exchange rate Qt ≡ EtPt∗Pt .
To obtain the dynamics of price dispersion, rewrite the definition of the dispersion using



























































































































The first-order conditions are

[Cst] βtC1−σt ψsCst = λst
[Mst] αsm YstMstλst =M∗0,tQ∗stλD







[Lst] βtLφt = αsl YstLstλst
[D0] Λ = λD
From the first-order conditions, we obtain aggregate consumption and the consumption














































= ∏s∈S ψ−ψss ∏s∈S (βtC1−σt ψsCstM∗0,tΛ
)ψs
is defined as the
shadow price of the aggregate consumption in terms of international currency. Combining











where ξ is the same constant as that in equation (1.8). The real exchange rate here is defined




using the shadow price of the aggregate consumption defined above.
We can also obtain the intra-temporal conditions. Due to the assumption αsl > 0 for all
































From this, we can calculate the aggregate labor productivity:
























For those sectors with positive exports, combining the FOC with respect to Xst and that




















Combining these, we obtain the conditions in equations (1.24)-(1.27).
A.2.2 Flexible price equilibrium
The household.












From the linearity of labor aggregator, we can immediately see thatWst = Ws must hold in






































)ψs is the consumer price index. Combining this with the same sequence
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is the same constant as the planner’s problem as long as the
marginal utility Λof the initial debt is the same.
We also get intra-temporal conditions







There are two aggregator firms in each sector: one for domestically consumed goods
and the other for exported goods. The variables related to exports are indicated by the























































The individual firm in sector s ∈ S takes wage Wt, import price EtQ∗st, the demand
function derived above, production function and tax rates for domestic salesτs and foreign
sales τXs as given. I allow the firm to set different prices for domestic consumers Psit and for
foreign buyers PXsit (pricing to market). As we will see later, this is necessary for the flexible


















































































The first-order conditions are

















































With flexible prices, all firms are symmetric within a sector. Thus, subscript i can be
dropped. In summary, we have






















Pst = (1− τs)−1 θs
























































































































Combining these leads to equations (1.28)-(1.31).
A.2.3 Definition of optimal steady state
The optimal steady state is defined as follows.
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1, 1, {1, 1}s∈S
)
































K˜us,t = F˜ us,t













F˜ us,t = C−σt
Pus,t
Pt



































































A.2.4 The solution and properties of the optimal steady state
A.2.4.1 The solution








































































t + λsβEt (Πs,t+1)



















































































































By taking the first-order condition with respect to Ct , Qt, Lst, Wt/Pt, ∆st, Pst/Pt, PXXt/Pt,
Πt, F˜ us,t, K˜us,t, it can be shown that there exists a solution to this system of first-order
conditions that satisfies Πt = Πus,t = 1, ∆
(s,t)
t = 1, Ct = C¯, Lt = L¯,Qt = Q¯, Wt/Pt = W¯ ,
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P ust/Pt = P¯ us , F˜ us,t = F¯ us and K˜us,t = K¯us with constant Lagrange multipliers. To do this,
use the following relationships: fs (Ps, 1;Ps) = 1, fs1 (Ps, 1;Ps) = −λs1−λsP
−1
s , fs2 (Ps, 1;Ps) =
−λs




s to see that the first-order conditions reduce to 10 linear
equations with respect to
(
Ξ1t,Ξ2t,Ξ3t,ΞM6t ,ΞX6t,ΞXX6t ,ΞM7t ,ΞX7t,ΞXX7t ,Ξ8t
)
. Thus, generically,
we can solve the system given C, {Ls},Q, W , P us , and F us . The values for C, {Ls},Q, W ,
P us , F us are the solutions to the constraints with zero inflation. Thus we have shown that











































































and the assumption that P ∗ = 1, we have

















































Let us first show the following relationships since these appear a few times.

ΛD¯0 (1− β) ξs (1− θ∗s) = −χ−1s ν−1s θ∗sφsx φlsαslL1+φ
C1−σ = ∑s∈S χ−1s φsc φlsαslL1+φ
ΛD¯0 (1− β)µs = αsm φlsαslL1+φ
MwM
−1




































C1−σ = φ′ldiagχ−1diagα−1l φcL1+φ,
where I again used the relationship derived from the resource constraint. Finally,ΛD¯0 (1− β)µs
can be calculated as follows.





























A.2.5 Second-order approximated welfare function
Exact relationships In the following, I will use the following equilibrium relationships.































pst = ct − cst = ∑s′∈S ψs′cs′t − cst (a)
wt = φlt + σct = φlt + σ
∑
s′∈S ψs′cs′t (b)
qt = σ (ct − c∗t ) = σ (
∑
s′∈S ψs′cs′t − c∗t ) (c)
mst = wt − qt − q∗st + lst = φlt + lst + σc∗t − q∗st (d)
yst = cst, yXst = −θ∗s
(
pXst − qt − p∗st
)













s∈S , ct, wt, qt can be written as linear functions of

















































1 + φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Ut
+ ΛD0,
denote the steady-state value of the welfare by
W¯ = 11− βU + ΛD¯0.
Subtracting this from welfare can still serve as our welfare criterion.
W − W¯ = E0
∞∑
t=0












1+φ around the steady state
(C,L) is








































Plugging this into the above,







































Similarly to the standard closed economy NK models, we can use the approximated re-
source constraint to derive the relationship between lt and ct. First, take the second-order


















⇒zst + lst − αsm (qt + q∗st − wt) +
1













































zst + lst − αsm
















+ 12 {zst + lst − αsm (−σc
∗
t + q∗st − φlt)}2
=φsc
(


















































− zst − 12 {zst + lst − αsm (−σc
∗
t + q∗st − φlt)}2
In matrix,
[I + φd (αm) 1S×1φ′l]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Ml
lt
=d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt + d (αm) (−1S×1σc∗t + q∗t )− zt
− 12αmφl
′
t (d (φl)− φlφ′l) lt +
1




2∆Xt + d (xt)xt
)
− 12d (d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt) (d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt)
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Thus, up to first order,
lt = M−1l {d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt + d (αm) (−1S×1σc∗t + q∗t )− zt} .
Furthermore, noticing that ∑∞t=0 βtE0∆ust = ∑∞t=0 βtE0 θs2κs (pius,t)2 ,where κs = (1−λs)(1−βλs)λs













SRt = M−1l [d (φc) d (ct) ct + d (φx) d (xt)xt −αmφl′t (d (φl)− φlφ′l) lt]
−M−1l [d (d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt) (d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt)]
+M−1l
[
d (θ) d (κ)−1
{






By approximating the lifetime international budget condition, we can approximate the
initial debt D0−D¯0
D¯0





















1− β : = x
′
td (θ∗ − 1) d (θ∗)−1 d (ξ) d (θ∗ − 1) d (θ∗)−1 xt
+ 2
(
−σcˆ∗t1S×1 + d (θ∗)−1 x∗t + p∗t
)′
d (ξ) d (θ∗ − 1) d (θ∗)−1 xt




1− β − φµ
′1S×1l′t (d (φl)− φlφ′l) lt
= x′td (θ∗ − 1) d (θ∗)−1 d (ξ) d (θ∗ − 1) d (θ∗)−1 xt
+ 2
(
−σcˆ∗t1S×1 + d (θ∗)−1 x∗t + p∗t
)′
d (ξ) d (θ∗ − 1) d (θ∗)−1 xt
− l′t (M ′md (µ)Mm + φµ′1S×1 (d (φl)− φlφ′l)) lt
Mm = φ1S×1φ′l + I
Plugging the expressions for Ut − U , ∑∞t=0 βtE0 [lˆt], and D0−D¯0D¯0 obtained above into the
equation for W − W¯ , we obtain the following welfare criterion


















































































SWt + ΛD¯0SDt −MwSRt
]
+ t.i.p.
Finally, I show that fc (χ, ν) and fx (χ, ν) can be simplified as
fc (χ, ν) = φ′ld (αl)
−1 d (φc)
(
d (χ)−1 − I
)
fx (χ, ν) = φ′ld (αl)
−1 d (φx)
(
d (χ)−1 d (ν)−1 − I
)
.





L1+φφ′l + ΛD¯0 (1− β)µ′ [I + φ1S×1φ′l]
)





Using the properties derived in Appendix A.2.4, the desired relationships hold as follows;


















d (χ)−1 − I
)
fx (χ, ν) =
1
L1+φ












A.2.6 Natural rate under the efficient steady state
When the steady state is efficient, χM = χX = χT = 1, and all the f are zeros. Thus,
recalling MwM−1l = L1+φφ′ldiag (αl)





















(1− σ)φ′ld (χ)−1 d (αl)−1φcc′tψψ′ct − φ′ld (αl)−1 d (φc) d (ct) ct
− φ′ld (αl)−1 d (φx) d (xt)xt + x′td (θ∗ − 1) d (θ∗)−1 d (φl) d (χ)−1 d (ν)−1 d (αl)−1 d (φx)xt
+ φ′ld (αl)
−1 d (d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt) (d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt)
− l′t (d (φl) + φφlφ′l) lt + φ′ld (αl)−1αmφl′t (d (φl)− φlφ′l) lt
− l′t
(
M ′md (φl) d (αm) d (αl)
−1Mm + φ11×Sd (φl) d (αm) d (αl)





−σcˆ∗t1S×1 + d (θ∗)−1 x∗t + p∗t
)′
d (φl) d (χ)
−1 d (ν)−1 d (αl)−1 d (φx)xt
− φ′ld (αl)−1
[
d (θ) d (κ)−1
{








lt = M−1l {d (φc) ct + d (φx)xt + d (αm) (−1S×1σc∗t + q∗t )− zt} .
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− c′td (φx) d (φl) d (αl)−1 d (φc) ct
− x′t
(
d (θ∗)−1 − d (φx)
)
d (φl) d (αl)
−1 d (φx)xt
+ 2c′td (φc) d (φl) d (αl)
−1 d (φx)xt
− l′tM ′ld (αl)−1 (d (φl) + φφlφ′l) lt
+ 2
(
−σcˆ∗t1S×1 + d (θ∗)−1 x∗t + p∗t
)′




d (θ) d (κ)−1
{



























d (φx) d (φl) d (αl)
−1 + d (φc) d (αl)





d (θ∗)−1 − d (φx)
)
d (φl) d (αl)
−1 + d (φx) d (αl)





d (φl) d (αl)
−1 − d (αl)−1 (d (φl) + φφlφ′l)M−1l
}
d (φx)xt
− 2 {d (αm) (−1S×1σc∗t + q∗t )− zt}′ d (αl)−1 (d (φl) + φφlφ′l)M−1l d (φc) ct
− 2
[[




−σcˆ∗t1S×1 + d (θ∗)−1 x∗t + p∗t
)′






d (θ) d (κ)−1
{






































Γc2 = (1− σ)φ′ld (αl)−1φcψψ′
−
{
d (φx) d (φl) d (αl)
−1 + d (φc) d (αl)
−1 (d (φl) + φφlφ′l)M−1l
}
d (φc)
Γcx = −φd (φc)φlφ′lM−1l d (φx)
Γx2 = −
{(
d (θ∗)−1 − d (φx)
)




d (φx) d (αl)




To obtain the expression for Γξv, note
d (αm) (−1S×1σc∗t + q∗t )− zt =
[
−σαm OS×S OS×S d (αm) −I
]
ξt
−σcˆ∗t1S×1 + d (θ∗)−1 x∗t + p∗t =
[












σαm OS×S OS×S −d (αm) I
′ d (αl)−1 (d (φl) + φφlφ′l)M−1l d (φc)
Γξx =

σαm OS×S OS×S −d (αm) I
′ d (αl)−1 (d (φl) + φφlφ′l)M−1l d (φx)
+
 −σ1S×1 d (θ∗)−1 I OS×S OS×S
′ d (φl) d (αl)−1 d (φx)
Now, calculate the flexible price equilibrium to simplify the above expression. The flexible
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wFt = φφ′llFt + σψ′cFt
lFt = M−1l
{
d (φc) cFt + d (φx)xFt + d (αm) (−1S×1σc∗t + q∗t )− zt
}
pFt = 1S×1ψ′cFt − cFt










First, the pricing equation gives
pFt = pXFt














d (φc) cFt + d (φx)xFt + d (αm) (−1S×1σc∗t + q∗t )− zt
}
= M−1l {d (φc)− d (φx) d (θ∗) ((1− σ) 1S×1ψ′ − I)} cFt






















= 1S×1ψ′cFt − cFt
d (αm) 1S×1σψ′cFt +αlσψ′cFt − (1S×1ψ′ − I) cFt
= αmσcˆ∗t − d (αm) qˆ∗t −αlφφ′llFt + zˆt
d (αm) 1S×1σψ′cFt +αlσψ′cFt − (1S×1ψ′ − I) cFt
+αlφφ′lM−1l {d (φc)− d (φx) d (θ∗) ((1− σ) 1S×1ψ′ − I)} cFt
=αmσcˆ∗t − d (αm) qˆ∗t + zˆt −αlφφ′lM−1l
× [− (d (φx)θ∗ +αm)σc∗t + d (φx)x∗t + d (φx) d (θ∗)p∗t + d (αm) q∗t − zt]
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l {d (φc)− d (φx) d (θ∗) ((1− σ) 1S×1ψ′ − I)}
]
cFt
=αmσcˆ∗t − d (αm) qˆ∗t + zˆt −αlφφ′lM−1l
× [− (d (φx)θ∗ +αm)σc∗t + d (φx)x∗t + d (φx) d (θ∗)p∗t + d (αm) q∗t − zt]
That is,
[





αm +αlφφ′lM−1l (d (φx)θ∗ +αm)
]
σc∗t −αlφφ′lM−1l d (φx)x∗t









cFt = M−1cc Mcξξt
Mcc =
[










αm +αlφφ′lM−1l (d (φx)θ∗ +αm)
]
σ
Mcx∗ = −αlφφ′lM−1l d (φx)











xFt = −d (θ∗) ((1− σ) 1S×1ψ′ − I)M−1cc Mcξξt +
[





−d (θ∗) ((1− σ) 1S×1ψ′ − I)M−1cc Mcξ +
[
−θ∗σ I d (θ∗) OS×S OS×S
]}
ξt









−d (θ∗) ((1− σ) 1S×1ψ′ − I)M−1cc Mcξ +
[







Fc = M−1cc Mcξ, Fx =
{
−d (θ∗) ((1− σ) 1S×1ψ′ − I)M−1cc Mcξ +
[
−θ∗σ I d (θ∗) OS×S OS×S
]}
,
F = [F ′c, F ′x]
′
.
The following shows that the second-order approximated welfare can be expressed in the
quadratic form of the gap from the flexible price equilibrium. That is,

Γc2Fc + ΓcxFx + Γ′ξc = 0 (a)′
Γ′cxFc + Γx2Fx + Γ′ξx = 0 (b)′
.
This set of equations is sufficient to see that when we express the real terms 12v
′
tΓv2vt+ξ′tΓξvvt














′ Γv2 (vt −Nξt) = 12v
′
tΓv2vt − ξ′tN ′Γv2vt + t.i.p.
Part (a)’
Γc2Fc + ΓcxFx
=− d (φc) d (φl) d (αl)−1
[
Mcc∗ Mcx∗ Mcp∗ Mcq∗ Mcz
]
− φd (φc)φlφ′lM−1l d (φx)
[
−θ∗σ I d (θ∗) OS×S OS×S
]
The second to S + 1th columns of part (a)’ is
− d (φc) d (φl) d (αl)−1Mcx∗ − φd (φc)φlφ′lM−1l d (φx)





l d (φx)− φd (φc)φlφ′lM−1l d (φx)
=d (φc) d (φl) d (αl)
−1 (αlφ− φαl)φ′lM−1l d (φx)
=0
The S + 2 to 2S + 1 columns of part (a)’ are
− d (φc) d (φl) d (αl)−1Mcp∗ − φd (φc)φlφ′lM−1l d (φx) d (θ∗)
=d (φc) d (φl) d (αl)
−1 (αlφ− φαl)φ′lM−1l d (φx) d (θ∗)
=0
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The 2S + 2 to 3S + 1 columns of part (a)’ are





(d (φl) + φφlφ′l)
′
d (αl)−1 d (αm)
= d (φc)











It suffices to show that d (φl) d (αl)
−1 (I + φ1S×1φ′l)M−1l is symmetric, but it is indeed
symmetric.
The last S columns of part (a)’ are
− d (φc) d (φl) d (αl)−1Mcz +
(
d (αl)−1 (d (φl) + φφlφ′l)M−1l d (φc)
)′








d (φl) d (αl)
−1
=− d (φc)
d (φl) d (αl)




d (φl) d (αl)







=− d (φl) d (αl)−1 d (φx)Mcξ
−
{
d (θ∗)−1 d (φl) d (αl)




−θ∗σ I d (θ∗) OS×S OS×S
]
The first column of part (b)’ is
− d (φl) d (αl)−1 d (φx)
[





d (θ∗)−1 d (φl) d (αl)







(d (φl) + φφlφ′l) d (αl)
−1 σαm − d (φx) d (αl)−1 d (φl) 1S×1σ
=− d (φx)











− d (φx) d (φl) {1S×1φ− φ1S×1}φ′lM−1l d (φx)θ∗σ
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The 2nd to S + 1’th columns of part (b)’ are
d (φl) d (αl)
−1 d (φx)αlφφ′lM−1l d (φx)
−
{
d (θ∗)−1 d (φl) d (αl)
−1 + d (φx) d (φl)φ1S×1φ′lM−1l
}
d (φx)
+ d (φx) d (αl)
−1 d (φl) d (θ∗)
−1
=d (φx) d (φl) 1S×1φφ′lM−1l d (φx)
− d (φx) d (φl)φ1S×1φ′lM−1l d (φx)
=0
The S + 2th to 2S + 1th columns of part (b)’ are
d (φl) d (αl)
−1 d (φx)αlφφ′lM−1l d (φx) d (θ∗)
−
{
d (θ∗)−1 d (φl) d (αl)
−1 + d (φx) d (φl)φ1S×1φ′lM−1l
}
d (φx) d (θ∗)
+ d (φx) d (αl)
−1 d (φl)
=d (φl) d (φx)φ1S×1φ′lM−1l d (φx) d (θ∗)
− d (φx) d (φl)φ1S×1φ′lM−1l d (φx) d (θ∗)
=0
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The 2S + 2’th to 3S + 1’th columns of part (b)’ are










(d (φl) + φφlφ′l) d (αl)
−1 d (αm)
=d (φx)











The last S columns of part (b)’ are








(d (φl) + φφlφ′l) d (αl)
−1
=− d (φx)












A.2.7 Proof of Lemma 1.2
From Appendix A.2.6, we can see that, under the efficient steady state, the objective function





























. It remains to show the form of the constraints.
All the constraints in Definition 1.1 except for pricing equations (1.13)-(1.18), (1.21),
and (1.22) are already used to substitute out auxiliary endogenous variables. The linear
approximations of these pricing equations reduce to the Phillips curve for each sector.







= αsm (qt + q∗st) + αslwt − zst − pXst
pis,t = pit + pst − pst−1
piXs,t = pit + pXst − pXst−1
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In matrix,







= d (αm) (1S×1qt + q∗t ) +αlwt − zt − pXt
pit = 1S×1pit + pt − pt−1
piXt = 1S×1pit + pXt − pXt−1.










+αlwFt − zt − pXFt = 0,
the Phillips curves can be rewritten as







= d (αm) 1S×1q˜t +αlw˜t − p˜Xt . (A.3)
Since the linear approximation of other equilibrium conditions that map qt, wt,pt,pXt into
ct,xt hold both in the sticky price equilibrium and in the flexible price equilibrium, the gap
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on the right hand side is linear in c˜t and x˜t

q˜t = σψ′c˜t
w˜t = φφ′ll˜t + σψ′c˜t
l˜t = M−1l {d (φc) c˜t + d (φx) x˜t}
p˜t = 1S×1ψ′c˜t − c˜t
p˜Xt = −d (θ∗)−1 x˜t + 1S×1σψ′c˜t
.
Plugging these into the Phillips curve (A.2) and (A.3), we can find γPv and γPXv in the
following expressions.








For the identity, we can rewrite
pit = 1S×1pit + p˜t − p˜t−1 + pFt − pFt−1
piXt = 1S×1pit + p˜Xt − p˜Xt−1 + pXFt − pXFt−1.
The gaps p˜t and p˜Xt can be similarly rewritten in terms of c˜t and x˜t. This gives the expressions
for γIv and γIvX . Regarding the flexible price equilibrium objects, pFt and pXFt , substitute the
solutions as functions of exogenous variables. This gives the expressions for It and IXt .
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A.2.8 Solution in the long-run expectation
This section derives the RPI as the index whose long-run expectation remains constant under
the optimal monetary policy. The argument parallels that in Woodford (2010). To this end,

































Γpid (θ) d (κ)−1 d (ψ) d (φx) d (φc)piXt + d (κ)
−1 (ϕXt −ϕXt−1)+ψXt = 0
[pit] 11×Sψt + 11×SψXt = 0
(A.4)
where ϕt,ϕXt ,ψt,ψXt are S dimensional Lagrange multipliers for the Phillips curves and the
identity.
I first focus on the long-run expectation. Assuming the existence of long-run expectations
of v˜t = vt − Nξt denoted by v˜∞t := limT→∞Etv˜T , Lagrange multipliers also have long-run

























Γpid (θ) d (κ)−1 d (ψ) d (φx) d (φc)piX∞t +ψX∞t = 0
[pit] 11×Sψt + 11×SψXt = 0
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Combining this with the conditions implied by the constraints in Lemma 1.2,

(1− β) d (κ)−1 pi∞t = γPv v˜∞t




the long-run expectation of the Lagrange multipliers for the Phillips curves ϕ∞t , ϕX∞t can be
shown to be zeros.
Specifically, from the last three equations of the first-order conditions and the third and
fourth equations of the constraints, we have pi∞s,t = piX∞s,t = pi∞t = ψ∞st = ψX∞st = 0 ∀s ∈ S.

























































Next, by summing the first-order conditions (A.4) with respect to sectoral inflation rates
pit,pi
X


























































+ κ−1s ϕst + κ−1s ϕXst
]
= const.
This also holds in long-run expectation.


















where logP is a constant.
A.3 Appendix to Section 1.4
A.3.1 Detailed welfare evaluation procedure
For each country-specific calibration of these parameters, we can solve for the equilibrium
characterized by the Phillips curves, identities relating inflation rates and relative prices, and
the normalization of CPI and monetary policy.

λs








= αsm (qt + q∗st) + αslwt − zst − pXst ∀s
pis,t = pit + pst − pst−1 ∀s
piXs,t = pit + pXst − pXst−1 ∀s
Monetary Policy
.
The normalization equation comes from all nominal variables being expressed relative to
CPI.
To consider the optimal policy, denote yt =
[
c1t, ..., cSt, x1t, ..., xSt, pi1t, ..., piSt, pi
X




, ξt = [c∗t , x∗1t, ..., x∗St, p∗1t, ..., p∗St, q∗1t, ..., q∗St, z1t..., , zSt]






















+ αsm (qt + q∗st) + αslwt − zst − pXst
)
s∈S
 = γPy yt+γPypEtyt+1+γPx ξt
 −pis,t + pit + pst − pst−1
−piXs,t + pit + pXst − pXst−1








γPy yt + γPypEtyt+1 + γPx ξt = 0 ϕPt
γIyyt + γIymyt−1 = 0 ϕIt
The first-order condition is
2Γy2yt + Γ′ξyξt + γP ′y ϕPt + γI′y ϕIt + γP ′ypϕPt−1 + γI′ymEtϕIt+1 = 0.
Thus, assuming an exogenous process ξt+1 = ρξt + ut, I solve the dynamics

γPy yt + γPypEtyt+1 + γPx ξt = 0
γIyyt + γIymyt−1 = 0
Etξt+1 − ρξt = 0
2Γy2yt + Γ′ξyξt + γP ′y ϕPt + γI′y ϕIt + γP ′ypϕPt−1 + γI′ymEtϕIt+1 = 0
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and evaluate welfare at the solution.























′ . Then, the solution takes the form
y˜t = Gxxt
xt+1 = Hxxt + u˜t.



























Alternative policies can be solved for by replacing the first-order condition with the monetary
policy rule considered.
I also track the Lagrange multipliers ϕPt , ϕIt defined as in the optimal dynamics as auxil-
iary variables that do not affect the system (that is, defined by the state variable xt and do
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not appear in any of the other equations). To do so, I solve

γPy yt + γPypEtyt+1 + γPx ξt = 0
γIyyt + γIymyt−1 = 0
Etξt+1 − ρξt = 0
pit = 0 or
∑
s∈S Is∈Coreψspist = 0
−ϕPt +Hϕxt = 0
.
In this way, the solution takes the same form
y˜t = Gxxt
xt+1 = Hxxt + u˜t.
Note that the difference in the policy is reflected in the coefficients Gx and Hx.
A.3.1.2 Calculation of welfare





















xt+1 = Hxxt + u˜t
can be calculated as follows by assuming Eu˜tu˜′t = Σu,Eu˜tu˜′s = 0 ∀t 6= s. Define














= tr [(G′xΓ2yGx + 2ΓyxGx)V ] .
The choice of Σx depends on the type of policy experiment.
I consider two types of policy experiment. The first type is that in which the economy
starts form the stationary distribution obtained under headline inflation targeting as an
approximation of the current policy. Then, this experiment compares switching from the
current headline inflation targeting to different policies. To obtain the variance-covariance
matrix, I use Hx obtained under the headline targeting policy HHeadx . By solving
xt+1 = HHeadx xt + ut+1,
we obtain





The second type of policy experiment compares different worlds each of which starts from
the steady state under the policy considered and continues the policy. In this case, Σx is the
solution to
Σx = HxΣx (Hx)′ + Σu
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where Hx is the solution to the equilibrium system under each policy.
A.3.1.3 Conversion to units of consumption
To interpret the welfare loss in units of consumption, the following procedure calculates
the consumption equivalent of the welfare loss relative to the optimal policy. Compare the






























Consider discounting COt by a fraction γS to make them equal.
















Using the approximation, Ut ≈ U + C1−σ
(























































Table A.1: Concordance between WIOT, NS2008, and BW2006
WIOT description ISIC NS2008
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 01, 02, 05 Farm products
2 Mining and Quarrying 10-14 (Note 1)
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15,16 Processed foods and feeds
4 Textiles and Textile Products 17,18 Textile products and apparel
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 Hides, skins, leather, and related products
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 Lumber and wood products
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 21,22 Pulp, paper, and allied products
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 Fuels and related products and power
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 Chemicals and allied products
10 Rubber and Plastics 25 Rubber and plastic products
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 Nonmetallic mineral products
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27,28 Metals and metal products
13 Machinery, Nec 29 Machinery and equipment
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30-33 Machinery and equipment
15 Transport Equipment 34,35 Transportation equipment
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36,37 Miscellaneous products
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 40,41 Fuels and related products and power
18 Construction 45 Services (excl. travel)
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 50 (Note 2)
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 51 Services (excl. travel)
21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 52 Services (excl. travel)
22 Hotels and Restaurants 55 Services (excl. travel)
23 Inland Transport 60 Travel
24 Water Transport 61 Travel
25 Air Transport 62 Travel
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 63 Travel
27 Post and Telecommunications 64 Services (excl. travel)
28 Financial Intermediation 65-67 Services (excl. travel)
29 Real Estate Activities 70 Services (excl. travel)
30 Renting of M and Eq and Other Business Activities 71-74 Services (excl. travel)
31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 75 Services (excl. travel)
32 Education 80 Services (excl. travel)
33 Health and Social Work 85 Services (excl. travel)
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 90-93 Services (excl. travel)
35 Private Households with Employed Persons 95 Services (excl. travel)
















A.3.2 Concordance of sectors across the World Input-Output Ta-
ble, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Broda and Wein-
stein (2006)
Table A.1 is the concordance table created by the author.
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A.3.3 Input-output adjustment
By aggregating the input-output table, I can obtain the following matrix.

P1Y11 · · · P1Y1S P1C1 PX1 X1
... . . . ... ... ...
PSYS1 · · · PSYSS PSCS PXS XS
EQ∗1M1 · · · EQ∗SMS n.a. n.a.

















· · · P1Y1S
TotcS
... . . . ...
PSYS1
Totc1
· · · PSYSS
TotcS


























































































· · · P1Y1S
P1Y1
... . . . ...
PSYS1
PSYS
· · · PSYSS
PSYS






























































Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Results using e-commerce intensity using Rakuten
B.1.1 E-commerce and National Prices
Table B.1: Relative Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict
Dt -0.0014** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0047*** 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Internet Intensity 0.0047 -0.0156*** -0.0155*** -0.0211*** -0.0421*** -0.0421*** -0.0279***
×Dt (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0040)
Constant -0.0040*** -0.0121*** -0.0097** -0.0041*** -0.0166*** -0.0164*** -0.0138***
(0.0004) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0004) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0028)
Sample Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods and Service
Fixed Effects Product Product and City Product Product and City Product and City
t 1992-2001 1992-2001 1992-2001 1992-2016 1992-2016 1992-2016 1992-2016
Observations 152,958 152,958 152,958 394,663 394,663 394,663 459,279
R2 0.000 0.040 0.040 0.001 0.038 0.038 0.038
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B.1.2 Gains Due to Price Arbitrage
Table B.2: Estimates Over Alternative Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict
Lagged Price -0.399*** -0.466*** -0.391*** -0.401*** -0.169***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Internet Intensity 0.562*** 0.816*** 0.359*** 0.416*** 0.189***
× Lagged Price (0.073) (0.078) (0.072) (0.073) (0.025)
Internet Intensity -0.950*** -1.863*** -1.142*** -1.011*** -0.348***
× Lagged Price × Post Rakuten (0.091) (0.091) (0.085) (0.078) (0.026)
t {1996,2006} {1996,2011} {1996,2016} {1996,2001, Annual
2006,2016} 1992-2016
k 5 5 5 5 1
Observations 52,017 43,388 42,683 87,818 394,663
R2 0.55 0.60 0.64 0.61 0.46
Table B.3: Robustness Check Using All Goods and Services
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ∆pict ∆pict ∆pict
Lagged Price -0.297*** -0.353*** -0.141***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Internet Intensity -0.052 0.145** 0.025
× Lagged Price (0.065) (0.070) (0.024)
Internet Intensity -1.061*** -1.013*** -0.329***
× Lagged Price × Post Rakuten (0.083) (0.076) (0.025)
t {1996,2001} {1996,2001 Annual
,2006,2016} 1992-2016
Observations 59,466 102,102 459,279
R2 0.52 0.60 0.45
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof of the theorem is by comparison of coefficients. At the end, the system of coeffi-
cients boils down to a cubic polynomial of β. The second order condition for the dealer then
selects the unique negative root. All other coefficients are uniquely determined once β is
obtained. Since a cubic polynomial equation has a closed form solution, all the equilibrium
coefficients can be written in closed forms.With additional calculations, we can also derive
welfare of agents in closed forms. We first prove existence and uniqueness. BCβIγIβUβγ 6= 0
is assumed until it is proven at the end.
Existence and uniqueness
Proof is by guessing and verifying p (z, s) = A+B (z + Cs).
Traders’ problem
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(Eid− p)x− θ2 (Vid)x
2 = Eid− p
θVid
.
By the joint normality of X and p (z, s) = A + B (z + Cs), the moments of return d condi-
tional on the traders’ information are
EId = E [d|z] = κdd¯+ κz
κd + κ
VId = V [d|z] = 1
κd + κ
EUd = E [d|z + Cs] = d¯+ κ
−1
d






VUd = κ−1d −
κ−2d
κ−1d + κ−1 + C2κ−1s
.










The uninformed agent’s best response is xBU (p) = αU + βUp where
αU =












κ−1d + κ−1 + C2κ−1s
)
θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )
. (C.2)
The total demand is xB (z, p) = α + βp+ γz where
α = λαI + (1− λ)αU , β = λβI + (1− λ) βU , γ = λγI . (C.3)
196
Dealer’s problem









(s− α− βp− γz)E [d|z] + p (α + βp+ γz)− θD2 (s− α− βp− γz)
2 V [d|z] .
The first order condition with respect to p gives p (z, s) = A+B (z + Cs) where
[A] : A =




θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ)
[B] : B = γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ) (C.4)
[C] : C = θDβ
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ) .
The second order condition is
β
(







θ, θD, d¯, s¯, κd, κs, κ, λ
)
is exogenous. Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium is
equivalent to those of the eleven parameters (αI , βI , γI , αU , βU , α, β, γ, A,B,C) that satisfy
(C.1), (C.2), (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5).
We can reduce this problem to finding a root of the equation that only contains β. To
see this, note that (αI , βI , γI) and therefore γ are already functions of exogenous parameters.
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By substituting (C.2) into (C.3), the problem reduces to finding (α, β,A,B,C) satisfying
[α] : α = λαI + (1− λ)






θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )





κ−1d + κ−1 + C2κ−1s
)
θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )
[A] : A =




θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ)
[B] : B = γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ)
[C] : C = θDβ
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
[SOC] : β
(




By substituting [B] and [C] into [β], we can obtain an equation that contains only β. Once β
that satisfies both this equation and [SOC] is obtained, (C,B) can be uniquely determined
by [C] and [B]. (α,A) is then the unique solution of a system of linear equations, [α] and
[A].
Now we show such β exists uniquely. By substituting [B] and [C] into [β],
b (β) := b0 + b1β + b2β2 + b3β3 = 0, (C.6)
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where coefficients (b0, b1, b2, b3) are

b0 = γ2κs (κd + κ)3
b1 = −κ2κsλ2θ (κd + κ)2
(
1 + 2 θD
θ
)
b2 = κs (κd + κ)
{
(γθD + κ)2 − 2 (θγ + (1− λ)κ) (γθD + κ)− (1− λ)κγθD
}
+κλθ2D (κd + κ) + κdκθ2D (1− λ)
b3 = κsγθθD (γθD + 2κ) + κκsγθ2D (1− λ) + κsκ2 {(1− λ) θD + θ}+ κθθ2D
.
b0 = b (0) > 0 and b3 > 0 implies that there is a β < 0 that satisfies b (β) = 0. Since
β < 0 satisfies [SOC], we obtain existence. For the uniqueness of β, it suffices to show










































We next show βI < β < βU < 0 < γ < γI , C < 0 < B and BCβIγIβUβγ 6= 0.
0 < γ = λγI < γI follows by (C.1) and (C.3). We know β < 0 by the above argument.
C < 0 < B follows from [C] and [B]. βI < β < βU < 0 comes from the fact that β is a
convex combination of (βI , βU) and
b (λβI) =




b (βI) =− 1− λ
θ3




 (2θ + θD) + κθθ2D
+κdκsκ (2θ + θD) + γ (κd + κ)κs (2θ + θD) (θ + θD)} < 0.
Finally, we show BCβIγIβUβγ 6= 0. γβIγI 6= 0 follows from the closed form solutions
(C.1) and (C.3). BCβ 6= 0 is proven by contradiction next. βU 6= 0 follows from β 6= 0.
To show β 6= 0, suppose β = 0. Then, the dealer’s objective is
max
p
(s− α− γz)E [d|z] + p (α + γz)− θD2 (s− α− γz)
2 V [d|z] .
For equilibrium price to exist for all z ∈ R, α = γ = 0, a contradiction to γ > 0.
To show B 6= 0, suppose B = 0. Then, the price function tells nothing about the signal
z. Then the aggregate demand becomes
xB (z, p) = κd
θ











⇒ 0 = γ (κd + κ) + κd + λκ
θ
(θDγ + κ) > 0,
a contradiction.
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To see C 6= 0, suppose C = 0. Since B 6= 0, the price function fully reveals z.

xBI (z, p) = κdθ d¯− κd+κθ p+ κθ z









− (κd + κ)
}
p
⇒xB (z, p) = 1
θ
{













Given xB (z, p) = α + βp + γz, β 6= 0, and B 6= 0, three possibilities have to be considered.
If [SOC] is met, the optimal pricing is given by (C.4). Hence,
θDβ
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ) = 0⇒ β = 0,











0, β = 2κd+κ
θD
. The dealer’s objective function becomes
arg max
p




{α + γz + 2 (κd + κ) (s− α− γz − E [d|z])} p.
There is no way for the coefficient of p to be 0 identically for all s and z, implying there is
no optimal price in this case.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1


































































































s− xB (z, p)
)2
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Combining these results, the objective function related to p is
(
s− xB (z, p)
)









s− xB (z, p)
)2
.










C.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Note that the explicit form of x (z, s) = xB (z, p (z, s)) is
x (z, s) = α + βA+ (βB + γ) z + βBCs.
For the first result limθD→∞ x (z, s) = s, recall the system of characterizing Eq. [A], [B],
and [C]. By taking θD →∞,
[A] : A = −α
β
, [B] : B = −γ
β
, [C] : C = −1
γ
.
In other words, βBC = 1, βB + γ = 0, and α + βA = 0. Hence, as θD →∞, x (z, s)→ s.
For the second result limθD→0 x (z, s) = 0, note that from [C] and βI < β < 0, C → 0 as
θD → 0. By substituting C = 0 into {[α] , [β] , [A] , [B]},
[α] : α = κdd¯
θ





[β] : β = −κd + κ
θ




[A] : A = − α2β +
κdd¯
2 (κd + κ)
[B] : B = − γ2β +
κ





, β = −λκd + κ
θ
, α = λκdd¯
θ
, A = κdd¯
κd + κ
solve the system and α + βA = βB + γ = βBC = 0. Hence, x (z, s)→ 0 as θD → 0.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 3.2
We prove each of the four claims in order.
Price informativeness
By theorem 3.1 and [C], C is negative and satisfies
1
C
= γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
θDβ
= γ (κd + κ)
θDβ
− γ − κ
θD
.
To show Q decreases, it suffices to show β < 0 is decreasing in θD. The range of Q comes







We show β is decreasing by the implicit function theorem. Denote b (β) in Eq. (C.6) by
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b (β, θD). The goal is to show
∂β
∂θD
= −∂b (β, θD) /∂θD
∂b (β, θD) /∂β
< 0.
Since b (β) crosses horizontal line from below at the equilibrium β < 0, ∂b(β,θD)
∂β
evaluated at
the equilibrium β < 0 is always strictly positive. Hence, by the implicit function theorem,
it suffices to check ∂b
∂θD
evaluated at the equilibrium β < 0 is positive. By using β3 =
− 1
b3




























































κsκ (κd + κ)
{




(1 + λ) θ2 + λθθD
}
+ κdθ2θ2D {1 + λ (2− λ)}+ 4κdθ3θD
]
> 0,





2θD (κd + κ)2 (1− λ) {2θ + (1 + λ) θD}
θΨ > 0.
These results imply that the quadratic function ∂b(β)
∂θD
is decreasing and positive on [βI , λβI ].






V (p (z, s))− lim
θD→0






















2 (2λ− 1) (κd + κ)κ2s + θ4κ {(2κ + κd)λ2 + κd (2λ− 1)}κs + θ6 (κd + κ)
κs (κd + κ) {κsκλ2 (κd + κ) + (κd + λκ) θ2}2
.
Note that the denominators of the last expression is positive. From the second equality, if
2λ − 1 ≥ 0, there is no restriction on κs. If 2λ − 1 < 0, the numerator of the ratio after
the last equality is a concave quadratic function of κs with a positive intercept. Hence, by
taking small enough κs, the numerator is positive.
Welfare of the traders
Fix a positive θD = θ¯D > 0 and its associated equilibrium price p (z, s). Note that the traders
can always choose demand functions to be identically 0 by selecting αI = βI = γI = αU =
βU = 0. Hence, the equilibrium interim utilities satisfy
E
[
















The right sides of the inequalities are the ex-ante welfare when θD → 0 by proposition 3.2.
By taking expectation on both sides and using the tower property, the proof completes.
Welfare of the dealer
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When Y is an n× 1 vector distributed N (µ,Σ) and A is an n× n matrix,
EY ′AY = Etr (Y ′AY ) = tr (AEY Y ′) = tr {A (Σ + µµ′)} .
Since the cash flow of the dealer is a quadratic form of uncertainty X, by using this property,
we can calculate the expected cash flow of the dealer in terms of coefficients (α, β, γ, A,B,C).






θ (s¯2κs (κκsλ2 + θ2) + κκsλ+ θ2)
κs (κd + κ) {κsκλ+ θ2 (1 + λ)} > 0.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The proof is by guess and verify, and is composed of three parts: the trader’s problem, the







= A0 + AxxDt−1 +B (zt + C ′st) .
Note that xDt−1 is the endogenous state.
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Traders’ problem
Guess the form of value function of the informed traders is, for some nonzero constant αI ∈ R
and symmetric matrix QI ,
J
(





























and pt are functions of (zt, st) and qI is a quadratic
form. Note that although informed traders cannot observe sDt , J depends on sDt through pt.











The equilibrium xDt is measurable with respect to F It due to market clearing xIt + xDt = x¯ in


















mIt+1 = dt+1xt +Ryt + sItdIt+1
pit + yt + ptxt = ptxIt−1 +mIt
Since there are three control variables, we solve the problem in three steps. The first step is
to substitute out risk-free bond yt. Note that mIt+1 can be written as
mIt+1 = (dt+1 −Rpt)xt +RptxIt−1 + sItdIt+1 +RmIt −Rct
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where NI is a matrix function of QI and (nI0, nI) are linear functions of other non-random
variables such as xt. Second, given the normality assumption, this term is an increasing
transformation of a quadratic function of xt, so xt can be maximized out
min
xt





2 (nI +NIµI (zt))
′ (Σ−1I −NI)−1 (nI +NIµI (zt))
=− αIR
(
mIt + ptxIt−1 − ct
)
+ q˜It
where (µI ,ΣI) are conditional moments





]′ |zt] , ΣI = V [dt+1, dIt+1, zt+1, st+1|zt]
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and q˜It is a quadratic form of
[
1, pt, xDt , zt, sIt
]
independent of pit. This step also yiels the
asset demand
xIt = qxppt + qxzzt + qxssIt + qx0
where (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0) are functions of (A0, Ax, B, C,QI). The third step is to maximize
over consumption pit the objective function
max
pit
−e−θIpit − β |I − ΣINI |−
1
2 e−αIR(mIt+ptxIt−1−pit)+q˜It

















Substituting pit into the objective function leads to
J
(
xt−1,mIt ; zt, st
)
























This has to be identical to the original guess so that
θIαIR
θI + αIR





















xIt = qxppt + qxzzt + qxssIt + qx0
xIt + xDt = x¯

































|I − ΣINI |−
1







where i11 is 5 × 5 matrix with (1, 1) element being 1 and all other elements being 0. Since
Q˜I is a function of QI , this equation pins down the fixed point.
Dealer’s problem


































Dealers do not observe sIt , but it affects value through the demand schedule





















mDt+1 = dt+1xt +Ryt + sDt dDt+1
pit + yt + ptxt = ptxDt−1 +mDt
xt = x¯− (qxppt + qxz zˆt + qx0)
The steps to solve the problem is similar to those in the traders’ problem, except that the
choice variable contains price. First, by deleting risk-free bond,
mDt+1 = (dt+1 −Rpt)xt +RptxDt−1 + sDt dDt+1 +RmDt −Rpit
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2 (nD +NDµD (zˆt))
′ (Σ−1D −ND)−1 (nD +NDµD (zˆt)) ,
where ND is a matrix function of QD, nD0 is a linear function of (xt, x2t , ptxt), nD is a linear
function of xt,





]′ |zˆt] , ΣD = V [dt+1, dDt+1, zt+1, st+1|zˆt] .
By substituting the demand schedule, the problem reduces to a minimization of a quadratic
function of pt, which is the second step. Hence, the second term of the objective function is
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an increasing function of
min
pt





2 (nD +NDµ (zˆt))






















and the optimal pricing is
pt = qp0 + qpz zˆt + qpssDt + qpxxDt−1




−e−θDpit − β |I − ΣDND|−
1
2 e−αDR(mDt −pit)+q˜Dt .






















































and the coefficients of the pricing decision becomes a function of (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0) and has
to coincide with the initial guess
pt = qp0 + qpz zˆt + qpssDt + qpxxDt−1 = A0 + AxxDt−1 +B (zt + C ′st) .
Fixed point
Given the price coefficients (A0, Ax, B, C), the informed agents’ problem gives a fixed point
equation of QI . (A0, Ax, B, C,QI) determines coefficients of xI , (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0) . Given
(qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0), the dealer’s problem gives a fixed point equation forQD. (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0, QD)
then determines (A0, Ax, B, C). One can solve the fixed point (QI , QD, A0, Ax, B, C, qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0)
numerically by repeating the loop until convergence. Once the fixed point is obtained, the
transition of xDt can be obtained from
pt = A0 + AxxDt−1 +B (zt + C ′st) , xIt = qxppt + qxzzt + qxssIt + qx0, xDt = x¯− xIt .
By substituting xIt and pt out, the transition of xDt is obtained by




− qxpBC ′st− qxssIt .
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One can define





C.6 Proof of Theorem 3.3
C.6.1 Proof of the first claim




, i = I, U.




























































where we apply the following formula in the last step









By the law of total variance and the homoskedasticity of VId,
VU (EId) = VUd− EUVId = VUd− VId⇔ VU (EId) + VId = VUd.
































, VUd = κ−1d −
κ−2d
κ−1d + κ−1 + C2κ−1s
where C is the coefficient of the price p (z, s) = A+ B (z + Cs). Hence, for uI = uU , C has
to be constant over θD, and therefore the price informativeness does not change after the
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= 1⇔ C = −
√√√√κs κ−1d + κ−1(e2θc − 1)−1 κκ−1d − 1 .











C.6.2 Proof of the second claim
We know from Appendix C.1, (β,B,C, λ) is characterized by





κ−1d + κ−1 + C2κ−1s
)
θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )
[B] : B = γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ)
[C] : C = θDβ
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
[λ] : C = −
√√√√κs κ−1d + κ−1(e2θc − 1)−1 κκ−1d − 1
Let C (λ, θD) denote the equilibrium coefficient as the function of λ and θD. We already
know from Theorem 3.2 that, for each λ ∈ (0, 1), C < 0 is a decreasing function of θD. By









λ− β + β2 θD
κd + κ
> 0.
To show this is indeed the case for large enough θD, it suffices to show limθD→∞ ∂β∂λ is bounded
and limθD→∞ |β| > 0. Suppose the limits are exchangeable. When θD → ∞, the system is
characterized by





κ−1d + κ−1 + C2κ−1s
)
θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )
[B] : B = −γ
β
[C] : C = −1
γ
[λ] : C = constant




2 + κdκsκλ2 + κλθ2 + κdθ2
θ3 + κκsλθ
.
For the boundedness of β, one can set λ = 1 in the denominator and λ = 0 in the numerator
to find the strictly negative number that is independent of λ and bounds β from above.




For the boundedness of ∂β
∂λ
, the same argument gives
∣∣∣∣∣∂β∂λ
∣∣∣∣∣ = κθ |(κκ
2
sλ




s + 2κsθ2) (κ + κd) + κdκsθ2 + θ4
θ3
.
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